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ABSTRACT  
   
The act of moving water across basins is a recent phenomenon in Arizona water 
policy. This thesis creates a narrative arc for understanding the long-term issues that set 
precedents for interbasin water transportation and the immediate causes—namely the 
passage of the seminal Groundwater Management Act (GMA) in 1980—that motivated 
Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix to acquire rural farmlands in the mid-1980s with the intent 
of transporting the underlying groundwater back to their respective service areas in the 
immediate future. Residents of rural areas were active participants in not only the sales of 
these farmlands, but also in how municipalities would economically develop these 
properties in the years to come. Their role made these municipal “water farm” purchases 
function as exchanges. Fears about the impact of these properties and the water 
transportation they anticipated on communities-of-origin; the limited nature of economic, 
fiscal, and hydrologic data at the time; and the rise of private water speculators turned 
water farms into a major political controversy. The six years it took the legislature to 
wrestle with the problem at the heart this issue—the value of water to rural 
communities—were among its most tumultuous. The loss of key lawmakers involved in 
GMA negotiations, the impeachment of Governor Evan Mecham, and a bribery scandal 
called AZScam collectively sidetracked negotiations. Even more critical was the absence 
of a mutual recognition that these water farms posed a problem and the external pressure 
that had forced all parties involved in earlier groundwater-related negotiations to craft 
compromise. After cities and speculators failed to force a bill favorable to their interests 
in 1989, a re-alignment among blocs occurred: cities joined with rural interests to craft 
legislation that grandfathered in existing urban water farms and limited future water 
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farms to several basins. In exchange, rural interests supported a bill to create a Phoenix-
area groundwater replenishment district that enabled cooperative management of water 
supplies. These two bills, which were jointly signed into law in June 1991, tentatively 
resolved the water farm issue. The creation of a groundwater replenishment district that 
has subsidized growth in Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima Counties, the creation water bank to 
store unused Central Arizona Project water for times of drought, and a host of water 
conservation measures and water leases enabled by the passage of several tribal water 
rights settlements have set favorable conditions such that Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix 
never had any reason to transport any water from their water farms. The legacy of these 
properties then is that they were the product of the intense urgency and uncertainty in 
urban planning premised on assumptions of growing populations and complementary, 
inelastic demand. But even as per capita water consumption has declined throughout the 
Phoenix-area, continued growth has increased demand, beyond the capacity of available 
supplies so that there will likely be a new push for rural water farms in the foreseeable 
future.     
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
   
Writing a thesis is a challenging task; doing so on a topic that I had only become 
familiar with during my second semester of graduate school is exponentially more 
difficult. But were it not for the assistance of and feedback from others, this thesis would 
remain a confused mess with only a weak narrative to provide some semblance of 
structure. 
  I came to this topic through Dr. Melanie Sturgeon, Director of the Arizona State 
Archives, and I will forever remain indebted to her for offering me the opportunity to 
interview lawmakers who have shaped Arizona’s political history. The three years that I 
worked on this project were profoundly educational, and I continue to reflect on the 
lessons these lawmakers imparted to me. I am equally thankful to my former colleagues 
for their good humor and endless insights which helped me navigate the confusing maze 
of water-related records.  
  Given the uncertain status of municipal water farms when I began my research, I 
am deeply grateful to Doug Kupel of the City of Phoenix Law Department, Yvonne 
McCall of the City of Mesa Real Estate Services Department, Scottsdale Public Records 
Administrator Tess Daley, and Annie DeChance of the City of Scottsdale Water 
Resources Department for their willingness and patience in responding to my sizeable 
public records requests. I likewise owe a debt to Monique Hafler of the Central Arizona 
Project, Julia Huddleston of the J. Willard Marriot Library at the University of Utah, 
Lindsey O’Neill of the Tucson City Clerk’s Office, and the Pinal County Recorder’s 
Office staff for locating older documents that added many colorful details to my story. 
iv 
 
Arizona State Senate Archivist Denise Cortez and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives staff were very helpful in pulling bills, committee minutes, and other 
materials that illuminated the legislative process. Kathi Knox, who worked for thirty 
years as a legislative staffer, was invaluable in helping me contextualize the personalities 
and issues that comprise legislative politics.  
 The most difficult component of my research was conducting oral interviews. 
While I cited a fraction of these interviews, I appreciate everyone who shared their 
recollections of an issue which is at least as old as I am. Your anecdotes helped me tease 
out the emotional weight and relevance from the extensive details of this complex issue.  
 My committee deserves tremendous praise for helping me realize this thesis. Dr. 
Smith, you advised me from the beginning to focus on the basic elements—the who, 
what, where, when, and why—of my thesis. That initially struck me as a self-evident 
proposition, but as I waded deeper into this issue, it became a useful guide for 
determining the scope of my research and writing. Dr. Vandermeer, you always 
emphasized the importance of crafting a well-structured narrative. While it gave me 
many headaches, the ability to understand an argument’s underlying mechanics and their 
intersection with a larger narrative has proven invaluable. I look forward to further 
honing this ability in future endeavors. Dr. Hirt, you have always reminded me that 
writing history is, above all else, the art of storytelling. Your patience in reviewing my 
early drafts and encouragement to find the compelling narrative amidst piles of dry legal 
doctrines, overlapping historical events, and tangential legislative spats made this thesis 
possible. 
v 
 
 Though not a member of my committee, I would be deeply remiss to not 
acknowledge the extensive mentoring I that have received over the years from Dr. David 
William Foster. Beyond encouraging me to attend graduate school, Foster’s indefatigable 
energy and penetrating insight into how we construct gender continually inspires me to 
re-evaluate many assumptions that have underpinned my worldview. I can only hope that 
more students have the opportunity to cross paths with him.      
My ultimate gratitude rests with my parents, Jana, and especially Alicia. Thank 
you all for your patience and understanding as I pulled all-nighters, sequestered myself in 
libraries, randomly drove off to places afar, and mumbled incoherently while typing at 
my laptop for hours at a time. Most people would have sent me to a mental institution; 
instead, you all have been nothing short of loving and supportive as I have worked 
through this project. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................ix 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. x 
CHAPTER 
1     REFLECTIONS .................................................................................................... 1  
Water and Power ............................................................................................. 4 
Effects of Moving Water................................................................................. 9 
Regional Patterns ........................................................................................... 12 
My Narrative ..................................................................................................14   
            2      FOUNDATIONS ............................................................................................... 19 
First Peoples ................................................................................................... 19 
Territorial Capitalism .................................................................................... 23 
Statehood ........................................................................................................ 28 
Politics of Postwar Growth ........................................................................... 33 
Surface Tension ................................................................................. 35 
Grounded Anxieties .......................................................................... 37 
Foundations for Moving Water .................................................................... 53 
3      ACQUISITIONS ............................................................................................... 54 
Institutional Friction ...................................................................................... 54 
Water Farms ................................................................................................... 57 
Planet Ranch ...................................................................................... 60 
Eloy Basin .........................................................................................64   
vii 
 
CHAPTER Page    
McMullen Valley .............................................................................. 67 
A Questionable Controversy .........................................................................73  
La Paz County ................................................................................... 76 
Pinal County ...................................................................................... 80 
Speculators and Profiteers............................................................................. 87 
Closing Thoughts...........................................................................................92  
4      NEGOTIATIONS .............................................................................................. 93 
The Legislature .............................................................................................. 94 
Interests ..........................................................................................................99  
Raising Awareness ......................................................................................105 
Establishing Facts? ......................................................................................109 
Forcing Resolution ......................................................................................116 
Crafting Compromise ..................................................................................125 
Thoughts on Process....................................................................................136 
5      APPREHENSION ...........................................................................................137 
New Institutions ...........................................................................................138 
Monuments ..................................................................................................145 
Future Farms ............................................................................................... 150  
Enduring Personalities ............................................................................... 155  
WORKS CITED ...................................................................................................................157 
PRIMARY SOURCES ............................................................................................157 
SECONDARY SOURCES......................................................................................164 
viii 
 
CHAPTER Page 
COURT CASES .......................................................................................................176 
STATE LEGISLATION..........................................................................................177 
APPENDIX 
     A      ACRONYMS .........................................................................................................179 
     B      FIGURES ................................................................................................................182 
     C      TABLES .................................................................................................................187 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE Page 
1. NUMBER OF PINAL COUNTY ESTABLISHMENTS, 1971-1991 .................188 
2.  PINAL COUNTY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, 1971-1991 ................................189 
3.  PINAL COUNTY FIRST-QUARTER PAYROLL, 1971-1991 .........................190 
4. PINAL COUNTY FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCT MANUFACTURING, 
1971-1991 .................................................................................................................191 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE Page 
1. MUNICIPAL POPULATION GROWTH, 1930-1990 .........................................183 
2. NUMBER OF PINAL COUNTY ESTABLISHMENTS, 1971-1991 .................184 
3. PINAL COUNTY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, 1971-1991 .................................185 
4. PINAL COUNTY FIRST-QUARTER PAYROLL, 1991-1991 ..........................186 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: REFLECTIONS 
I drove to Willcox, Arizona with a vague idea of what to expect. Though I was a 
native Arizonan, twenty-three years living in the suburbs of Phoenix amounted to 
knowing little about this small, southeastern Arizona town. As I headed towards the 
sunrise on the I-10, I could occasionally turn my head and take in the scenery of Texas 
Canyon and the Dragoon Mountains. What struck me then, and continued as I took Exit 
336 towards the Kansas Settlement, was how someone could make a living farming in an 
area that seemed nothing more than dry grasslands. My answer lay with Gus Arzberger. 
 Three months earlier, I had begun working on the Arizona State Archives 
Legislative Oral History Project. Since those who had worked on this project before me 
had gravitated towards interviewing Phoenix-area lawmakers, Dr. Melanie Sturgeon 
encouraged me to focus on those who represented areas outside this urban sprawl. I drew 
up a list, poured over legislative journals and newspapers, and made several phone calls. 
Fortune had it that the first interviews I secured were with Gus and his wife, Marsha, in 
early March.  
The Arzbergers together represented twenty-four years of legislative service to 
southeastern Arizona, most of which had come from Gus’s tenure in the House of 
Representatives (1984-1994) and Senate (1994-2000). What mattered as much as his 
political career was that Gus was born and continued to live in the Kansas Settlement. 
Now at eighty-nine years old, he had witnessed every shift and change in economy that 
impacted his community. What he revealed during the course of my interview was a 
microcosm of the history of western Anglo-settlement. His father, who was a Kansas 
farmer, migrated to Willcox to take advantage of generous land grants intended to bring 
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the desert into production. After securing a 160-acre plot and groundwater rights in 1909, 
he moved his young family out to Willcox where they and many Kansas families pumped 
groundwater to reclaim the desert lands. It was the defense of his father’s land that drew 
him to legislative politics. When the state legislature passed the Groundwater 
Management Act of 1980, he feared that it would threaten his water rights, and therefore, 
his livelihood. As he recalled beginning his political career in 1984, he became agitated 
and mentioned a related issue that caught me off guard. What followed over the next 
twenty minutes were his memories of Arizona’s water wars.    
Between 1984 and 1986, Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix purchased parcels of 
rural, agricultural farmland in La Paz and Pinal Counties with the intention of extracting 
and transporting the groundwater beneath those farms back to their respective service 
areas to satisfy future demands based on predictions of explosive urban population 
growth in undeveloped areas. None of these water farms yet existed in southeastern 
Arizona, but for Gus and many of his legislative colleagues who represented rural areas, 
they marked a fundamental shift in the relationship between water and political power. 
Their efforts over the next six years ensured that these transfers never occurred. 
However, the lessons of how the state’s political system dealt with these water farms, and 
the rural-urban transportation they anticipated, are profoundly relevant to the history of 
Arizona and of the southwestern United States. 
 What spoke to me then, and continued to resonate when I interviewed more rural 
legislators, was the emotional weight that these properties held. Transporting 
groundwater is an inherently disruptive act. Nearly all of the water farms anticipated 
withdrawing groundwater from basins whose aquifers had gradually collected water for 
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millions upon millions of years. Once that water left the basin, those remaining would 
have to contend with the land subsidence, higher pumping costs, and degraded water 
quality that came with a lowered water table. What little rains there were to recharge their 
aquifers would never be sufficient to raise the water level to its previous level. Those who 
remained lacked the means as well as the capital and institutions necessary to better their 
well-being. Like Owens Valley before them, their lives would be condemned to 
economic ruin as their lands were drained of their water. All that would remain was 
Phoenix: a monolithic metropolis so hell-bent on growing that its population had doubled 
five times since the end of World War II. Rather than face the reality that their pro-
growth mantra had surpassed the natural capacity of their natural surroundings and 
needed to be restricted, city leaders instead turned to outlying areas as fuel for their 
dreams.1 Buying these water farms implied subjugating rural areas: they were tantamount 
to imperialism.       
But having researched and spoken with those involved in this issue, I have found 
that complex relationships between different state, regional, and national institutions and 
laws—not to mention the willingness of some rural landholders to sell their lands during 
a period of agricultural recession—has muddled my once succinct opinion. While my 
research still enforces my conviction that water flows uphill towards power, I have come 
to see power less as a monolith towering over the land and more as the varied valleys, 
basins, and mountain ranges that define Arizona. This issue, in other words, was not 
simply a story of Phoenix elites acquiring rural lands; it was a continuous negotiation 
                                                   
1 I borrow this term from the title of Doug Kupel’s book, Fuel for Growth.  
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with those in outlying areas that began when these water farms were purchased and ended 
with a legislative compromise which satisfied nearly all interests involved.             
WATER AND POWER  
Though I was born and raised in Arizona, I spent the first twenty-two years of my 
life unaware of water policy. I first became interested in this topic when I bought a used 
copy of Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert (1986). It was a seminal work with a cutting 
narrative that portrayed the West as a land conquered by heavily-subsidized dams and 
irrigation works that were promoted by elites and enabled through pork barrel legislation. 
Reisner posited that the goal of western settlers, and their “federal archangels, the Bureau 
of Reclamation and Corps of Engineers, has long been to double, triple, quadruple the 
amount of desert that has been civilized and farmed.” The ability of these two agencies to 
create a perceived plethora of cheap water sustained the mirage of a land of bountiful 
development. Reisner acknowledged the inevitability of this development: “[a]s long as 
we maintain a civilization in a semi-desert with a desert heart, the yearning to civilize 
more of it will always be there.” The end of these efforts can be seen in California, where 
“virtually every drop of water in the state is put to some economic use before being 
allowed to return to sea.”2 
Reisner’s thesis seemed to complement those of two other scholars that several 
professors encouraged me to explore once I entered graduate school. Donald Worster 
argued in Rivers of Empire that water is controlled by a conspiracy among the powerful. 
Because water was and remains scarce, development for a growing population required 
                                                   
2 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: the American West and its Disappearing Water (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1993), 5, 9, 12, 14, 480, 484-485.  
5 
 
an “intensive, large-scale manipulation of water” resulting in a “coercive, monolithic, and 
hierarchical system, ruled by a power elite based in the ownership of capital and 
expertise.” Worster saw western water history as an extension of Karl Wittfogel’s thesis: 
that as societies remake nature, they remake themselves. The manipulation of water in 
desert societies required increasingly elaborate infrastructure projects that enshrine elite, 
centralized control. As the products of the modern capitalist state, these “hydraulic 
societies” are governed from the top-down by an amalgam of capitalists, technocrats, and 
state planners whose power derives from two sources. On one hand are the private 
agriculturalists that reap profits from subsidized water and migrant labor while 
“designing and controlling the hydraulic means of production.” On the other hand are 
government bureaucrats who, through the Bureau of Reclamation, wielded the capital and 
technical expertise necessary to re-engineer the West while serving as the arbiter for 
determining what claims to water are valid. Necessity and a vision of the West as a land 
of exploitative production united these potential rivals in their efforts to control the 
region.3     
At the other end of this nexus of powerful interests were those disadvantaged by 
the manipulation of water. F. Lee Brown and Helen Ingram argued in Water and Poverty 
in the Southwest that the poor and powerless have not participated in, and consequently 
not benefited from, many of the legal compacts that have allocated water and 
infrastructure projects that have transported it. Based on economic statistics matched with 
demographic data and patterns of water use, Brown and Ingram identify these groups as 
                                                   
3 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1987), 7, 22-23, 27, 48, 51-53.  
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rural Hispanic and Indian populations. Despite the recognition of pre-1848 water rights, 
indigenous “reserved rights” in Winters v. United States (1908), and water rights in the 
Colorado River Compact, many of these rights were never quantified or adjudicated. 
Hydrological development then has deprived these communities of their traditional water 
rights. Hispanic acequia communities in the Upper Rio Grande Valley of northern New 
Mexico and southern Colorado similarly have been denied recognition of their pre- and 
post-1848 rights, not to mention the benefits of storage facilities that the Bureau of 
Reclamation constructed for extra-regional interests. Both of these populations depended 
on agricultural economies that provided a degree of independence while fortifying a link 
to their place and their past. Water has a value not as a commodity, but instead as 
communal property that allows these marginalized peoples to participate and locally 
govern their lands.4     
All three of these scholars portrayed the hydraulic West as land divided been the 
powerful and powerless. I also found scholars who agreed with this understanding of 
water and power, but emphasized the power of local elites who had less cohesive 
relationships. Norris Hundley’s history of water manipulation in California, The Great 
Thirst, maintained that the very interests that drove California’s economic development 
did so for their own agendas. The proliferation of vast infrastructure projects and the 
inequalities in water distribution they reflected were nonetheless consequences of 
competing factions. By the 1980s, new interests in the appropriation process, particularly 
environmentalists, have been able to exert some pressure by shifting public policy away 
                                                   
4 F. Lee Brown and Helen M. Ingram, Water and poverty in the Southwest (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press, 1987), 3-4, 7, 9, 29, 32-33, 36-37, 39-40.  
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from private interests. Hundley maintains that the end of agricultural subsidy pricing, the 
failure of the Peripheral Canal to gain voter approval, and efficient management of 
existing resources, whether through conservation or reuse programs, have diluted the 
influence of agri-capitalists and urban districts that had dominated the state’s water 
allocations. This turn reflects greater public involvement and more democratic allocation 
of water resources.5 
Robert Gottlieb and Margaret Fitz-Simmons came to similar conclusions about 
the role of six southern California water agencies in Thirst for Growth. They insisted that 
those in charge of these districts were firmly invested in the politics of growth that fell in 
line with the interests of local elites. Subsidizing and importing water—first from federal 
projects, and later through state agencies—ensured a steadily growing economy. Gottlieb 
and Fitz-Simmons place the Metropolitan Water District (MWD), which serves 127 cities 
in six counties, at the center of their narrative. Under the Laguna Declaration of 1952, the 
MWD stated that it would expand its access to water supplies to meet future demands; 
their members, in return, would have to forgo independent arrangements in favor of water 
distributed through the district. Other water agencies responded to the rise of the MWD 
by staking their own claims to sources of water. The San Diego County Water Authority, 
Imperial Irrigation District, and Kern County Water Authority all formed in the 1940s to 
secure their Colorado River and State Water Project allocations. But the MWD’s clout 
declined when it failed to secure passage of the Peripheral Canal; environmental and 
water quality concerns forced the district to rely on conservation measures to meet future 
                                                   
5 Norris Hundley, The Great Thirst: Californians and Water: A History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2001), 4-12. 
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demands. As federal water projects became more politicized in the 1970s, increased 
public participation and calls for more environmentally sensitive practices and demand 
management led to similar changes in the mission of these agencies.6       
In contrast to the decentralized elite thesis are those scholars who argue that water 
allocations have been subject to a more open and democratic process supposedly 
common to the rest of the United States. Donald Pisani’s work on early reclamation 
projects up to 1935 pointed to how political realities distorted the U.S. Reclamation 
Service’s goals of democratic agrarian capitalism. The ambiguous mission and lack of 
central control left it susceptible to influence from Western states in the form of 
congressional representatives who lobbied for particular projects and state engineering 
offices that developed plans for elaborate projects. Local elites distributed dam and canal 
projects as patronage, ignoring any questions as to whether the projects in question were 
cost-effective or agriculturally viable. That 51 percent of funds raised through public 
lands sales had to be spent in the same state further guaranteed these spoils. But while 
reclamation projects did not necessary benefit small farmers, the dispersion of projects 
among variable elite groups—ranging from private land, electric power, and canal 
conglomerates—ensured that power could not be concentrated in any one demographic of 
people.7     
Though he confined his argument to Arizona, Doug Kupel in Fuel for Growth put 
forth a thesis that was similarly at odds with scholars in the first two groups. The arid 
                                                   
6 Robert Gottlieb and Margaret FitzSimmons, Thirst for Growth: Water Agencies as Hidden Government in 
California (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1991), 2-9. 
7 Donald J. Pisani, Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, 
and the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 60, 117-118, 
119, 138, 143, 292-294.  
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nature of the West does not make its cities all that different from those in the eastern 
United States. Like the western metropolises of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and 
Phoenix, both New York and Boston have transported water from distant regions to keep 
pace with their projected population growth. Water allocations furthermore are only one 
of several factors like technology, economy, and politics that dictate the scope and pace 
of urban growth. Kupel maintained that elite interests were not conceiving, engineering, 
and operating water works that set the pace for urban expansion. Urban leaders instead 
were reacting as responsible public officials to popular demands—and not those of a 
select, powerful group—for new water sources.8 I agree with Kupel that urban water 
policy in Phoenix has largely been a reactive affair, but the distinction between elite 
interests and public demands over water augmentation is largely a moot point. The prime 
concern has been whether enough water existed to support growth—be it for more 
farmlands, residential housing developments, or industrial facilities—in the immediate 
future.             
CONSEQUENCES OF MOVING WATER 
The inherent controversy in water transfers is their impact on nearby communities 
and third parties. For many residents of rural Arizona, the memory of Owens Valley 
governed their understanding of water transfers: any rural area which sold any of its 
water rights to a metropolitan city risked complete ruin. Gary Libecap argued in Owens 
Valley Revisited that this image belied reality. Through a meticulous analysis of sales 
records, he persuasively made the case that groups of farmers banded together to exercise 
                                                   
8 Douglas E. Kupel, Fuel for Growth: Water and Arizona’s Urban Environment (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2003), xv-xx, 222-223.  
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more power in negotiating the terms and price of land sales. While the Los Angeles 
Department of Water and Power (LADWP) could wait out farmers in these negotiations, 
one or two large water holders could set the timetable and pace for discussions. In 
response to the purported destructive nature of these transfers, Libecap maintained that 
Inyo County’s population did not collapse and that its property values remained 
comparatively higher than those of neighboring counties. The agriculture within Owens 
Valley was at odds with the area’s high elevation and short growing season; its continued 
existence had largely depended on nearby mining towns as buyers. Those that remained 
pushed for reparation claims that were intended to inflate urban land values within Inyo 
County; when the LADWP purchased these lands as a settlement, local landowners 
profited. From Libecap’s economic and property rights-centric view, the opportunity to 
have one’s lands purchased brought with it the possibility of a better life in a city.9 
Others contended that removing water from irrigated agriculture has limited 
negative impacts. Regional income from farming and its link to employment, according 
to Maurice Kelso, Bill Martin and Lawrence Mack, is rather insignificant. Since modern 
irrigated agriculture is capital intensive, there is considerably less demand for workers or 
local services. Considering Arizona’s rapidly growing non-agricultural economy, any 
overall job losses from retiring agricultural land would be minimal.10  
Others have observed that the economic impact of groundwater transfers varies 
greatly depending on location. Charles Howe and Christopher Goemans, who focused on 
                                                   
9 Gary D. Libecap, Owens Valley Revisited: A Reassessment of the West’s First Great Water Transfer 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Economics and Finance, 2007), 43-47, 64, 87, 109-110, 112-114. 
10 Maurice E. Kelso, William E. Martin, and Lawrence E. Mack, Water Supplies and Economic growth in 
an Arid Environment: An Arizona Case Study (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), 164-167. 
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transfers within Colorado, noted that those from the South Platte Valley to urban areas 
and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, which began in the 1930s with 
Denver acquiring cattle ranches and continued into the 1980s when Aurora and Thornton 
acquired many remaining ranches and water rights, were comparatively small (the 
median amount was 367 acre-feet) and continuous in nature. Though sometimes referred 
to as Colorado’s Owens Valley, the area’s economic diversity and connections to the 
state’s economy minimized many negative impacts.11  
The case of water transfers in the Lower Arkansas Valley in southeastern 
Colorado, conversely, showcased their deleterious potential. Water rights that were part 
of these transfers were usually sold in large swaths that had been historically dedicated to 
higher-valued crops like sugar beets. When the land was retired from productive use, the 
local economy and the people who relied upon it—older Hispanic communities that 
preceded Anglo-settlement and have been among the most impoverished in the state—
suffered.12 A similar situation occurred with transfers from the agricultural Arkansas 
Valley, which has historically been economically depressed, were incredibly large and 
went outside the basin. Economic losses incurred from transfers from this valley were 
likely to persist over a longer period of time; when combined with the area’s sparse 
population, they calculated that per capita losses were eight times greater than those in 
                                                   
11 Charles W. Howe and Christopher Goemans, “Water Transfers and Their Impacts: Lessons Learned from 
Three Colorado Water Markets,” Journal of the American Water Resources Association Vol. 39, No. 5 
(June 8, 2007): 1056-1058, 1060; Teresa A. Rice and Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Agricultural to urban 
water transfers in Colorado: an assessment of the issues and options: Completion Report No. 177 (Fort 
Collins, Colorado: Colorado Water Resources Research Institute, 1993), 3. 
12 John M. Nielsen, “The Economic Impacts on Southeastern Colorado of Water Transfers from Local 
Agriculture to Cities Outside the Region,” B.A. Honors Thesis, Department of Economics, University of 
Colorado-Boulder, 1986. 
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the South Platte Valley. That most farmers who sold their water rights had to use the 
money earned to pay off debts meant that Arkansas Valley did not economically benefit 
from these transfers.13 
REGIONAL TRENDS 
 Interbasin water transportation has figured prominently in the history of nearly 
every southwestern state. In some cases, like California, they are so extensive that they 
practically create artificial watersheds. In other states like Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Arizona, they singularly exist to bring water to the most populous and economically 
dynamic area of their respective states. There are two noteworthy observations that I 
would like to offer for understanding their role and impact in the region. First, nearly all 
instances of interbasin water transfers either came about through Bureau of Reclamation 
projects or have been facilitated by their infrastructure. Within New Mexico, the San 
Juan-Chama Diversion Project, which was authorized in 1961 and completed a decade 
later, moves over 90,000 acre-feet of water from the San Juan River and its three 
tributaries—the Rio Blanco, Navajo, and Little Navajo Rivers—through 27 miles of 
tunnels to the Heron Reservoir. Most of the water is then released to the Rio Chama—a 
major tributary of the Rio Grande—for use by municipal and irrigation interests along the 
Rio Grande north of the Elephant Butte Reservoir.14 The Colorado-Big Thompson 
Project, which was completed in the 1950s, diverted water from the western slope of the 
Rocky Mountains through a 13.2 mile tunnel that crossed the continental divide to feed 
                                                   
13 Howe and Goemans, 1061, 1062-1063. 
14 Ira G. Clark, Water in New Mexico: A History of its Management and Use (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1987), 262-263.  
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bustling agriculture along the Front Range. Irrigated agriculture in Churchill County, 
Nevada benefited from an early Bureau of Reclamation Project that transported water 31 
miles from the Truckee River. Instances in which states or cities have covered the 
infrastructure costs for transporting water, such as Los Angeles’s infamous aqueduct to 
Owens Valley or the creation of the massive State Water Project, are anomalies limited to 
California and—in the case of the Windy Gap Project—Colorado.     
Most interbasin water transfers were largely intended to support irrigated 
agriculture. When the Colorado-Big Thompson Project was originally authorized in 1937, 
it was intended to buttress irrigated agriculture along the Front Range that had relied on 
surface waters from the South Platte River Basin. California’s State Water Project was 
authorized in 1959 to support farmers in the San Joaquin Valley. The Central Arizona 
Project and the Truckee-Carson Project in Nevada were likewise designed primarily to 
benefit farmers. Occasionally, some transfers simultaneously supported both growth in 
cultivated acreage and urban areas like the San Juan-Chama Project and Newlands 
Reclamation Project. But by the 1980s, accelerating municipal and industrial water 
demand began to collide with the sizeable water rights of rural irrigated agriculture. In 
Colorado, where irrigated agriculture accounted for nearly 85 percent of all water usage 
in 1980, cities began to purchase tracks of land. Aurora, which had earlier relied on 
Denver and the South Platte River, initially acquired irrigation rights from the Rocky 
Ford Ditch in the Arkansas River Basin and an interest in the Colorado Canal on the main 
portion of the Arkansas River in 1986. Over the next two decades, city officials moved 
forward with purchasing irrigation rights from four ranches in the upper Arkansas Basin 
and interests in two transmountain diversion projects. Thornton, another suburb of 
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Denver, purchased 89 farms in the two northern Colorado counties for their water rights 
on the Cache la Poudre River at a cost of $57 million.15 And in Arizona, three Phoenix 
area municipalities purchased tracts of rural agricultural land from 1984 to 1986 for their 
water rights.  
MY NARRATIVE  
 Many of those involved in Arizona water policy have told me that their job is to 
find the “next bucket of water” that will ensure our state’s continued growth. This goal is 
not new; in fact, the overarching struggle throughout Arizona’s existence has been how 
best to utilize its limited water supplies so that economic growth can continue. The entire 
history of state water policy then can be seen as a series of crises that are brought on 
when one of the state’s major water users and economic drivers cannot locate that 
proverbial next bucket. From this perspective, Arizona’s experience with interbasin water 
transfers was simply another crisis created by the Phoenix metropolitan area out of a 
perceived scarcity of future supplies.  
 The struggle for adequate supplies actually antedates the creation of the creation 
of the state. The two major civilizations which settled the area—the Hohokam, and later, 
the Spanish—struggled to divert and store sufficient surface waters to maintain their 
settlements. Where they succumbed to nature, Anglo-settlers who brought with them 
industrial technologies began to fashion nature to their whim. Groundwater, which until 
this point had only percolated in springs or been harvested in shallow wells, became a 
                                                   
15 Carl Abbott, Colorado: A History of the Centennial State (Boulder: Colorado Associated University 
Press, 1976), 387; Aurora Water, “Water Supply Fact Book, 2010-2011,” Accessed September 13, 2012, 
https://www.auroragov.org/cs/groups/public /documents/document/001772.pdf; City of Thornton v. Bijou 
Irrigation Co., 1996 Colo. LEXIS 492 (Supreme Court of Colorado cir. 1996).  
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commodity that pumps pulled from deep within the earth. The territory’s early set of the 
laws, the Howell Code, encouraged this activity by enshrining a fallacy dating back to 
Spanish settlement that groundwater and surface water were distinct bodies of water.   
Phoenix and its neighbors were founded as agricultural communities. The 
availability of subsidized water and power through the Salt River Project (SRP) enabled 
their continued growth. As Phoenix became more urban at the turn of the century, 
demand for additional water pushed city officials to pump groundwater and arrange an 
agreement with the nearby Yavapai Indians to divert water from the Verde River. The 
establishment of manufacturing and industrial enterprises in Phoenix during World War 
II, and the mass migration to the growing metropolitan area that followed, further 
stressed its water supplies. A shortage in surface water supplies during the summer of 
1953 led city officials to annex nearby SRP lands for their water rights. Many 
surrounding cities also began annexing additional lands in the 1960s and 1970s. Since 
many of these new acquisitions were farmlands, their conversion to less-consumptive 
urban or residential uses resulted in a net gain in available water for the cities. The fact 
that these areas were being absorbed, thus offering residents the opportunity to politically 
and economically participate in their new surroundings, minimized whatever harm might 
have come to rural residents at the edge of the cities due to this transition.  
 At the same time the Phoenix-area was expanding and urbanizing, Prescott and 
Tucson were facing the limits of their surroundings and looking beyond their boundaries 
for new sources of water. The appurtenant groundwater in Chino Valley for Prescott and 
Avra Valley for Tucson offered one solution. The “water farms” these cities established 
by acquiring and retiring lands from agricultural use were a minor extension of what 
16 
 
Phoenix cities were already pursuing. After all, the land was in the same county, so 
property tax impacts were internalized; both Prescott and Tucson incorporated the 
purchased land into their respective service areas, thereby ensuring an adequate future 
water supply for local residents. The groundwater, for that matter, was in the same 
hydrologic basin as these cities. Above all, the water transportation these farms enabled 
were ultimately limited in scope and driven by an immediate need for water.16  
 But crises in ground and surface water supplies during the 1970s and 1980s 
pushed the logic of these water farms to a new level. One legacy of the proliferation of 
irrigated agriculture throughout the state was overdrafting of groundwater. Where no 
surface waters were available, farmers simply drilled wells and pumped up groundwater 
that had been collecting over millions of years at a rate that far exceeded what rains and 
flooding could replenish. By the 1940s, falling water tables and land subsidence made it 
apparent to the state’s political leaders that groundwater regulation was necessary. The 
fierce pushback from farmers, however, diluted any regulations that the state legislature 
passed. The 1948 Groundwater Code allowed the State Land Commissioner to designate 
areas with critical overdraft, but only provided weak regulations for limiting groundwater 
pumping. It took a threat from the Secretary of Interior in 1979 that Arizona would be 
denied its allocation of the Central Arizona Project (CAP), which could divert 1.5 million 
acre-feet of Colorado River water to the Salt River Valley, for Arizona’s political leaders 
to hammer out the Groundwater Management Act (GMA) of 1980, which sought to 
restrict groundwater withdrawals around Arizona’s three major urban areas to sustainable 
                                                   
16 Woodard, Gary. C et al. The Water Transfer Process in Arizona: Analysis of Impacts and Legislative 
Options (Tucson: University of Arizona, College of Business and Public Administration, 1988), 28. 
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levels by 2030. Uncertainty over how the Arizona Department of Water Resources would 
gradually reduce water consumption and how it would define the GMA’s goals to 
achieve a “safe yield” of groundwater and a “one-hundred year assured water supply” for 
new developments in the regulated basins promoted insecurity as the act entered its 
implementation phase in 1984. At the same time, Phoenix-area cities experienced 
substantial growth in areas without access to surface waters from SRP or CAP.  
With no viable surface supplies in sight and groundwater pumping potentially 
limited, Phoenix-area cities began looking for new sources of water to make up for 
projected future shortfalls. Irrigated agriculture, which had been the lifeblood of 
Arizona’s economy and had exercised a near-monopoly on water rights, was gradually 
declining in prominence. With the recession of the early 1980s looming over their heads, 
many farmers began to contemplate selling their lands. The proximity of these farmlands 
in La Paz and Pinal Counties to the CAP, which would serve as the infrastructure for 
transporting the water, was too enticing. Between 1984 and 1986, Scottsdale, Mesa, and 
Phoenix purchased farmlands in these counties for their water rights. Rather than unitary 
actions, those in rural areas excised agency not only in the terms of sales, but also in how 
these properties would be economically developed. Despite the negotiated nature of these 
acquisitions, these municipal water farms—and more importantly, the wave of 
speculators who followed in their wake—became a political controversy. State 
lawmakers struggled for six years to reach an agreement on this issue. Two major 
political scandals, a lack of urgency that had driven previous negotiations on water 
issues, and ongoing difficulty in determining the value of water removed from basins 
allowed talks to breakdown frequently. The resolution the legislature eventually reached 
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in 1991 consisted of two pieces of legislation. One established compensation rates for 
water transported and drastically reduced the basins from which these transfers could 
occur, while the other laid the foundation for a Phoenix-area groundwater replenishment 
district that allowed members to collectively manage their water resources. Since this 
resolution, no city has transported water from their rural properties: the creation of a 
newer and larger groundwater replenishment district; lackluster enforcement of the 
GMA; the conclusion of the Fort McDowell Indian Community Settlement (1990), San 
Carlos Apache Tribe Settlement (1992), and the Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act 
(2004)  which enabled tribal water leases to urban areas;17 broader application of 
reclaimed effluent, and greater acceptance of water conservation measures have sustained 
metropolitan water supplies, and in the process, effectively rendered these water farms 
superfluous.  
 
  
                                                   
17 Daniel Killoren, “American Indian Water Rights in Arizona: From Conflict to Settlement, 1950-2004” 
(PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2011), 281, 295, 319-320, 324. 
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CHAPTER 2: FOUNDATIONS 
FIRST PEOPLES 
Arizona’s early inhabitants were at the mercy of nature. They settled where water 
flowed, with most early communities taking root along the state’s interconnected central 
river systems. Where the Black and White Rivers join in the White Mountains of eastern 
Arizona, the Salt River emerges. From there, it flows 200 miles west to its confluence in 
the Gila River. The Verde River, one of Arizona’s few perennial rivers, flows from the 
Del Rio Spring in Chino Valley south for 150 miles until it joins the Salt River. The Gila 
River begins in the Mogollon Mountains of western New Mexico and bisects Arizona as 
it flows east-to-west until it joins the Colorado River north of present-day Yuma, 
Arizona. Along its 600-mile journey, it picks up water from the Santa Cruz, San Pedro, 
and Salt Rivers, which effectively makes it the largest watershed in Arizona.   
Indigenous settlement along this system began over 15,000 years ago, but water 
resource manipulation did not occur until permanent communities with early forms of 
agriculture appeared around 1000 BCE. Though four indigenous civilizations defined 
Arizona, only one is worthy of mention for its hydraulic works. The Hohokam shaped the 
Salt and Gila River as well as their tributaries over 500 years (900 to 1400 ACE) through 
a complex and extensive system of canals and reservoirs. This system grew in what 
would become the Phoenix-area during the Classic Period (1100-1358) and was defined 
by extensive distribution canals and lateral networks that diverted Salt River water at 
points where underlying bedrock pushed water upwards. Where the canal intakes were 
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more generous, the grander villages and irrigation communities flourished.1 Though 
limited to growing crops during the spring and summer, their irrigated agriculture 
nonetheless could sustain a sedentary population surpassing 40,000 people spread over 
100,000 square kilometers.2  
The sudden decline of the Hohokam around 1450 has been the subject of intense 
scholarly debate. Some point to intensified warfare over available sites; others argue that 
a prolonged drought quickly followed by the most intense flooding in three-hundred 
years destroyed their communities.3 But the most common theory emphasizes how the 
Hohokam managed their environment. They had fully constructed their farmlands along 
the Salt and Gila Rivers by 600 ACE and adopted equitable practices for distributing 
water throughout their communities to cultivate crops ranging from maize to squash.4 As 
their farming intensified, their populations at sites along floodplains became more 
concentrated and pushed the productive capacities of the environment beyond its natural 
limits.5 Where all scholars agree is that the resulting environmental degradation from 
their activities probably contributed to rapid decline of the Hohokam.6 
                                                   
1 W. Bruce Masse, “The Quest for Subsistence Sufficiency and Civilization in the Sonoran Desert,” and 
David A. Gregory “Form and Variation in Hohokam Settlement Patterns,” in Patricia L. Crown and W. 
James Judge, eds. Chaco & Hohokam: Prehistoric regional systems in the American Southwest (Santa Fe: 
School of American Research Press, 1991), 178, 220-221. 
2 Determining populations based on archaeological data is an endeavor rife with assumptions. Some 
scholars put the estimated population of the Hohokam within the now-Phoenix-area at 100,000. I have used 
the lower estimates based on more recent scholarship. 
3 Gregory, 183-184, 186-187. 
4 Glen Rice, “War and water: an ecological perspective on Hohokam irrigation,” Kiva Vol. 63, No. 3 
(1998): 268.   
5 James M. Bayman, “The Hohokam in Southwest North America,” Journal of World Prehistory, Vol. 15, 
No. 3 (2001): 291-292. 
6 Beyond the collapse of the Hohokam, researches have noticed a similar movement in regional population. 
On study of settlements calculated a millennia of steady growth until the population peaked between 
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The next major settlers, the Spanish, never reached Phoenix. They instead 
remained close to the Santa Cruz River in southeastern Arizona. The river emerges from 
the numerous creeks and streams that color the San Rafael Valley and initially flows 
south before curving north until it reaches present-day Tucson. It briefly heads 
underground and continues to the northwest where, if the rains are generous, it may reach 
the Gila River.7 Rooted in the arid Iberian Peninsula, Spanish legal codes treated water 
and land as public commodities. Since water was a communal property, corporate and 
municipal rights had priority over individual and private rights. The Crown owned all 
lands and waters and distributed them through nineteen lands grants. Most of the water in 
question was surface flows; groundwater existed only in springs and the seepages that 
flooded mineshafts. What defined that Spanish legal legacy was that while diversions on 
riparian parcels were limited to domestic purposes, the owner of land featuring a well or 
spring had unrestricted rights to its underlying water. This fallacy, that surface and 
groundwater are distinct bodies, would persist into Anglo water law.8  
 Like the Hohokam before them, the early 18th century Spanish economy strained 
the surrounding environment. Stock animals quickly outnumbered their human 
counterparts and consumed excessive quantities of water. As they stripped away grass 
from the lands before it could regenerate, top soil lost its absorptive character and turned 
                                                                                                                                                       
100,000 to 160,000 people. But 150 years before the first Europeans arrived, the population of the entire 
southwest rapidly shrunk. J. Brett Hill et. a. “Prehistoric Demography in the Southwest: Migration, 
Coalescence, and Hohokam Population,” American Antiquity Vol. 69, No. 4 (Oct. 2004): 693-694. 
7 Barbara Tellman, Richard Yarde, and Mary G. Wallace, Arizona’s Changing Rivers: How People Have 
Affected the Rivers (Tucson: Water Resources Research Center, College of Agriculture, University of 
Arizona, March 1997), 17, 43, 59, 97, 123.  
8 Michael C. Meyer, Water in the Hispanic Southwest: A Social and Legal History, 1550-1850 (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1984), 20-22, 55, 86, 120; J.J. Bowden, “Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in 
the Southwest,” Land & Water Law Review Vol. 8, No. 467 (1973): 472-473. 
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to dust. Animal excrement occasionally contaminated communal canals called acequias. 
Since pastures were sparse, supporting every animal demanded more grazing lands. Stock 
animals edged out native wildlife and sporadic water shortages were common in Arizona 
and New Mexico during Spanish settlement (1521-1821). Early mines required enough 
water for six towns; that many were close to urban areas and polluted water with heavy 
metal tailings only worsened matters.9    
Agriculture, however, caused the most environmental strain for the Spanish and 
indigenous communities. When Father Eusebio Kino founded San Xavier del Bac in 
1692 in Tucson, he drew the mission’s water supply from the Santa Cruz River and 
nearby springs that tapped into the river’s water table. The small agricultural plots on the 
mission’s grounds were intended to entice indigenous peoples towards reliance on the 
mission. The new crops and livestock grazing on these lands unintentionally altered the 
fertile grasslands of the Santa Cruz Valley. In dry years, the mission’s diversions hurt the 
Pima communities that lay downstream. The military Presidio of San Agustin de Tucson, 
which the Spanish moved from Tubac to the eastern bank of the Santa Cruz in 1775, and 
its system of land grants also drew from the river. The mission lands, the presidio on the 
eastern bank, the Pima settlements on the western bank (which technically held 75  
percent of the river’s water rights), and new, water-consumptive forms of economic 
activity soon overburdened the Santa Cruz River. As early as 1761, authorities reported 
that it did not have enough water to support current users. While competing claims were 
arbitrated in courts, none of the parties could curtail consumption patterns or re-engineer 
                                                   
9 Meyer, 50-51, 68, 80, 84-86, 92; Michael F. Logan, Desert Cities: An Environmental History of Phoenix 
and Tucson (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 28-31. 
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the river to meet their needs. All parties remained at the mercy of the river’s meager 
flows.10  
The armed strife and emigration which defined Mexican control of Arizona wore 
away at many Spanish settlements. When the sparse territory changed hands to the United 
States with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, two peoples had tried and 
failed to continually inhabit it. As pre-industrial peoples who lacked the technology, 
capital, and organization necessary to productively and efficiently use their surroundings, 
they instead fell victim to them.11 
TERRITORIAL CAPITALISM 
Anglo settlement redefined the hydraulic paradigm. Where the indigenous peoples 
and the Spanish came to water, the industrial technologies empowered settlers to bring 
water to them. Arizona’s complex of system of groundwater basins, which had developed 
over millions of years and had remained largely untapped, became a viable resource. As 
more farmers and miners pumped groundwater, their activities proliferated beyond the 
spaces the Hohokam and Spanish had once inhabited.  
The area’s territorial status meant that most executive officials were presidential 
appointments largely unfamiliar with what was a sparsely populated territory of four-
thousand souls. Where residents could exercise influence was in electing delegates to 
their territorial legislature. With the assistance of federal judge William T. Howell, this 
                                                   
10 Meyer, 55, 56; Tellman, Yarde, and Wallace, 18; Michael F. Logan, The Lessening Stream: An 
Environmental History of the Santa Cruz River (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2002), 46-48, 
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11 Meyer, 57; Logan, The Lessening Stream, 62-77.  
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body wrote the first set of laws in 1864.12 All running waters under the Howell Code 
were public waters for the purposes of mining and irrigated agriculture.13 The doctrine of 
prior appropriation, under which the first water user had senior rights to any who would 
follow, governed all surface water diversions so that water became a fungible commodity 
for economic growth.14 The code’s failure to address groundwater sparked a lawsuit fifty 
years later over who owned a plot of land. Determining its ownership depended on who 
held rights to its underlying, and potentially legally unrecognized, water. The Arizona 
Territorial Court essentially created two distinct categories of groundwater. That which 
percolated upwards was sole property of the overlying landowner, while subterranean 
streams were subject to prior appropriation.15 
In the time it took to resolve this case, the agricultural community of Phoenix had 
come into existence. Led by Jack Swilling, a morphine-addicted Civil War veteran, 
farmers began excavating and renovating Hohokam ditches to divert enough of the Salt 
River to irrigate 5,000 acres of wheat, barley, and corn by 1868. Citrus trees took root as 
Phoenix, a name Swilling chose to represent a revitalized desert civilization, began to 
rise. Congressional passage of the Desert Lands Act in 1877, which increased homestead 
                                                   
12 David R. Berman, Arizona Politics & Government: the Quest for Autonomy, Democracy, and 
Development (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 16, 25-27.  
13 The Howell Code, Chapter LV, “Of Acequias or Irrigating Canals,” §1 ,422.  
14 If their intention was not clear enough, the territorial legislature amended the code in 1887 to state that 
riparian water rights, which viewed waters as common property, “shall not obtain or be of any force or 
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15 Howard v. Perrin, 8 Ariz. 349-351, 353, 354 (S.C. AZ 1904), LexisNexis.  
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allotments in arid regions to 640 acres, attracted more settlers who built twelve canals to 
irrigated 30,000 acres of valley farmland by 1900.16  
Men like A.J. Chandler and William J. Murphy made irrigated long-staple cotton 
the area’s economic driver. The favorably warm climate and minimal precipitation 
allowed for longer growing seasons, while fertilizers made continued cultivation 
possible.17 Developers worked with farmers to lobby cotton usage for the military and the 
Goodyear Tire Company, which relied on long-staple cotton for the belting in their new 
tires. The 8,000 acres of farms south of Chandler and 16,000 acres along the Agua Fria 
River were among the most productive during World War I. Increased vertical integration 
of business suppliers, processors, and distributers further enabled cotton to become a 
profitable business crop. The Southern-Pacific Railroad’s connection to Maricopa in 
1879 and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe’s connection to Phoenix in 1895 opened more 
new markets for valley farmers.18 
Even as irrigation expanded under the aegis of the Salt River Canal Company 
(SRCC) and Maricopa Canal Company (MCC), Phoenix’s planners began looking for 
additional water supplies. Before incorporating in 1881, domestic supplies came from 
wells, pumps, and tanks of wealthy individuals and businesses. When a municipal 
franchise that the city council had awarded proved inadequate, private investors created 
the first water works system. But even their system could only accommodate consumer 
                                                   
16 Logan, Desert Cities, 47, 49-53, 57-59; Thomas Sheridan, Arizona: A History (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1995), 132, 133, 199, 200, 
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18 Erik-Anders Shapiro, “Cotton in Arizona: a historical geography” (M.S. thesis, University of Arizona, 
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demand to a point; by 1892, it had reached capacity as residents consumed 700,000 
gallons a day.19 Since most residents still depended on their irrigation ditches or wells, 
the city council began directing them to apply in advance for municipal ditch water which 
the city would purchase from the SRCC. When the SRCC canal ran dry, the city 
contracted with the MCC for additional water, only to have a drought show limits of 
these companies in maintaining water supplies. Progressive reformers also pushed for 
municipal ownership of utilities by lobbying congress to amend the Harrison Act to lift 
the restrictions on bond indebtedness for the public works projects of territorial 
municipalities. Phoenix began expanding the capacity of this new system and initiated 
negotiations with the Yavapai Indians at Fort McDowell to divert additional water from 
the Verde River.20  
The city’s increasing population enabled the area’s territorial delegates to gain 
several institutions and the territorial capital by 1889. This new political clout also 
enabled Phoenicians to utilize the newly passed Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902. As 
an exemplar of the Progressive Era, the act was intended to lay the foundation for a more 
democratic capitalism by funding irrigation works that would support small farms in the 
arid West. For Salt River Valley farmers, the Reclamation Service could realize the 
infrastructure necessary for continued growth. After determining the priority of users’ 
water rights through a friendly suit, the federal government purchased all canal 
companies and had Phoenix assume control of all irrigation water within its limits. As the 
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first venture of its kind, the Salt River Project (SRP) faced hurdles over how to balance 
federal and local control in a multipurpose waterworks. The governmental crusade of 
reclamation gave way to practical realities when reclamation officials recognized the Salt 
River Valley Water Users Association (SRVWUA) on February 9, 1903. The association, 
which would assume control of SRP, was comprised of business-oriented farmers with 
large landholdings. To control flooding and generate electricity, planners constructed the 
Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River at its confluence with Tonto Creek, approximately 70 
miles northeast of Phoenix. While the dam, which came online on March 18, 1911, 
provided power, the water deliveries that the city council began contracting for on March 
20, 1919 would serve as the foundation for unifying control and distribution over much 
of the area’s surface water supplies in the coming years.21 
But Arizona’s water situation on the eve of statehood was perilous. Aside from 
requiring that an appropriator place a notice of location and quantity of a diversion, any 
over-arching water regulations were non-existent. According to historian Dean Mann, 
Many appropriators ignored the legal requirements concerning filing notices of 
intention to appropriate. The courts concurred in bypassing these requirements by 
deeming the application of water to beneficial use sufficient to establish a water 
right. The failure by the courts to require adherence even to these minimum 
requirements led to considerable litigation over rights. The courts were often not 
competent to make judgments since the decisions depended on factual 
information which the litigants were frequently unwilling or unable to provide. 
There was often confusion concerning the land to which the rights applied, and 
seldom was there any hydrographic data which was necessary for a proper 
judgment.22   
 
                                                   
21Karen L. Smith, The Magnificent Experiment: Building the Salt River Reclamation Project, 1890-1917 
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986); Kupel, Fuel for Growth, 58-62; Logan, Desert Cities, 58. 
22 Dean E. Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963), 39.  
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STATEHOOD 
 The progressivism that dominated Arizona at statehood manifested in the 1919 
State Water Code. Beyond building on the Howell Code by declaring all surface waters 
and underground channels23 public and limited to beneficial use, it created the State 
Water Commissioner to manage applications for new appropriations. The state legislature 
also fashioned the Arizona Resources Board for statewide water management. While it 
had the power to create plans for water development, utilization, storage, and 
conservation, it could only recommend policies to the governor.24  
 Statehood also marked the beginning of an obsession with the Colorado River, 
which formed the boundary between Arizona and its western neighbors and was the 
repository for almost every major river in the state. But only those farmers near its banks 
had benefited from its flows. One engineering firm had proposed to divert part of it to the 
Gila River, where it could feed 3 million acres of farmland in Yuma and western 
Maricopa counties. Others like Phoenix booster George Maxwell dreamed of bringing the 
river to Maricopa and Pinal counties. Fear that southern California’s exploding 
population would leave little of the river leftover united these aspirations. The legislature 
had refused to ratify the 1922 Colorado Compact because their 2.8 million AF allotment 
seemed paltry.25 Most legislators sided with Fred Colter, a prominent cattle rancher who 
                                                   
23 According to one of the code’s authors, too little was known about groundwater to include a blanket 
provision that would allow the State Water Commissioner to regulate it. Water politics instead focused on 
appropriating surface water. G.E.P. Smith, “Groundwater Law in Arizona and Neighboring States,” 
University of Arizona College of Agriculture Technical Bulletin No. 65 (December 29, 1936), 49.  
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1919, §1-2, 4-8. 
25 One legacy of the CRC was that it enshrined the Colorado River’s annual flow at 15 million AF per year. 
This number was based on a decade of stream flow measurements at Lee’s Ferry with inaccurate 
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reasoned that since the Colorado formed the state’s boundary, Arizonans should have the 
right to use whatever amount they desired.26 Leaders instead pushed Colter’s proposal to 
divert the river’s water to the Verde River through a complex chain of forty different 
projects. While this feat of engineering could never get a fraction of the funding it 
required, leaders nonetheless persisted in opposing the compact.27  
While this obstinacy persisted, the Phoenix Union Station became the main 
connection to the transcontinental Southern-Pacific Railroad in the 1920s, and with it, 
heralded more connections to the national economy and brought more agricultural 
processing facilities and warehouses.28 From 3,048 farmers at statehood to 5,501 farmers 
cultivating 205,000 acres of land seven years later, Arizona hosted diverse crops ranging 
from alfalfa to citrus fruit. But cotton remained pivotal, particularly when the British 
export embargo in 1916 increased domestic cotton prices. The SRWVUA pushed the 
crop, which would help pay off the debt owed to the federal government for construction 
costs, to the point that total acreage tripled in Arizona to 243,000 acres within a year 
(1919-1920). The association also pursued three more dams on the Salt River to bring 
another 34,000 acres into cultivation.29  
Cotton farming in the Phoenix-area also brought about a significant water case. A 
subsidiary of the Goodyear Tire Company sought an injunction against a water 
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conservation district and land company. In diverting water from Agua Fria River, the 
subsidiary claimed these two entities were diminishing the flow of an underground 
stream. Since the 1919 Water Code did not distinguish between surface and underground 
flows, the case hinged on the relationship of the water in question to the river: was it 
merely sub-flow that paralleled the river’s movement, or percolating groundwater 
separate from the river? In determining an answer, the Arizona Supreme Court 
introduced a test for determining whether sub-flow existed based on whether 
withdrawing groundwater water would “diminish appreciably and directly” any surface 
flows. The court thus introduced the first legal mechanism for curbing groundwater 
withdrawals.30  
Phoenix’s urbanization did not change its water consumption patterns. City 
leaders continued to react to demands instead of planning for the future. Though officials 
considered looking to the Verde River for supplemental supplies since 1886, it took 
nearly thirty years of studies, planning, and negotiating with representatives of the Fort 
McDowell Yavapai before the Phoenix City Council submitted a bond issue for a gravity 
supply system from the river in 1919. When Verde River water began flowing through its 
domestic system in 1922, city leaders pushed for eliminating all irrigation ditches within 
the city. The completion of an additional concrete pipeline in 1931 and fiscal hardship of 
the Great Depression pushed them to favor a municipal distribution system of pipes over 
the costs of maintaining irrigation canals. Supply augmentation measures, which included 
renegotiating an agreement with the Yavapai to operate a 120-acre well field, aided the 
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municipal system. This shift, which manifested during World War II, marked the 
completion of Phoenix’s transition from an agricultural to urban community.31  
Regional shifts pushed Arizona into an aggressive stance over its rights to the 
Colorado River. When Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act in December 
1928, it consented to the Colorado River Compact—which Arizona had refused to 
ratify—and authorized the construction of a reservoir for diversions for southern 
California.32 Representatives from the area’s seven prominent irrigation and water 
districts concluded an agreement three years later that gave the Metropolitan Water 
District (MWD), which oversaw the Los Angeles metropolitan area, junior water rights.33 
The MWD began planning to construct diversion projects to supply a population that had 
doubled over the past decade to 1.2 million residents. The only option for Arizona, which 
lacked a sufficient state water agency and remained obstinately opposed to ratifying the 
CRC, was to petition the U.S. Supreme Court to rule on California’s Colorado River 
diversions. The court refused three times. There was no justiciable issue: Arizona had no 
plan for the river’s water and any interstate controversy required the federal government 
to be a party.34 
State leaders clung-on to their opposition until another set of regional negotiations 
forced their hands. Disputes between the United States and Mexico over rights to the 
Colorado River had perpetually flared and simmered since the CRC, which provided no 
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allocation to Mexico, entered into effect. At the direction of President Franklin 
Roosevelt, whose Good Neighbor policy towards Latin America sought to undermine 
Axis involvement in the western hemisphere, the United States resumed negotiations with 
Mexico over several international rivers in 1939. The resulting treaty that was signed into 
law on February 3, 1944 guaranteed an annual allocation from the Colorado River of 1.5 
million AF to Mexico.35 Losing more of the Colorado crippled the stubborn mindset that 
the river was Arizona’s exclusive domain. Within a week, the state legislature had 
ratified the CRC and contracted for delivery of the state’s allocation and also provided 
$200,000 to the Bureau of Reclamation to investigate how the state could fully utilize this 
allocation. The results would be the forerunner to the largest trans-basin diversion project 
in Arizona’s history. 
The statehood experience (1912-1945) brought three critical changes in Arizona’s 
hydraulic arrangement. It first marked the greatest expansion of irrigated cotton in the 
Salt River Valley, and consequently, increased diversions of the Salt River. Beyond the 
valley, cotton use thrived in Pinal County, where farmers zealously pumped groundwater 
with little consideration of the consequences. It also signaled the rise of Phoenix as a 
political and economic center within the state. Finally, the Colorado River, which had 
once been a mere political boundary, now became an active component of Arizona’s 
future. While Arizona’s political leaders came to terms with the CRC, the long-term 
viability of the river meant resolving the ongoing dispute with California over the river’s 
water.  
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POLITICS OF POSTWAR GROWTH 
 The Second World War revolutionized Phoenix. The valley’s dry air and stable 
climate was ideal for airplanes. The inflow of federal funding for aviation inland facilities 
to train pilots, as well as upgrading Sky Harbor Airport, provided more economic 
connections. Developer Del Webb also sought out contracts to build military facilities 
throughout the state while companies like Alcoa and Goodyear built new manufacturing 
plants. These new connections and opportunities, as well as the experience of those who 
had been stationed there combined with the availability of cheap land and the provisions 
of the G.I. Bill and FHA loans attracted many newcomers to the valley. Widespread 
adoption of air-conditioning made the hot summers escapable. Before the century’s end, 
the population of Phoenix and those cities which surrounded it would double five times 
over.36  
This exponential postwar growth took city leaders by surprise. Within one year 
(1945-1946), domestic water consumption had increased by 5 million gallons so that 
Phoenicians were consuming 59 million gallons daily. Diversion from the Verde River 
could only provide 45 million gallons a day; the rest came from either alkaline wells or 
reservoirs that lacked the capacity to meet peak demand. While a committee 
contemplated new well fields and system improvements, the city council contracted with 
SRP to use a well for six months. After Phoenix had renewed this contract several times, 
SRP officials proposed that Phoenix help cover the construction of new headgates on the 
spillway of the recently finished Horseshoe Dam in return for more Verde River water. 
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Two years of negotiations and a bond campaign established the rights to 25,000 AF that 
could ensure the city’s future.  
But an eight year-long drought left little water available in these reservoirs. At the 
beginning on an intensely hot July in 1951, SRP informed Phoenix officials that they had 
less than ten days of Verde River water left. A summer monsoon spared the city, but the 
brief crisis set the city manager on the path to acquire new supplies at any cost. Within a 
year, officials concluded an agreement with SRP. In return for covering all reclamation-
related fees and assessments for subdivided lands that were within city limits, Phoenix 
would receive the irrigation water that had once been used for agriculture. Since a 
residential user always consumed less water than a farmer’s field, every acre converted 
from farmlands to residential houses yielded a net-increase in water. The wave of 
annexations that followed made SRP the supplier for 85 percent of Phoenix’s water by 
1959.37 
This new growth increasingly strained the area’s surrounding water resources. 
Nearly all surface waters, save the Colorado River, had been diverted.  State leaders 
began mobilizing to seek federal funding for a project that could divert the river’s waters 
to the center of the state. The ensuing struggle for the state’s first and largest interbasin 
transportation of water would last twenty years and require lengthy litigation. The 
postwar era also signaled the beginning of a Sisyphean struggle with groundwater 
overdrafting. Between 1940 and 1948, groundwater pumping had doubled to 3 million 
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AF annually; annual recharge, at best, was at most a third of that amount.38 Political 
resolution of these surface and groundwater issues would impact how interests sought 
and acquired water resources for years to come. 
Surface Tension 
Diverting the Colorado River shifted from fevered dream to reality after 
Department of Interior planners singled out an ideal route for a canal through Parker in 
1947. As negotiations with California over the Bridge and Glen Canyon Dam sites 
authorized in the Colorado River Basin Act had deadlocked, Phoenix civic leaders 
formed the Central Arizona Project (CAP) Association to promote the project. State 
legislators led by Sidney Kartus even considered making CAP a state endeavor, but could 
never muster enough support to move forward with the costly project. Instead, Arizona 
Senators Hayden and McFarland began recruiting congressional support for a CAP 
authorization bill in 1947. Maneuvering and lobbying allowed their measure to clear the 
Senate twice, but overwhelming opposition from California’s delegation in the House of 
Representatives doomed it. Their lawmakers and legal team insisted that Arizona’s 
diversions from the Colorado River’s tributaries should count towards its overall 
allocation; adding the CAP would cause Arizona to exceed its allocation. They pressed 
Arizona’s delegation to again request the Supreme Court to determine water rights on the 
Colorado River. Fears that a ruling would limit their diversions gave way to Arizona’s 
resigned petition for the court’s mediation on August 13, 1952. In order to protect the 
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reserved water rights to five Indian reservations, the federal government intervened; 
Nevada, Utah, and New Mexico would soon follow.39  
The Supreme Court began its proceedings in Arizona v. California by appointing 
a special master to review evidence, establish pertinent facts, and make recommendations 
to the court. After the first one abruptly died, Simon H. Rifkind assumed the position and 
continued taking testimony from over 340 witnesses as forty-eight attorneys made their 
case over three years. Rifkind then turned over his findings to the Supreme Court Justices 
for their evaluation in 1961.40 It took them two more years to author a ruling which 
declared that Arizona’s 2.8 million AF allocation from the Colorado River excluded any 
tributary water.41  
The ruling paved the way for congressional authorization of the Central Arizona 
Project which, in the eyes of Senator Hayden, would be a lifeline for irrigated agriculture. 
After the enabling legislation, the Colorado River Basin Project Act (CRBPA), was 
signed into law in 1968, the Secretary of Interior determined that the project’s sizeable 
costs would be repaid through a political subdivision within Arizona. The state legislature 
created the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) in 1971 to manage 
repaying the costs of constructing, operating, and maintaining the CAP as well as to 
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subcontract water deliveries—which were generously subsidized—to users within its 
three-county service area.42  
But even with a legally recognized access to the Colorado and the CAP 
authorized, problems loomed for the CAWCD. Congress had only passed the CRBPA 
after Arizona’s delegation agreed that CAP water would have the lowest priority of 
diversions within the lower basin in the event of future water shortages. The agency also 
would have to come to terms with the claims of Indians whose own water rights had been 
marginalized. In response to the pleas from lawyers of the federal government to 
determine Indian water rights, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California also set aside a 
million AF of Colorado River water for all irrigable acreage on five reservations along 
the river and established that the rights to this water were superior to non-Indian water. 
This ruling, however, did not address the claims of Indians living along the river’s 
tributaries. Only negotiations in the years to come would validate those claims at the 
expense of other users.43   
Grounded Anxieties 
The lower energy costs, introduction of more efficient pumps, and high cotton 
prices that defined the 1930s expanded groundwater-dependent agriculture. And it also 
raised concerns about overdrafting. Several studies from researchers at the University of 
Arizona and the U.S. Geological Survey which started in 1939 had confirmed that 
groundwater levels statewide were in rapid decline. Despite insistently prodding the 
rural-dominated legislature, Governor Sidney Osborn could only get proposals to create a 
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study committee that would draft a new code—none of which passed. Even the Arizona 
Farm Bureau’s efforts in 1942 and the Arizona Agricultural Post-War Planning 
Committee’s grim prediction in 1944 that abandoned farmlands were inevitable without 
more pumping restrictions could not generate any political action. Opposition from 
farmers and real estate developers eager to turn a profit stymied any discussion.44  
In an announcement that would echo decades later, Osborn warned the legislature 
in 1945 that the Bureau of Reclamation would not support the CAP unless Arizona could 
control overdrafting. The legislature rallied to pass a meek bill that required well owners 
to provide information about their pumping and plans for future wells to the State Land 
Commission. While the Groundwater Act of 1945 did not curb pumping, the information 
collection it enabled provided Osborn with enough justification to call the legislature into 
special session two years later to draft a new groundwater code. The law, which took 
three tense special sessions to pass, vested the State Land Department with the power to 
designate basins that lacked enough groundwater to provide for irrigation at the current 
rate of withdrawal. But declaring a “critical groundwater area” only forbade drilling new 
wells; it did not restrict pumping from current wells. The State Land Commissioner only 
declared one such area before 1951. That the act turned a blind eye to deepening or 
widening irrigation wells that had been in service for the past five years and exempted 
wells for stock, domestic supplies, industry, and transportation underscored how 
ineffective it was in reducing groundwater overdrafting.45  
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The failure of Congress to authorize the CAP in 1951 drove newly elected 
Governor Pyle to appoint a study committee to investigate remedies to the code. They 
recommended placing all groundwater in public ownership and applying a rights system 
similar to the prior appropriation doctrine. Where this system differed from the current 
scheme was in its recognition of the shared nature of aquifers. Later users could exercise 
correlative rights which would entitle them to a reasonable share of the aquifer while 
limiting usage for senior users. The state would then establish criteria for pumping 
groundwater unique to each basin. The committee transmitted these recommendations to 
the legislature, only to have the Arizona Supreme Court fundamentally change the legal 
status of groundwater before it could make any headway.            
 The dispute involved two landowners in Laveen, a town southwest of Phoenix 
that was so small that it escaped the most recent census. Bristor had been building homes 
since 1916 that were supplied by an underlying aquifer. Arman Decondo Cheatham, the 
town’s postmaster, purchased land west of Bristor to expand what soon became one of 
the state’s largest dairy farms. Rather than rely on suppliers, Cheatham decided to grow 
his own hay and, starting in 1948, he sunk eleven wells that tapped into the aquifer on 
which Bristor had relied. When Bristor’s wells went dry, he sued to stop Cheatham from 
withdrawing any more water. Cheatham argued in court that he could pump as much as 
he wanted, regardless of its effect on Bristor, because the water in question was an 
underground stream and therefore not private property. The court, he maintained, should 
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consider it public water which would limit any withdraws to reasonable use.46 In a 3-2 
decision, the Arizona Supreme Court declared that all groundwater was public water 
subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation and remanded Bristor’s case for 
reconsideration. It noted that  
To permit the present underground water race to continue unabated, without 
regulation or control, would inevitably lead to exhaustion of the underground 
supply and consequently to economic disaster. The common-law concept that the 
owner of land owned everything to the center of the earth below and to the sky 
above became a part of the body of that law under conditions wholly different 
from those which obtain anywhere today.47 
The ruling enabled the state legislature to take a more active role in governing 
groundwater usage. Major irrigation districts and the SRVWUA quietly accepted the 
ruling and began pushing for a new groundwater code. But farmers, especially from Pinal 
County, virulently protested what they considered a death knell for their business. When 
the legislature resumed for the 1952 session, there was little enthusiasm to take up Pyle’s 
recommendations for a new groundwater code. Any hopes for a negotiated solution 
further crumbled when the state supreme court announced that it would rehear Bristor v. 
Cheatham. Legislators instead created of a new commission consisting entirely of 
farmers to study the issue again. Hearings throughout the state led the Underwater Study 
Commission to issue a report in January 1953 endorsing local administration to curb 
groundwater pumping and the adoption of correlative water rights, which would 
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apportion groundwater pumping rights according to the amount of land each user owned 
above the given aquifer.48 
Before this system could be considered, the Arizona Supreme Court released its 
new ruling. A new justice and another’s misgivings led to a dramatic reversal of its 
earlier ruling. A majority now determined that because of the investment required to 
develop land, the groundwater underneath should be considered a property right. They 
therefore placed groundwater under the doctrine of reasonable use, which allowed anyone 
to make withdrawals to meet the “reasonable” demands of improving his or her lands.49  
With economic realities now dictating the pace of pumping, divisions among 
legislators over how to restrict overdrafting intensified. Every proposal in the ensuing 
session had exemptions carved-out. The only accomplishment was passing a stop-gap 
measure that temporarily prohibited drilling additional wells in critical areas until April 
1954. When the following session yielded no breakthroughs, legislators hastily cobbled 
together two bills. One extended the drilling ban by another year, while the other mildly 
enhanced the powers of the 1948 Groundwater Act: the State Land Commissioner could 
now create larger critical areas and deny permits for new irrigation wells for lands within 
critical areas that were not already being cultivated. It became law without the signature 
of Governor Pyle, who branded it a “sorry, weak, and confused ending” to any 
meaningful negotiations for securing an adequate groundwater code.50  
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Apart from declaring critical groundwater areas, the commissioner was powerless 
to stop groundwater overdrafting. One case reinforced this flaw. In 1957, the State Land 
Commissioner had declared a critical groundwater area in Pima County that included the 
Anway family farm. They continued to withdraw groundwater, but channeled it to 
previously uncultivated land. The declining water table forced neighboring farmers to 
take a crop out of rotation. They, along with the attorney general, asserted that in 
pumping more water to bring this land—which lay in a critical groundwater area—into 
production, the Anways had violated this 1954 law. The court, however, thought that if 
the legislature had intended to limit groundwater use in these critical groundwater areas, 
it would have written the statute to express that sentiment. The Amways and others were 
free to use groundwater however they thought most beneficial for their property.51 
While the Anway decision limited pumping restrictions, a shift in the state’s 
political structure all but ensured that the state legislature could not make any further 
changes to groundwater law. In June 1964, the Supreme Court ruled that state legislative 
districts had to be roughly equal in population. Gary Peter Klahr, an eccentric and 
tenacious University of Arizona law student, filed a lawsuit that year arguing that the 
composition of the state legislature violated this “one-man, one vote” standard. A federal 
court agreed, and when the rural-dominated legislature failed to pass a new 
apportionment plan that met this standard, the court imposed its own. In declaring that the 
legislature would now be composed of thirty legislative districts of equal population, 
each of which would send two representatives and one senator, the court effectively 
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swept away the foundation of the old “cowboy legislature.” Where it once had to senators 
like every county, Maricopa County, which cradled the Phoenix-area, now had sixteen 
senators. The November 1966 elections brought urban Republicans to majority positions 
in both houses of legislature.52 Empowered and eager to solidify their political standing, 
these legislators embarked on an aggressive reform crusade that stretched for over a 
decade: to list but a few of their efforts, lawmakers created a more professional process 
for writing the state budget, either eliminated many state boards that crowded the 
regulatory landscape or combined them into professional agencies, wrestled with 
resolving disparities in capital funding for school construction, and erected a novel 
healthcare program to administer federal Medicaid funds. Most of this agenda aligned 
with the concerns of these urban legislators. Though they were known issues that were 
becoming more problematic for rural districts, groundwater overdrafting and 
transportation never generated enough interest within the state legislature for its members 
to push through any reforms in the next decade.53         
In this policy vacuum, Tucson’s actions in the Avra and Altar Valleys and the 
ensuing litigation shaped the framework for transporting groundwater. Developers had 
profited from the WWII economic boom by constructing neighborhoods that, while 
outside Tucson’s service area, could nonetheless be supplied through private wells. 
Tucson started expanding its water service area in 1938 by acquiring these systems to 
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meet the needs of a growing population; it operated forty-three wells that supplied 200 
water companies and 250,000 customers by the 1960s. But this mounting dependence on 
groundwater also caused the water table to drop precipitously. With the nearby Santa 
Cruz River already strained, Tucson initially adopted conservation measures as a remedy. 
Even after Congress approved the CAP, the immediate fears of water shortages prompted 
city official to look west for new supplies in Avra Valley.54  
This valley formed a north-south groundwater area confined by mountains on the 
east and west. The alluvium of valley floors absorbed the run-off from the mountains that 
totaled 16.5 million AF of water. But the excessive pumping to feed burgeoning 
farmlands above led the State Land Department to declare the valley a critical 
groundwater area in 1954. Tucson purchased Avra Valley farmland and drilled six wells 
from which officials planned to convey 30,000 AF per year 15 to 18 miles back to the 
city’s service area. While their lawmakers unsuccessfully pushed for a bill to open up 
groundwater transportation, the city applied for a right-of-way over a patch of state lands.  
The city’s actions did not sit well with those remaining who irrigated 33,000 acres of 
Avra Valley lands. After failing to negotiate a solution with Tucson’s attorneys, W.W. 
Jarvis and four farmers sued the State Land Department to prevent Tucson’s right-of-
way. The appeals mounted, leading the Arizona Supreme Court to rule on the case.55  
The court favored the injunction. Continual pumping by irrigators and natural 
drainage had depleted the aquifer by 15 percent of its capacity and dropped the water 
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table eighteen feet, thus meriting the Avra Valley’s declaration as a critical groundwater 
area. Since Tucson’s additional pumping would amount to 25 percent of that which was 
already being withdrawn, it was clearly violating the state’s groundwater code. The court 
issued an injunction against the right-of-way until the Avra and Altar Valleys were no 
longer critical groundwater areas.56 The court did say Tucson could use eminent domain 
so long as it compensated farmers for their losses. But the combination of irrigated lands, 
the 8,000 acres of state trust lands under cultivation, and the remaining 81,000 acres of 
desert land that would be harmed by additional pumping made it impossible for Tucson 
to “adequately compensate” farmers.57 
Less than a year later, both parties found themselves before the Arizona Supreme 
Court with new grievances. Before the court issued its Jarvis I decision, Tucson had 
completed a $3 million pipeline to convey water. Instead of abandoning the pipeline, the 
city continued pumping water but delivered it to Ryan Field and several residences that, 
while outside the critical groundwater area, were within the larger Avra Valley drainage 
area. Tucson insisted that no water was leaving the valley; farmers countered that the 
city’s actions violated the spirit of the court’s earlier ruling. Since “additional users 
would necessarily deplete the supply of existing users,” the court again ruled that Tucson 
could not transport water outside of the critical groundwater area.58 Perhaps out of 
foresight, Tucson asked the court where it could acquire cultivated lands within the 
critical groundwater area from which it could then withdraw groundwater. The court 
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looked to the State Water Code’s prioritization of domestic and municipal uses over 
irrigation and stock watering to conclude that Tucson could do so, provided that the water 
withdrawn would be “an amount equal to the annual historical maximum use.”59 Jarvis II 
in effect created the precedent for allowing a city to purchase and retire farmland for its 
water rights.   
Tucson began acquiring and then retiring Avra Valley farmland within the critical 
area while requesting to have the court modify its Jarvis I injunction. After a special 
master delivered a study, the court tackled the delicate task of quantifying the “historical 
maximum use” in Jarvis II that would dictate how much water Tucson could extract. The 
city argued that the rate should be 4.4 AF per year, which was the amount farmers had 
traditionally withdrawn. Those opposed to this rate reasoned that since half of the water 
withdrawn for local agriculture returned underground, Tucson should be limited to the 
consumptive amount—the portion that did not return to the water table—rather than the 
total amount taken out. The court sided with Jarvis in interpreting “historical use” as 
consumptive use.60 The Jarvis cases established important precedents for water farms and 
rural-urban water transportation. But the court’s decision in a simultaneous case that 
consolidated groundwater disputes quickly rewrote many of these protocols.  
The Farmers Investment Company (FICO) had irrigated 7,000 acres of pecan 
groves in the Santa Cruz Valley with 38,500 AF of percolating groundwater that the State 
Land Commissioner declared part of the Sahuarita-Continental Critical Groundwater 
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Area on October 14, 1954. Three mining companies—the Pima Mining Company, 
Anamax Copper Mining Company, and the Duval Mining Company—began mining low-
grade copper ore in the Sierrita foothills east of FICO’s lands and outside the critical area 
in the 1960s. Since purifying copper ore was a water-intensive process, all three 
companies purchased land within the critical area to pump and transport groundwater to 
their mills. By the late 1960s, they were pumping out 25,000 AF per year. Tucson had 
been pumping 10,000 AF a year from a well field within this same critical area since the 
1950s for its customers elsewhere. 
FICO first sued Anamax in November 1969, charging that the company’s 
transportation activities had lowered the water table and therefore increased pumping 
costs. Anamax countered that any depletion in the critical groundwater area was surely 
the fault of FICO, Tucson, and other users who pumped from this area. After the case 
worked its way through Superior Court, FICO amended its complaint to include the other 
mining companies as well as the State Land Commissioner in November 1973.61 Tucson 
also filed an injunction against FICO and the mining companies out of concern that the 
fertilizers and industrial chemicals they used were contaminating groundwater within the 
critical area. The mines countersued and argued that Tucson had no right to transport 
water from its wellfields outside the critical groundwater area.62       
All three parties in this intricate case were surprised when the Arizona Supreme 
Court announced its ruling on August 26, 1976. The court reduced the three cases to a 
simple legal issue: did the doctrine of reasonable use permit someone to use percolating 
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waters off the land from where they were withdrawn if it damaged others who relied on 
this common supply? In answering yes, the court effectively banned any injurious 
groundwater transportation.63 Mining and municipal lawyers swiftly petitioned for a 
rehearing only to have the court deny them. The only viable option was to turn to the 
state legislature. At the insistence of legislative leaders, mining, municipalities, and 
agricultural representatives came together to draft a temporary bill that would protect 
current groundwater pumping until more comprehensive legislation could be passed. But 
each side sought a different result. The mines aimed to continue transporting water; if 
not, their industry would face certain demise.64 City representatives pushed for more 
comprehensive groundwater conservation measures that would free up additional water 
resources for their continued growth. Both shared a conviction that irrigated agriculture 
operated a water monopoly—one amounting to 89 percent of the water in the state—that 
had precipitated the groundwater crisis. Agricultural negotiators, on the other hand, 
wanted to find a way to permit water transportation without infringing on the rights of 
farmers. The resulting bill, which the legislature passed without alteration, reflected the 
compromise between all three interests.65    
The Groundwater Transfer Act of 1977 sanctioned transporting groundwater 
outside of critical areas while trying to minimize any harm. Any landowner injured by the 
transportation could sue to recover damages. Transporting groundwater from lands within 
a critical area required Certificate of Exemption from the State Land Department. 
                                                   
63 Ibid., 527. 
64 “Copper Mines Worried Over Water Shortage,” Arizona Legislative Review, April 6, 1977, pg. 1.  
65 Desmond D. Connall, Jr., “A History of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act,” Arizona State Law 
Journal (1982): 319-320.  
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Emulating the foolhardy logic of the 1948 Groundwater Code, the department would 
grant a certificate to any party that had transported groundwater before January 1, 1977 at 
the rate it had transported before that date. It would also issue a comparable certificate if 
the requesting party had bought, leased, or retired the farmland from which it would 
withdraw the water. As with the previous criteria, the requesting party would be entitled 
to withdraw as much water as had been pumped and applied to lands in question.66  
The act’s provisions reflected the intention of its authors; it would serve as a 
temporary measure until a twenty-five member commission—consisting of legislators 
and lobbyists who had participated in negotiations thus far—authorized in its last 
provision could draft legislation to enable more efficient groundwater use. Even before 
this commission began meeting in 1978, many of its members had become more 
committed to reforming Arizona’s groundwater laws. President Carter’s unsuccessful 
proposal to cut CAP funding in February 1977 nearly meant that the state’s future 
depended on their efforts. Several Arizona Water Commission (AWC) studies directed 
them on future water usage trends and introduced twelve groundwater management 
schemes. While participants agreed to limit groundwater consumption in the three most 
urban basins (the Salt River, Upper Santa Cruz, and Little Chino), they differed on 
approach. The AWC study had recommended reducing groundwater overdraft by 
purchasing and retiring 9 percent of irrigated agriculture land (approximately 128,000 
acres) in the Upper Santa Cruz and Salt River Basins. Mining and municipal 
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representatives maintained that this approach denied the public nature of groundwater 
while rewarding the very farmers who had produced this crisis.67 
By January 1979, negotiations shifted in venue and purpose. Now gathered at 
Castle Hot Springs, members began putting together the schema that would shape the 
most comprehensive groundwater legislation Arizona had yet seen. Beyond an initial 
divide over the scope of the law, when they sided with urban interests on regulating only 
the most overdrafted areas, agriculture representatives were constantly outnumbered. The 
initial draft recommended a system that quantified, and therefore limited, groundwater 
rights which would be severable from the land. Cities and mines could then purchase and 
retire farms to maintain their activities. The report’s management scheme focused on 
local control with an overriding agency to retire groundwater right by purchase or 
condemnation. The shrill cries from farmers at public hearings that September killed its 
passage. Only Secretary of Interior Cecil Andrus’s threat in September 1979 that he 
would not allocate any CAP water until Arizona had passed a groundwater code that 
would remedy ongoing overdrafting could revive talks.68  
When private negotiations the following month failed to reach a consensus on all 
points of contention, those involved asked Governor Bruce Babbitt to step in. Over coffee 
and cheap donuts, Babbitt and this “rump group” of lobbyists and legislators spent six 
months hammering out an agreement. Even with a draft bill in place by April, negotiators 
took two months to scrutinize the 175-page bill, line-by-line, until they had reached a 
                                                   
67 Connall, 320, 324-325. 
68 Political lore has it that Babbitt, who was determined to resolve this issue, requested that Andrus send his 
letter. Connall, 326-329.  
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livable compromise. Within a week in early June 1980, the commission had approved, 
the Arizona State Legislature had passed without debate, and Babbitt had signed into law 
the Ground Water Management Act (GMA).69 
The act created the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) to oversee 
its implementation and enforcement through five management periods beginning in 1985. 
By gradually curtailing groundwater pumping in four active management areas (AMA) 
through each period, the state would reach safe-yield—the point at which groundwater 
withdrawals equaled natural and artificial recharge—by 2025. Beyond covering previous 
critical groundwater areas, these four AMAs contained 80 percent of the state’s 
population and 69 percent of its economic activity. Three of them encompassed the 
groundwater basins that cradled the urban centers of Prescott, Phoenix, and Tucson. Any 
new subdivided land within these AMAs required showing access to a 100-year assured 
water supply (AWS) which could be easily satisfied by contracting for CAP water or 
other “renewable” surface supplies.70 A fourth AMA that covered five sub-basins in Pinal 
County followed alternate criteria. To preserve the agricultural foundation of the area, the 
GMA permitted current farming to continue for as long as feasible, consistent with the 
necessity to preserve future water supplies for non-irrigation uses.71  
Within the AMAs, the GMA established three tiers of water rights. One 
grandfathered existing uses of irrigated groundwater and could be transferred with its 
                                                   
69 Connall, 340, 343.  
70 ARS §45-576. 
71 ARS §45-431. 
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corresponding land.72 Another, a type 1 groundwater right, applied to land permanently 
converted to non-irrigation use under which someone could withdraw up to 3 AF per 
year. Like the irrigation grandfathered right, this right was paired with the land 
overlaying the groundwater.73 The final right, the type 2 right, is the most flexible. 
Though limited to non-irrigation use, it amounts to the maximum quantity of 
groundwater pumped between 1975 and 1980 for non-irrigation use. Unlike the previous 
two rights, a user can transfer a type 2 right without selling the land—including 
withdrawing water from a different spot that is still within the same AMA.74 In allowing 
a user to convert water rights, the GMA relaxed the restraints on groundwater 
transportation.   
To discourage any legal challenges, a non-severability clause tied the GMA 
together. If the courts struck down any portion, the entire act would collapse. While its 
approach—which the Ford Foundation lauded as one of the most innovative programs in 
state government—was intended to reflect a comprehensive consensus, several 
unresolved issues lingered. What exactly constituted a 100-year AWS? Why rely on 
gallons per capita per day (GPCD) limits—which measured total water consumption—as 
the metric for reaching safe-yield, and not simply limit the amount of groundwater 
withdrawn? Finally, how likely was it that epicenters of growth—in crops harvested, 
population, and industrial production—would submit to restrictions on water 
consumption? The GMA put in place tenuous criteria for reducing overdraft while 
                                                   
72 ARS §45-452; ARS §45-465. 
73 ARS §45-463. 
74 ARS §45-464. 
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providing those subject to them with an escape mechanism through transporting 
groundwater.   
FOUNDATIONS FOR MOVING WATER 
 Within half a millennium, the inhabitants of Arizona went from coming to water 
to making water come to them. The increased ability to divert and transport water—in 
effect, to sever it from its place—changed its value. Where indigenous consensus 
regarded it as a community good, Spanish mercantilism made water a centrally managed 
public commodity. The industrial capitalism Anglo-settlement brought rendered water a 
private commodity whose legal ownership depended on whether a user could apply it to 
economically productive activity. Farmers in central Arizona zealously diverted rivers 
and plundered ancient aquifers for profit. Political clout enabled those in the Phoenix-
area to obtain one of the first federal reclamation projects and negotiate diversions from 
the Verde River; city leaders similarly created a franchise that pulled more water from the 
depths of the earth. Annexing and retiring SRP-served agricultural lands became the new 
mantra when existing water supplies proved incapable of maintaining urban and 
industrial growth. When faced with a similar crisis, Tucson pushed this rationale by 
acquiring then retiring farmlands in Avra Valley, land that while in a separate drainage 
basin was still geographically close. While the CAP promised more fuel for growth, 
increasingly severe groundwater overdrafting, a ruling which threatened the future of 
groundwater transportations, and federal demands for comprehensive reform forced state 
leaders to confront a crisis wholly of their own making. Their solution, the GMA, simply 
fashioned loopholes for groundwater transportation that shoved Arizona headlong into 
another crisis.        
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CHAPTER 3: ACQUISITIONS
 
INSTITUTIONAL FRICTION 
 Insecurity hovered over the Phoenix-area after the passage of the Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA) in 1980. While it had ensured the viability of the Central 
Arizona Project (CAP), the lifeline for an area rapidly outgrowing the capacity of its local 
water resources, no one knew how rigorously it would be enforced. The GMA was many 
things to many people, but unease about what lay ahead united them. The following year 
passed with little indication of how the newly established Department of Water 
Resources (ADWR) would act. But when the agency began announcing requirements, 
anxiety intensified.   
Its declarations of active management areas (AMA) triggered two challenges to 
the GMA’s constitutionality. In the first, a continuation of an ongoing case, the small 
town of Chino Valley sued to stop its larger neighbor, Prescott, from transporting water 
from wells the city owned that were within the boundaries of the Chino Valley. Since 
both municipalities were within the Little Chino Sub-basin of a proposed AMA, the 
GMA sanctioned this transportation. Chino Valley lawyers therefore argued that the 
GMA was unconstitutional because it amounted to taking property, in the form of 
groundwater, without due process of law or just compensation.1 The other case, which 
several companies and residents in the Upper Agua Fria Sub-basin of the same AMA 
initiated, claimed that the GMA’s restrictions on groundwater pumping decreased the 
value of the lands, which overlay an aquifer, without any compensation. 2  
                                                   
1 Town of Chino Valley et. al. v. City of Prescott (Chino Valley II), 131 Ariz. 79, 80 (1981).   
2 Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 689 (1983). 
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The court upheld the GMA using the same precedent that had struck down earlier 
challenges to the 1948 Groundwater Code and its 1977 amendments: the state legislature 
had the power to declare groundwater as something that could be used and not owned.3 
Equally important as these rulings was who defended the GMA. Representatives from a 
range of agricultural, mining, and municipals interests filed supportive amici curae 
briefings in Chino Valley II.4 Whatever qualms some had, few dared to risk the disruption 
that would ensue if the GMA was struck down.     
The First Management Plan (1980-1990) for the Phoenix AMA that the ADWR 
released in December 1984 established moderately stringent measures for reducing per 
capita consumption.5 As the product of extensive reviews and stakeholder meetings, no 
one should have been surprised that it curtailed municipal groundwater withdrawals to 
1980 levels. By the provisions of this metric, municipal providers consumed 418,000 
acre-feet (AF), 44 percent of which came from groundwater. While this consumption 
only accounted for 20 percent of the AMA’s total water use, the ADWR predicted that by 
2025 cities would consume over half of their underlying groundwater. The agency 
therefore implemented requirements to shift users towards “renewable” supplies like the 
CAP. They proposed that by 2025 mined groundwater would only account for 13 percent 
of the Phoenix AMA’s total water supply. To accomplish this ambitious task, the ADWR 
                                                   
3 Southwest Engineering Company v. Ernst, 79 Ariz. 403 (1955); Town of Chino Valley v. State Land 
Department, 119 Ariz. 243 (1978). 
4 Town of Chino Valley et. al. v. City of Prescott (Chino Valley II), 131 Ariz. 78 (1981).   
5 The gallons per capita per day (GPCD) is calculated by dividing the gallons a municipality withdrew in 
1980 by its population in 1980, then multiplying the quotient by 365. It is worth noting that the gallons 
withdrawn includes groundwater withdrawals and surface water diversions (but not effluent), which makes 
the management plan an overall water conservation measure rather than simply a regulation for curbing 
groundwater withdrawals.   
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divided large municipal providers into low (less than 140 GPCD), medium (141-350 
GPCD), and high (350+ GPCD) users. High consumers would need to reduce their 
GPCD by 11 percent while medium consumers could either reduce GPCD by 6 percent or 
reach 140 GPCD. Low consumers were free of any restrictions except complying with 
their new assigned maximum GPCD by December 31, 1986. Most of these requirements 
fell on the medium users that supplied 95.6 percent of the AMA’s 1.45 million people.6  
The First Management Plan placed modest constraints on the ability of these cities 
to provide enough water for their growing populations. Despite an economic recession in 
the early 1980s, Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix—the three most populous cities in the 
Phoenix metropolitan-area—had already surpassed the population upon which the GPCD 
standards were calculated by 1984.7 Predicting future water consumption, when all three 
cities were at least 40 percent undeveloped, would be difficult. But if they could not 
supply their growing populations, they feared that growth moratoriums could bind their 
future.         
Where groundwater had once been considered insurance against future droughts, 
cities now looked to CAP for security. The state legislature had expanded the authority of 
the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) so that it could contract with 
the Department of Interior to operate and maintain portions of CAP. But even as the 
CAWCD began negotiating individual subcontracts in the fall of 1983, uncertainty crept 
in. The Ak Chin Indian Community and Tohono O’odham Nation had already completed 
                                                   
6 Arizona Department of Water Resources, Phoenix Active Manage Area, Management Plan for First 
Management Period, 1980-1990 (Phoenix, Arizona: December 1984), 24, 63-64, 67-69, 72-73.  
7 See Figure 1: Municipal Population Growth (in millions), 1930-1990. 
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negotiations for their reserved rights which brought them 112,800 AF annually of 
Colorado River water, and two other sets of negotiations were still underway.8 Any water 
rights that would inevitably be granted to these tribes could have a higher priority over 
other CAP users, increasing the possibility that the project could not deliver enough water 
to fulfill the demands of those who had planned on utilizing it.    
Future scarcities became present realities by 1984. While the GMA did permit 
groundwater transportation within AMA sub-basins, the notion that any of the twenty-
three cities within the Phoenix AMA would permit any groundwater transportation away 
from them was ludicrous. Encumbered by GMA requirements that limited how they 
could increase their supplies, the only solution for Phoenix-area cities was to search out 
new sources of water, most likely in farmlands with well-established water rights.  
WATER FARMS 
Water rights sales pitches intensified as the GMA implementation drew near. Sam 
Steiger, a former congressman known for his colorful bluster, began marketing options to 
46 wells from Wine Glass Ranch in Big Chino Valley in 1983. Since the underlying 
aquifer was outside of the Prescott AMA, it was free of pumping restrictions; Prescott 
was already drawing 4,000 AF (about 90 percent of its water) from the nearby town of 
Chino Valley. Steiger planned to sell at least 3,500 AF at $150 per AF to Prescott. The 
remainder he would market to Phoenix, Mesa, Scottsdale, and Glendale with the caveat 
that they would be cut off if the water table dropped more than 10 percent over a five-
year period. If it had gone into action, 50,000-100,000 AF would have left the Big Chino 
                                                   
8 An Act Relating to the water rights of the Ak-Chin Indian Community, Pub. L. No 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698, 
98th Congress, (October 19, 1984); Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No 97-293, 96 
Stat. 1274, 98th Congress, (October 12, 1982). 
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Valley each year. But no one bought into his plan. Uncertainty over the natural recharge 
of the valley, increased costs for transporting this water to the Verde River, and the risks 
that diminishing the river’s flow would incur legal challenges from the Salt River Project, 
stopped Steiger’s scheme.9  
Corporations and current owners of other rural lands took an interest in marketing 
their water. Arizona Public Service Company, a private utility, had originally acquired 
12,550 acres of La Paz County land and water rights in 1980 for a 1,500 megawatt coal-
fired power plant. When it became clear that the plant would not be needed until 2000, 
the utility leased the land to tenant farmers and began marketing its water rights. James 
Fullmer, a rancher who acquired 3,961 acres of farmland and desert land along the La 
Paz-Maricopa County line in the late 1970s, listed his properties and their groundwater 
reserves for $9.6 million.10 
Many farmers were still reeling from the 1981 recession. Depressed prices from 
international competition met higher operating costs of pumping groundwater and the 
realities that younger generations had little interest in continuing the business. 
Agricultural representatives had based their position during GMA negotiations on the 
understanding that their role within Arizona’s economy—and with it, their near 
                                                   
9 Roger Manning, a former Executive Director of the Arizona Municipal Water Users Association, recalled 
Steiger pitching this deal to him. When Manning asked for a written agreement, Steiger blanched. Carolyn 
Anderson, “Council to consider Steiger water offer; But can Big Chino Valley aquifer replenish pumped 
groundwater?” Prescott Courier, October 9, 1983, 1A, 10A; Carolyn Anderson, “Steiger presents proposal 
to sell Big Chino water to city of Prescott,” Prescott Courier, December 6, 1983, 1A; Joseph Pomento, 
“Big Chino water costs to increase, Steiger says,” Prescott Courier, February 9, 1984, 1A, 16A.   
10 “Elizabeth Checchio, Water Farming: The Promise and Problems of Water Transfers in Arizona 
(Tucson: Water Resources Research Center, University of Arizona, January 1988), 8, 9, 10; Gary Woodard 
et. al., The Water Transfer Process in Arizona: Analysis of Impacts and Legislative Options (Tucson: 
Division of Economic and Business Research College of Business and Public Administration, the 
University of Arizona, April 1988), 134, 143-144. 
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monopoly on water rights—would decline. Farmers within Maricopa County had hoped 
that the GMA would compel Phoenix-area cities to purchase their land for its appurtenant 
groundwater. At almost $10,000 per acre, such a sale would afford a comfortable 
retirement.11 Few realized that the proverb of developers going for cheap dirt also applied 
to cities, many of which were scouting rural areas while trying to figure out how they 
would transport groundwater back to their service areas. One emerging area caught their 
attention.  
Discontent with county government had always existed in Yuma County. The 
county seat in Yuma was closer to California and Mexico than to many residents in the 
county’s north. The paltry funding for quality roads and tax burden for services that 
northern residents would never reap—namely indigent healthcare for migrant workers—
reinforced this sense of neglect and roiled them to political action. Don Moon, the son of 
a prominent family and a politically ambitious lawyer, discovered a loophole in state law 
that allowed residents to secede and form a new county. Within a year of circulating 
petitions, northern residents had voted to create La Paz County in 1983 with Moon 
serving as its first county attorney. But the county quickly fell into debt. The start-up 
costs of assembling a new government, current operating expenses, and a lawsuit with 
Yuma County to divide resources demanded more than its tax base—less than 5 percent 
of which was private land—could support. It took a legislative bailout for the county to 
regain fiscal solvency two years later.12 All the while, construction of the Granite Reef 
                                                   
11 Roger Manning, personal interview on February 7, 2013.   
12 Jan Mohr Meng and Marc Meng, The County of Peace (Parker, Arizona: Jmar Productions, 1984), 3; “La 
Paz County Is Now Officially Out of Debt,” Parker Pioneer, November 8, 1984, pg. 1.  
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Aqueduct, which would divert Colorado River water into the Granite Reef Aqueduct of 
the CAP, had snaked through the new county on its way to Phoenix. The project, which 
provided the infrastructure to transport water from rural lands to the Phoenix-area, would 
soon come online.  
Planet Ranch 
Planet Ranch occupied a curious position within La Paz County. Resting along 
the Yuma-Mohave County line formed by the Bill Williams River and 20 miles upstream 
from its confluence with the Colorado, the ranch had been formed from two small 
homesteads that George L. Gibbons had purchased and combined into a 4,525-acre swath 
in 1955. Five years later, Arizona Ranch and Metals Company (ARMCO), a Salt Lake 
City-based mining and stock company, began constructing a copper mine and mill in 
nearby Mineral Wash. Since processing copper ore was water-intensive, ARMCO 
purchased Gibbon’s land and water rights as well as those surrounding them in 1961.13 
The first hint of the company’s plan came in a commissioned study the following year 
which concluded that 16,800 AF could be pumped for crops every year.14 After the 
Alamo Dam was built 20 miles upstream in 1968, the company acquired more farmlands 
within the river’s floodplain so that Planet Ranch enveloped 8,400 acres of deeded land 
and over 175,000 acres of federal and state grazing land by 1970.15 ARMCO 
                                                   
13 Included in this purchase were two other ranches, Lincoln and Rankin Ranch, were respectively 8 and 13 
miles upstream from Planet Ranch. Albert C. Martin and Associates, Planet Ranch: Development Master 
Plan Report Prepared for Arizona Ranch and Metals Company (Los Angeles, California: October 1970), 6. 
14 Samuel F. Turner, “Water Resources of the Planet Ranch on Bill Williams River, Mohave and Yuma 
Counties, Arizona,” August 1962, pg. 45. Arizona State Archives, RG 142 Department of Water Resources, 
Box 13, Folder 16, Dept Office Files (32-F-02) 003 Bill Wms River – Planet Land Exchange 1962, 1974, 
N.D.   
15 “The History of Planet Ranch,” General Ranch Info, Planet Ranch Files, City of Scottsdale. 
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commissioned a development plan that year for creating a residential retreat for wealthy 
Southern Californians. Planners saw no irony when they proclaimed that the “natural 
landscape should be held basically sacrosanct” by planning two golf courses and using 
groundwater to create a 745-acre artificial lake that featured a marina and an exclusive set 
of island homes in its center.16 ARMCO went a step further by pursuing a three-way land 
swap with the Bureau of Land Management and the State Land Department to create this 
city. Opposition from numerous state agencies, including the Arizona Water 
Commission, dragged out proceedings for three years. While the resolution in October 
1977 limited their plans, the GMA passage offered an alternative avenue for marketing 
their lands.17  
As water demand in the Phoenix-area grew, the company started to plan for 
selling their water rights. Instead of spending millions to construct a behemoth delivery 
system to Phoenix, ARMCO determined that the CAP could do nearly all the work for 
them if they could overcome the legal hurdles of transporting non-project water through 
it. When the company queried the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) whether it could let its 
Bill Williams River water flow into the CAP intake from Lake Havasu for later 
withdrawal, the agency pointed out that doing so was contrary to the law of the river, but 
                                                   
16 Albert C. Martin and Associates, Planet Ranch: Development Master Plan Report Prepared for Arizona 
Ranch and Metals Company (Los Angeles, California: October 1970), 31, 39, 62-63, 68, 72. 
17Among the complaints against ARMCO were that its application lacked any land planning or any 
discussion of the environmental impacts of development. The deal that came in October 1977 consolidated 
ARMCO’s holdings. They sold off a 1,575 acre-parcel of land to the Nature Conservancy which was added 
to the Bill Williams National Wildlife Refuge further downstream. Robert G. Worden, Department of 
Economic Planning and Development, to Constance LaMonica, Arizona State Clearinghouse, “Planet 
Townsite – Draft Environmental Statement State Application Indentifier: 73-80-0024,” June 11, 1973; 
Wesley Steiner, Arizona Water Commission, to Constance LaMonica, Department of Economic Planning 
and Development, May 2, 1973, Arizona State Archives, RG 142 Department of Water Resources, Box 13, 
Folder 16 Dept Office Files (32-F-02) 003 Bill WMS River – Planet Land Exchange 1962-1974, N.D.   
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suggested—along with the ADWR—that ARMCO would not be legally encumbered if it 
would transport its water directly to the CAP.18 At the same time, the company requested 
that the CAWCD comment on transporting non-project water. In what was the first 
official statement on CAP wheeling, the board endorsed “the concept of transporting 
water surplus from outlying areas of the state into the District for use within its 
boundaries.”19 Within a year, ARMCO had sold Planet Ranch. 
Scottsdale officials had originally negotiated a two-year lease with ARMCO that 
they had hoped would make the ranch pay for itself. When that agreement collapsed, the 
city quickly bought Planet Ranch and its 13,500 acre-feet of Bill Williams River water 
rights in March 1984 for $11,600,000.20 The city, which had heavily relied on 
groundwater, also had a 20,488 AF CAP allocation and planned to contract for a 5,061 
AF SRP allocation. As it stood, the groundwater and CAP supply were enough for 
210,000 residents. Yet by their calculations, which assumed a usage rate of 325 GPCD 
and growth rate of 5,000 people annually, most of which would occur outside of the SRP 
boundaries, this allocation would be fully committed by 1987. A 30 percent demand 
reduction would only provide a four-year delay.21 Buying Planet Ranch was not a cheap 
venture. Scottsdale initially paid $2,222 per AF to acquire 12,150 AF of water rights that 
                                                   
18 Letter to Frank C. Brophy Jr. from N.W. Plummer, Regional Director of Bureau of Reclamation, June 30, 
1983, Arizona State Archives, RG 142 Department of Water Resources, Box 13, Folder 21 Dept Office 
Files (32-F-02) 006 BWR; PR Apps, Permits, Certs, etc, ca 1975, 1983. 
19 Letter from Wallace Walker, President of ARMCO, to Executive Directors and Directors, Central 
Arizona Water Conservation District, November 22, 1982; Central Arizona Water Conservation District 
Minutes, March 5, 1983, pg 3, CAWCD files.  
20 Payments were broken down into $2,850,000 payment at the close of escrow and remainder would be 
paid off over 8 years at 9% interest. See “Scottsdale’s Planet Ranch,” Planet Ranch Files, City of 
Scottsdale. 
21 City of Scottsdale Water Resource Department. 1985 Water Resource Plan, 21, 27-28.  
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it would transport from Planet Ranch. It would cost the city an additional $15 million 
(approximately $1,250 per AF) to treat this water before it could be used.22 Since the Bill 
Williams River would provide a continual water supply, City Manager Roy Pederson 
spoke for many Scottsdale officials when he claimed that it “could virtually assure 
Scottsdale of adequate water supplies consistent with quality growth and development for 
the foreseeable future.”23    
Once the ARMCO shareholders approved the sale and the property changed 
hands on May 24, 1984, Scottsdale began planning. The alfalfa farming that ARMCO 
had relied on to maintain their water rights would continue for at least another fifteen 
years. Officials intended to sell this alfalfa to local horse owners. By fiscal year (FY) 
1988-1989, they calculated that their alfalfa profit would almost cover the $1.3 million 
needed for every year for operating costs and capital improvements.24 In the meantime, 
the city contracted with Boyle Engineering Corporation to file applications for the 
certificates necessary to transfer the ranch’s water rights.25 Pederson also followed up 
                                                   
22 City of Scottsdale Water Resource Department, 1984 Water Resource Plan, 36-39. 
23 Even after acquiring Planet Ranch, Scottsdale was also considering additional water ranches which 
would have run another $56.4 million. Ibid; Roy R. Pederson, City Manager, to the Honorable Mayor & 
City Council, “Acquisition of Planet Ranch,” Agenda Item No. 19, March 1984, Planet Ranch Files, City of 
Scottsdale.  
24 Scottsdale hired 19 full-time and 6 part-time employees, some of whom had staffed Planet Ranch under 
ARMCO, to manage Planet Ranch. Interview with Roy R. Pederson, February 5, 2013; City Council 
Action Report from Field Operations/Fleet Management to Mayor and City Council, “Planet Ranch – FY 
84/85 Budget, Positions and C.I.P Projects – Ordinance No. 1657,” July 16, 1984.   
25 City Council Action Report from Leonard Dueker, Community Development, to Mayor and City 
Council, “Award Engineering Contract for Applications to Transfer & Change Water Rights & Permits,” 
Agenda Item No. 41, February 4, 1985, Planet Ranch Files, City of Scottsdale. 
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with CAWCD about wheeling non-project water, only to be told that any such agreement 
would have to wait until the district had completed all CAP subcontracts.26  
A tepid response greeted this unprecedented action. ADWR Director Wesley 
Steiner, who maintained that the intention of the GMA was to liberalize groundwater 
transportation, endorsed the sale.27 Scottsdale Mayor Herb Drinkwater had vowed that 
nothing would be done to “spoil the way of life” of La Paz County. Once ranching 
operations ended, he predicted that Planet Ranch would become a wildlife refuge. The 
following year, Scottsdale officials began talks with La Paz County for an 
intergovernmental agreement to cover lost revenue. It would take the city two more years 
before it began making any payments in-lieu of property taxes.28 While The Parker 
Pioneer announced the purchase above its masthead, none of state legislative candidates 
who ran for office that year—Senator Jones Osborn and Representatives Bob McLendon 
and Frank McElhaney— mentioned the sale in any political advertisements. No one, it 
seemed, cared much about the state’s first municipal water farm that would transport 
water across county and basin lines.  
Eloy Sub-basin   
                                                   
26 Letter from Roy Pederson to Thomas Clark, CAWCD General Manager, November 15, 1984, CAWCD 
files; Letter from Thomas Clark to Roy Pederson, December 12, 1984, No. 69091, CAWCD files.  
27Many regard Steiner as the godfather of Arizona’s water development. After working in his native 
California on the development of a state water plan and becoming an expert on Colorado River water issues 
in the 1950s and 1960s, Steiner came to Arizona in February 1969 to serve as Executive Director of the 
Interstate Stream Commission. Steiner drafted the first statewide water plan, agitated for more restrictions 
on groundwater pumping, and oversaw negotiations for Plan 6 funding. By 1981, he was the Director of the 
newly created Arizona Department of Water Resources. Steiner, Wesley. “Oral history interview on 
December 3, 2003. Central Arizona Water Conservation District. http://www.capaz.com/Portals/1/Property 
Agent/1228/Files/1187/Interview%20with%20Wes% 20Steiner.pdf.    
28 La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Scottsdale/La Paz County IGA,” March 18, 1985, pg. 
850042-850043, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 1, Arizona State Archives; La Paz County Board of 
Supervisors Minutes, “Executive Session,” December 21, 1987, pg. 870274 [870282], RG 106 La Paz 
County, Roll 2, Arizona State Archives. 
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Once a modest agricultural community, Mesa’s population had tripled between 
1975 and 1985 to almost 300,000 people, making it the second-fastest growing city in the 
United States. Most of this growth came from aggressive annexation eastward between 
1970 and 1980 which increased its geographic size 232 percent to 65.38 square miles. By 
the next decade, the East Valley suburb would comprise 113.2 square miles. But this 
growth brought burdens. Groundwater accounted for nearly 27 percent of its supplies 
(14,738 AF) by 1985. While Mesa planned to shift to SRP and CAP water as it grew, 
these sources would only cover two-thirds of its 200,000 AF need by 2025. Even with the 
projected decrease in GPCD, utilizing reclaimed water, and implementing other 
conservation measures, city officials predicted that they would face a 30,000 AF shortage 
(15 percent of the projected water supply) by the turn of the millennium.29    
While Scottsdale was in negotiations for Planet Ranch, Mesa officials led by 
Water Resource Manager Karl Kohlhoff were considering Pinal County farmland for 
supplemental supplies.30 Like Scottsdale’s endeavor, purchasing and developing these 
water rights was expensive. The estimated total cost of $500 per AF was twice that of 
reclaiming effluent ($250), at least 2.6 times the cost of CAP water ($190), and over 11 
times the cost of SRP water ($45).31 But the high quality of the groundwater, its 
proximity to Mesa and the CAP, and its location in a planned depletion AMA justified 
                                                   
29 Karl F. Kohlhoff, “Urban Use of Arizona’s Rural Groundwater,” Journal American Water Works 
Association (March 1988): 47-48. 
30A native Arizonan, Kohlhoff was Mesa’s longtime water resource management coordinator when the city 
underwent exponential growth. Well, Huish & Associates to Dick Rosa, Administrator for Real Estate 
Services, December 20, 1984, “Pinal County water farms – acquisition,” Real Estate Services Department, 
City of Mesa.  
31 Included in this cost is the price for acquiring and delivering that water, along with any costs associated 
with operations, maintenance, and repair.  
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acquisition. Mesa purchased 32 parcels of land from 13 farmers totaling 11,606 acres in 
the Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District and Hohokam Irrigation and 
Drainage District. Most of these farmlands had produced upland and Pima varieties of 
cotton in addition to wheat, barley, and alfalfa that consumed 55,000 AF per year. These 
lands would soon yield 28,919 AF of groundwater annually for a city that became the 
largest landowner in the county.32  
Mesa officials intended to trade their groundwater for a portion of Tucson’s CAP 
allocation. After converting existing grandfathered water rights to a type 1 non-irrigation 
water right, which would allow its use on any lands, Mesa would deliver this 
groundwater to the CAP in return for an equal delivery of Tucson’s CAP allotment. The 
city would then use the CAP water to irrigate the farmland until 2000. At that point, 
farming would end and Mesa would begin withdrawing 2.7 AF of groundwater per acre 
which they would then exchange with Tucson for an additional CAP allotment. Before 
making this purchase, the city ran this proposal by the CAWCD. The district’s board 
thought that the idea complemented its support for transporting non-project water, but 
insisted that it would need the proposal “completely described” before approving it.33 
Even though Mesa never established a formal agreement with Tucson—the city only had 
a tentative letter of support from Tucson City Manager Joel D. Valdez—when it 
submitted its plans to the ADWR, the agency nonetheless approved it in April 1987.34  
                                                   
32 Kohlhoff, 47-49. 
33 Letter from CAWCD General Manager Thomas C. Clark to Mesa Public Workers Manager Dean Sloan, 
April 10, 1985, Real Estate Services Department, City of Mesa.  
34 Kohlhoff, 48-49. 
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While Mesa owned these lands, those within Pinal County exerted some influence 
over their future. Intergovernmental agreements with both irrigation districts hosting 
water farms bound Mesa to pay assessments until their respective debt obligations were 
repaid. The city also agreed that if it sold any lands to another tax-exempt entity, it would 
require the purchaser to abide by similar agreement.35 To head-off future concerns, Mesa 
commissioned an economic development plan for its properties and created an 
intergovernmental committee with representatives from the nearby towns and the Pinal 
County Planning Department to implement it. The study viewed Mesa’s activities as part 
of the county’s transition away from agriculture. When it would begin transporting 
groundwater in 2000, Mesa would devote 1 AF of CAP water per acre to the industrial 
development of the land. They predicted that the water and lands would be foundations 
for six mid-sized industries (including a regional jet port), a shopping center, and two RV 
parks. The Pinal County Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the plan, which 
Mesa Mayor Peggy Rubach and Community Development Manager Wayne Balmer 
personally presented to them, on October 10, 1989.36  
McMullen Valley  
Phoenix foresaw the oncoming groundwater restrictions before they arrived. 
Groundwater had supplied almost half of the city’s water in 1975 but within ten years, as 
                                                   
35 “Intergovernmental Agreement between the City of Mesa, Arizona and the Hohokam Irrigation and 
Drainage District, Pinal County, Arizona” 85-A38, August 29, 1985, pgs. 3, 6; “Intergovernmental 
Agreement between the City of Mesa, Arizona and Central Arizona Irrigation and Drainage District, Pinal 
County Arizona,” November 17, 1987 
36 Greiner Engineering, Inc, City of Mesa/Pinal County Water Farm Project, June 10, 1988, Section 2. 
Economic Analysis, 2-4; Wayne Balmer, Community Development Manager, to Mayor Rubach, 
“Responses to the size issues raised by the Pinal County Governmental Alliance, Inc.,” January 29, 1991, 
Real Estate Services Department, City of Mesa; Pinal County Board of Supervisors, “Minutes for October 
10, 1989,” Book 18, Resolution PZC-11-88.   
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the GMA was entering into effect, it accounted for only 27 percent of the city’s supplies. 
Officials had offset this decline by contracting with SRP for two-thirds of their waters 
and planned for the CAP filling out the rest.37 But the city’s 1985 water resource plan, 
which was the first comprehensive plan that the city had produced, forecasted that current 
supplies would not last. Even though Phoenix would begin receiving CAP water in 1986, 
rapid population growth outside the CAP and SRP service areas would surpass available 
supplies by the millennium—even with a 20 percent demand reduction. Though planners 
contemplated numerous improvements in water system efficiency, they found that 
“conservation alone will not suffice if rapid growth continues.” The implementation 
schedule recommended acquiring at least 20,000 AF of additional water within the next 
two years for use by 2004.38  
Phoenix arrived late to acquiring a rural water farm. Official were well aware that 
these properties were becoming increasingly controversial; rural lawmakers were already 
pushing for moratoriums on any future purchases.39 Any acquisition they made would 
carry numerous liabilities with it. They hired George Britton, a Babbitt administration 
natural resource economist who had helped draft the GMA, to lead the search for a water 
farm and gave him two criteria: first, any site under consideration had to be close to the 
CAP aqueduct; second, any underlying groundwater had to be in a self-contained aquifer 
                                                   
37City of Phoenix, Water & Sewers Department, “Water Production and Consumption in Million Gallons,” 
Annual reports for the years 1975 to 1985.   
38 Phoenix Water Resource Plan, 1985: a plan developed by the Phoenix Water and Wastewater 
Department to meet long-range water resource requirements (Phoenix: City of Phoenix, Water and 
Wastewater Department, 1985), 6-7, 9, 21, 22, 26, 31, 32, 34, 52-53, 66-67, 77, 78; David R. Garcia to 
Michael Gritzuk, “McMullen Valley History/Status Summary,” December 14, 1994, Law Department, City 
of Phoenix.  
39 “Thorny issues await legislators,” Arizona Capitol Times, January 8, 1986, pg. 18.  
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to limit the impact on surrounding lands. As Britton and his team were getting their 
search underway, a delegation from the McMullen Valley Water Conservation and 
Drainage District (MVWCCD) led by President Mary Urrea approached them with an 
offer in hand.40  
Located in northeastern La Paz County, McMullen Valley cradled the towns of 
Salome and Wenden which were the hub of nearby farming and mining operations. 
Residents drilled the first wells in the early 20th century for local cattle ranchers, the 
recently completed Arizona and California Railroad, and the nearby Bonanza Mine in 
Harrisburg Valley. Irrigated agriculture had taken root when the Harquahala Livestock 
Company drilled four wells in 1917, but only five other wells popped-up in the Salome-
Harrisburg Valley area by 1954. Only when farmers sank the first deep irrigation well 
into the Aguila Valley that gushed 2,000 gallons every minute did irrigated agriculture 
take off. Within seven years, 23 new irrigation wells were tapping into the deep 
underlying aquifers.41 Twenty-five years of bountiful cotton farming crashed with the 
1980s recession. Rising power costs made irrigation prohibitively expensive: one farmer 
paid $250,000 a year to irrigate his 1,200-acre cotton field.42 Concerned residents formed 
the MVWCCD in 1984 to spread the water costs associated with crop irrigation and to 
get a slice of cheaper, subsidized Hoover Preference Power. But as negotiations 
                                                   
40 George Britton, personal interview, March 9, 2013; Jay I. Moyes, personal interview, April 8, 2013. 
41 William Kam, Geology and Ground-Water Resources of the McMullen Valley, Maricopa, Yavapai, and 
Yuma Counties, Arizona: Water Resources Report Number Eight (Phoenix: Arizona State Land 
Department, 1964), 10, 13.  
42 Scott Armstrong, “Western cities buy out farmers for water; Will rural areas survive if they sell their 
precious resource?” Christian Science Monitor, April 21, 1987, pg. 3. 
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continued, the district had to rely on more expensive power from APS. Within a year, the 
district’s representatives were offering their lands and water rights to Phoenix.43     
Britton’s team proceeded cautiously. They hired an engineering consulting firm, 
James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers,44 to analyze the costs and benefits of 
acquiring thirty different rural agricultural plots for their water rights. Though the study 
selected McMullen Valley as the most promising source, officials looked to three sites in 
La Paz County that were close to the Granite Reef Aqueduct as potential water farms. 
Only two areas, Aguila Farms and McMullen Valley, offered, according to the study, the 
“opportunity to virtually control the use of the groundwater resource in these areas since 
the acquisition of lands being offered comprise over 80 percent of total existing irrigation 
areas.”45 There was little geographic difference: McMullen Valley and Aguila Valley 
formed part of the McMullen Valley Basin. The perched aquifer which contained 7.3 
million AF underneath the district (enough to serve 150,000 residents for 200 years) 
made McMullen Valley the favored site, even though the 20 miles that separated it from 
the Granite Reef Aqueduct of the CAP meant $34 million in transportation 
                                                   
43 In 1987, the Arizona Power Authority, the principal negotiating body for Hoover Dam hydropower, 
allocated 12,974,000 kilowatt hours (KH) of Schedule A power and 5,970,000 KH of Schedule B power to 
the MVWCDD. La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Arizona Public Service Applications, Gas 
and Electric Public Service Franchises,” March 19, 1984, pg. 429, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 1, Arizona 
State Archives; La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Public Hearing, Proposed McMullen Valley 
Water Conservation and Drainage District,” January 23, 1984, pgs. 376-377, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 
1, Arizona State Archives; La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “McMullen Valley Canvas,” May 
7, 1984, pgs. 475-479, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 1, Arizona State Archives; Michael Gritzuk to David 
R. Garcia, “McMullen Valley History/Status-Summary,” December 14, 1994, pg. 3, Law Department, City 
of Phoenix; Jay I. Moyes, personal interview, April 8, 2013.  
44 James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers Inc. worked with two other firms, Franzoy-Corey 
Engineers and Architects as well as Landry and Associates, to create their study.  
45 James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers Inc., City of Phoenix Water Resources Study McMullen 
Valley: Executive Summary, 1, 2, Law Department, City of Phoenix. 
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infrastructure.46 The closest this report came to addressing the third-party effects of this 
water farm was an acknowledgement that “[s]ince natural recharge is very low in the 
desert area of western Arizona, any groundwater development project would undoubtedly 
result in mining of the groundwater basin.” But the impact of removing groundwater 
seemed remote: “[l]ike Aguila Valley, McMullen Valley is remote and it is doubtful that 
significant development pressures will materialize in the foreseeable future.” 47  
Before agreeing to the purchase, city officials, district representatives, and the La 
Paz County Board of Supervisors met several times to smooth over any concerns. Fiscal 
matters dominated these meetings, though the supervisors also pushed Phoenix officials 
for an economic and hydrologic impact study.48 Phoenix officials assured the supervisors 
that they would cover any loss in property tax base and compensate La Paz County for 
any economic losses.49 After the purchase, they helped create the McMullen Valley 
Chamber of Commerce to attract new businesses to the area and made a point of hiring 
local workers for all maintenance activities. They hoped to replace agriculturally 
dependent jobs while pursuing 3-5 percent employment growth. Goodwill gestures 
abounded: officials donated ambulance, made $54,000 in donations to the nearby Tri-
Valley Medical Clinic, and arranged to lease a building to the clinic to store emergency 
                                                   
46 The data on which James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers based their findings were the Arizona 
Water Commission’s “Inventory of Resources and Uses,” which would later serve as the basis for the 
GMA. The inventory listed McMullen Valley as a Category I basin, meaning that enough data existed to 
provide a reasonable estimate of water balance.  William L. Chase, Jr. to Betsy Rieke, May 13, 1991, Law 
Department, City of Phoenix.  
47 James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers Inc., 11-12, Law Department, City of Phoenix.    
48 La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “McMullen Valley Study Committee,” May 18, 1987, pg. 
870079, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 2, Arizona State Archives.  
49 Ray Schultze, “Water agreement spawns ‘mistrust’,” The Phoenix Gazette, November 2, 1987, pgs. B1-
B2. 
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equipment at a dollar. At one point, they even purchased animals from the Tri-Valley 4-
H, slaughtered them, and then donated the meat to the McMullen Valley Food Bank.50 
 The purchase in December 1985 was the largest and priciest water farm in 
Arizona’s history. For $30,567,990, Phoenix bought 23 farms totaling 13,129 acres of 
MVWCDD farmland and leased 2,720 acres of state land. After commissioning another 
report to evaluate its options, the city decided to gradually phase out cotton farming for 
less water-intensive crops until 2005, by which time would it began withdrawing 30,000 
AF per year.51 During wet years, it would recharge aquifers with excess CAP water. In 
drier times, it would transport McMullen Valley groundwater via CAP to recharge 
aquifers within the Phoenix AMA.52 
 Phoenix met little local opposition. The report that the La Paz County Board of 
Supervisors requested from Phoenix found that most residents believed their future lay 
beyond agriculture; nearly all respondents in fact favored some form of economic 
diversification. The most criticism came from local water companies that fretted over 
lowered water tables and decreased opportunities for commercial and residential 
expansion.53 But outside of McMullen Valley, some viewed this purchase with 
                                                   
50 William L. Chase Jr., “Background information on the City of Phoenix’ McMullen Valley Property,” 
May 1989, Law Department, City of Phoenix.; Frank M. Ales to William L. Chase, Jr., “McMullen Valley 
Information for Legislation – Response,” March 11, 1991, Law Department, City of Phoenix; Robert E. 
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52 Elizabeth Checchio, “Water transfers in Arizona: Measuring effects on areas of origin.” (MS thesis, 
University of Arizona, 1990), 102; Robert E. Moore, P.E. Resource Management Associates, City of 
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53 James M. Montgomery, Consulting Engineers, 4-11. 
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trepidation. As tone La Paz County lawmaker put it, if Phoenix, the urban leviathan that 
dominated the state, could pull water from distant lands, all rural Arizona could be fertile 
ground for water farms.54 
A QUESTIONABLE CONTROVERSY 
The act of moving water across basins is loaded with consequences. But as the 
water farms stood during the time that legislative negotiations were underway, there was 
no legal way for these cities to transport groundwater. Scottsdale and Phoenix had never 
resolved how to transport their waters through CAP. Under the doctrine of prior 
appropriation, if Scottsdale’s Bill Williams River allocation was left to flow into the 
Colorado River, it became water subject to more senior users. And if it chose to directly 
pump it to the CAP, as Phoenix planned, it would need to work out a wheeling agreement 
with the CAWCD—something that no entity had accomplished and that neither city had 
begun to negotiate. Though Karl Kohlhoff had created an ingenious exchange 
arrangement to sidestep this legal issue, Tucson city officials had only “conceptually 
approved the proposed exchange”—provided they could resolve any number of 
considerations such as determining acceptable water quality to obtaining approval from 
the CAWCD.55 Kohlhoff’s plan, like those of Scottsdale and Phoenix, required more 
negotiation and fine-tuning before it could come to fruition. 
Yet it is worth mulling over the potential effects of municipal water farming. All 
three cities chose to lease their newly acquired lands to farmers. How they reconciled the 
                                                   
54 Personal Interview with Herb Guenther, March 20, 2013. 
55 “Water Exchange” letter from Tucson City Manager Joel D. Valdez to Mesa City Manager Charles K. 
Luster, February 25, 1985, Real Estate Services Department, City of Mesa Files. Kohlhoff also ran the 
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health of a rural economy with the risks of continued groundwater overdrafting could be 
challenging. But when it came time to transition lands to exporting groundwater, three 
issues arose. First, land retired from agricultural use could be reclassified to a lower 
valuation which would further constrain the fiscal solvency of rural governments. Since 
municipal property is tax-exempt under the Arizona Constitution, merely transferring 
ownership of these lands had significant consequences for surrounding communities.56 
Rural counties would lose property tax revenue, have smaller debt and bonding 
capacities, and therefore receive a proportionally smaller share of state revenues. The 
state legislature partially resolved this issue when it passed a bill in 1986 that allowed 
cities to make voluntary payments in-lieu of property taxes on remote municipal property 
“from which water is withdrawn or diverted and transported for use on other property.”57 
Scottsdale, Phoenix, and Mesa all began making in-lieu payments the following year. Yet 
this legislation did not resolve the issue of reduced bonding capacity which would curb a 
community’s ability to govern itself. 
The second, and more complex issue, was what impact retiring agricultural lands 
would have on rural economies that were more limited. Between 1980 and 1984, rural 
counties lost 73,000 non-agricultural jobs. A survey by the Arizona Department of 
Economic Security revealed that by 1984, the average unemployment rate of rural 
counties was 9.6 percent.58 Retiring farmland directly put those working the land out of 
                                                   
56 Arizona Constitution, Article 9, §2 (1). 
57 Remote municipal property; taxation, water, HB 2264, 37th Legislature, 2nd Regular session (CH 146 E, 
1986). 
58 College of Agriculture, University of Arizona, Arizona Agriculture: Now and a Vision for the Future: 
Executive Report (Tucson: College of Agriculture, University of Arizona, 1986), 21, 51, 53. 
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work, while those who processed and distributed crops would face diminished work. And 
the lessened pay for these workers could induce economic changes throughout a 
county.59 But the linkages between agricultural employment and regional income could 
be tenuous. Fewer workers were needed as irrigated crop production became more 
capital-intensive and mechanized. More important was the role and viability of 
agriculture as an economic engine. By the late 1970s, rising power costs and foreign 
competition meant that irrigated agriculture was venture at the margins. Considering how 
marginally profitable many of these lands were reputed to be, some municipal 
representatives argued that these lands would have been abandoned in due time. Perhaps 
under municipal ownership, they reasoned, there would be capital available to shift the 
area’s economic base.60   
But the third and ultimate issue that animated the transfer, ownership, and export 
of rural water was the value of water. When farmers sold their lands to cities and 
developers, water was a simple commodity that could be exchanged among consenting 
parties. But for those living in surrounding communities, water took on a larger value; it 
was a communal good that could not be severed from its lands. Many residents feared 
that removing water from these areas would psychologically condemn them—by those 
living outside and from within—as communities deprived of any future. While 
quantitative data can provide some approximation of the impact these water farms would 
have on the surrounding communities, they can never approximate how residents felt 
                                                   
59 Between 1975 and 1980, six rural counties had a net emigration of individuals 15-29 years of age. Ibid, 
81-82. 
60 Gary C. Woodard et. al., The Water Transfer Process in Arizona: Analysis of Impacts and Legislative 
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about the future of their communities. The water farms would endure as monuments to 
lost sovereignty.   
The only empirical indication of their impacts was Avra Valley. The three court 
cases these 22,878 acres of farmland generated in the 1970s and 1980s set precedents for 
all future water farms.61 Even after the passage of the GMA, Tucson continued acquiring 
farmlands to assert control over the area and any competing groundwater users so that it 
controlled over half of the valley’s lands and 60,000 AF in groundwater by 1988. Russian 
thistle embodied the consequences of municipal ownership. As Tucson quickly retired 
17,200 acres of cultivated lands without any cover crop to ease the transition to native 
vegetation, these plants sprung up from the rapidly drying soil and formed tumbleweeds 
that bounced across the valley. For some remaining residents, the sight of tumbleweeds 
and Tucson’s decision not to develop the valley confirmed that growth was not in their 
future. But for others the tumbleweeds also signaled that farmlands were reverting to 
their natural surroundings and the overdrafting that had sunk the water table 70 feet 
started to ebb. During the 1970s, Tucson withdrew 14,000 AF per year—far less than the 
estimated 136,300 AF farmers pumped in the years before the city began acquiring their 
lands.62 This abstract analysis can reveal all possible consequences, but what actually 
mattered to residents in the surrounding communities varied depending on each farm.  
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La Paz County 
 The fiscal impacts of municipal water farms most worried the La Paz County 
Board of Supervisors.63 Though municipal-owned water farms accounted for 18,200 
acres of land which was 2.56 of the county’s assessed valuation, the small population and 
limited tax base would amplify the fiscal impacts of water farms.64 Two researchers 
calculated that every 1,000 acres of retired agriculture would deny Parker, the county 
seat, $2,564 in revenue while the county would lose $11,517. Another, Elizabeth 
Checchio, investigated how these farms could potentially affect the fiscal and economic 
health of counties of origin. She determined that La Paz County would be 37 times more 
vulnerable to the fiscal impacts of retiring municipally owned agricultural land than Pima 
County had been when Tucson acquired its Avra Valley farmland.65 In practical terms, 
Phoenix and Scottsdale’s water farms (assessed at $929,658) denied La Paz County 
$18,896 in property taxes and $77,878 in total taxes in 1987 which the county had to 
make-up by raising their property tax rate by 0.02 cents. Phoenix’s McMullen Valley 
farms also contracted the assessed valuation of several nearby school and fire districts.66 
For a county that emerged from debt in November 1984 and was planning to annex a 
                                                   
63 La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Call to Public,” September 21, 1987, pg. 870195, RG 106 
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portion of the county seat, Parker, that lay within the Colorado River Indian Reservation 
to offset the falling revenues brought by municipal water farms less than a year later, 
retiring this land would have made La Paz’s fiscal state even more tenuous.67 
While over 107,000 acres of farmland formed the county’s prominent agricultural 
base which accounted for 26 percent of total personal income, all but 35,000 acres were 
concentrated on reservations for Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT).68 Phoenix and 
Scottsdale’s holdings, in other words, comprised over 45 percent of this non-Indian 
agriculture. One study calculated that retiring 1,000 acres of the most agriculturally 
productive lands would cause La Paz County to lose seventeen jobs. Geography could 
partially moderate the impact of this retirement: eastern La Paz County is entirely 
agricultural, while the economic base of the western portion along the Colorado River is 
divided between tourism and sales to the CRIT. But the county’s small economy meant 
that it “cannot absorb the labor force released from the agricultural industry as a larger 
economic area could.”69 Checchio similarly determine that agricultural incomes within 
the county were 79 times more sensitive to retiring farmlands than Pima County had been 
when Tucson acquired its Avra Valley properties. Overall incomes in La Paz County 
were, according to her comparative index, 39 times more sensitive to retiring municipally 
owned lands.70 Yet farming was not the sole economic driver. La Paz County Manager 
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Neta Bowman credited the rise of light industry with 6.8 percent decline in the county’s 
unemployment rate between May 1986 and May 1987. While this rate still hovered 
around 9.1 percent, it spoke to the tenuous role of agriculture in the county’s future.71  
The McMullen Valley farmland reflected this larger framework. The valley’s 
residents were poor: nearly 46 percent had household incomes below $10,500 and almost 
a third of the 373 jobs there were in agriculture or agricultural-linked industries that were 
slowly declining.72 The city leased their lands to the CRIT which farmed 3,725 acres of 
cotton that, at $1000 per acre in supply and labor, contributed $3,750,000 to the 
economy. When combined with the increasing cotton cultivation to 5,000 acres, Phoenix 
officials calculated that they had contributed $18.75 million to the local economy.73 The 
area’s two elementary schools and one high school, which were the next largest source of 
jobs, saw their enrollment drop by a third between 1982 and 1984 because of the 
recession.74 While legislation in the early 1980s shifted maintenance and operations to a 
state equalization formula, schools districts still relied on the total assessed valuation of 
property for bonding. Phoenix’s farmlands, in other words, would undermine the capacity 
of these schools to service their communities. The fact that these two economic drivers, 
which constituted over half the area’s jobs, were limited meant that McMullen Valley’s 
future hinged on the abilities of Phoenix and the McMullen Valley Chamber of 
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Commerce it created to attract business. Even after political resolution of the water farm 
issue, officials were still fretting that they had “found it difficult to attract money and new 
businesses.”75  
Planet Ranch, conversely, had been intended as a water farm well before 
Scottsdale acquired it. The city simply maintained the 2,400 acres of alfalfa cultivation 
ARMCO put in place as a placeholder for surface water rights when it was trying to 
market Planet Ranch. The fifteen full-time and two part-time employees, nearly all of 
whom lived on the ranch, were a temporal anomaly. The only real harm in exporting 
Planet Ranch’s water was it could potentially harm the Bill Williams River National 
Wildlife Refuge immediately downstream. The refuge, which was created in 1941 and 
expanded to 6,501 acres in 1981, hosted 250 species of birds and an array of reptiles and 
mammals like bighorn sheep. Scottsdale’s expanded alfalfa farming pulled water from a 
deep aquifer which filled the Bill Williams River’s subflow and acted as a shock absorber 
in droughts. When releases from the Alamo Dam declined in the summer of 1991, the 
trickling river flow could not support much of the cottonwood-willow galleries that 
served as the foundation for the riparian habitat on which most wildlife at the refuge 
depended.76 If diversions to Planet Ranch continued as Arizona’s climate warmed, the 
potential damage to the refuge would have increased in severity.       
Pinal County 
                                                   
75 Michael Gritzuk to David Garcia, December 14, 1994, pg. 4, Law Department, City of Phoenix.  
76 Jeannie Wagner, Proposed addition of Planet Ranch to the Bill Williams unit of the National Wildlife 
Refuge System (Albuquerque: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1991), 1, 2, 5, 6; Peggy Shaw, “Bill Williams 
River is drying up below Planet Ranch,” The Parker Pioneer, January 30, 1991, pgs. 1, 3, 8, 15.  
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Pinal County shared many of La Paz County’s vulnerabilities. Public lands, 
whether in the form of three Indian reservations or parts of two national forests, 
dominated the landscape. Over 60 percent of the county’s population were 
“dependents”—either children under fourteen or seniors—who were more vulnerable to 
cuts in government spending.77 But it was more fiscally solvent and economically diverse 
than La Paz County. With 22 percent of land in private hands, an amount over four times 
greater than La Paz, Mesa’s holdings accounted for only 0.26 percent of the county’s 
primary assessed valuation ($812,000).78 This statistic does not deny the negative fiscal 
impact of Mesa’s purchase, but clarifies the potential damage. Checchio’s index showed 
that the loss of Pinal agricultural lands from tax rolls would be six times more severe than 
Avra Valley. But when compared with La Paz County, the county’s high assessed 
valuation minimized the potential fiscal impact.79   
Mesa entered Pinal County at a moment of economic transition. Agriculture 
defined the western side. As the fastest growing cotton district during the 1930s and 
1940s, it had produced more of this lucrative crop than the entire state combined. But the 
cost of this activity was born in increased overdrafting of aquifers: the average Pinal 
County farmer would have to drill 325 feet before hitting the water table in 1956.80 Even 
the tepid 1948 Groundwater Code designated most of the County farmland as a critical 
                                                   
77 Arizona Agriculture, 91. In contrast, 34.7% of Maricopa County’s population was children while 17.6% 
were senior citizens. Arizona as a whole was 36.4% children and 17.3% seniors.  
78 Arizona owns 35% of county lands, three Indian reservations comprise 23% of lands, the U.S. Forest 
Service and Bureau of Land Management oversee 14%, and the remaining 6% is dedicated to 
miscellaneous public lands usage. Checchio, 161.  
79 Checchio, 163, 165, 167.  
80 Erik-Anders Shapiro, “Cotton in Arizona: a historical geography” (M.S. thesis, University of Arizona, 
1989), 62, 66, 297-298.  
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groundwater area by 1951.81 Falling water tables, rising energy costs, the designation of 
the Pinal AMA, the recession, and the creation of corresponding federal payment-in-kind 
program—which required growers to fallow one-third of their acreage in return for 
surplus cotton equal to what they would have cultivated on this acreage—in 1983 all 
restrained cotton cultivation. Though 212,700 acres remained cultivated in the mid-
1980s, farmers had already abandoned 45,000 acres.82 More would follow.  
 The eastern mountainous side featured mines, many of which antedated statehood. 
At their peak in 1981, mining companies brought in $400 million to the county economy 
while employing more workers than the agricultural sector. The Arizona Bureau of Mines 
estimated that 10 mining jobs indirectly created 14 other supply and service jobs. But 
prolific foreign production had begun to decrease demand and prices by 1975. The price 
of copper had lost almost half of its peak value by 1984. As copper mining shrunk to 
1960s production levels across the nation, the Phelps Dodge Corporation which powered 
Arizona’s copper industry lost $400 million between 1982 and 1984. Only five copper 
mines remained open by 1991.83 While Arizona still accounted for 70 percent of national 
copper output in 1986, the industry would not return to its former prominence in Pinal 
County’s economy.84   
                                                   
81 Dean E. Mann, The Politics of Water in Arizona (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1963), 52-53. 
82 Between 1978 and 1992, agricultural employment decline by at least 1.5% annually. Arizona 
Agriculture, 53; Shapiro, 208.  
83 See Table 1: Number of Pinal County Establishments, 1971-1991. One difficulty in articulating the 
economic impacts of the mining industry is that companies declined to provide any employment 
information to the U.S. Census Bureau.  
84 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Copper: Technology and Competitiveness, OTA-E-
367 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September, 1988), 5, 12, 13, 40, 67.  
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 The decline of its two largest industries affected the county’s population. Nearly 
one-in-five residents were living below the poverty line in 1982; two years later, one in 
ten was unemployed.85 Within this shifting context, water farms occupied a prime slice of 
agriculture lands. At one point, the 31,607 acres negotiated for water farms would have 
taken up 9.8 percent of the county’s cultivated acreage.86 Even at the aftermath of the 
recession, direct agricultural incomes accounted for almost $83 million in county 
incomes and comprised 15 percent of estimated total personal income for the county. 
According to Checchio’s index, Pinal County would have been 10 times more sensitive to 
incomes lost if all proposed water farms were retired from agricultural use.87 If the same 
formulas are strictly applied to Mesa’s water farms, which represented 3.5 percent of 
cultivated acreage, Checchio’s sensitivity index drops to 3.55 times. A separate study that 
assumed 22,095 acres would be immediately retired forecasted a 3 percent drop in county 
employment and public school enrollment as people moved elsewhere. But within thirty 
years, these declines would reduce to less than a percent of the county’s total 
employment and population.88  
 Within this context, Mesa’s management of its water farms mattered. Because of 
Pinal County’s ongoing problem with overdrafting, the city required the farmers to whom 
it was leasing its lands to cut their cultivation to a third and cut water usage by 80 
                                                   
85 Arizona Agriculture, 87.  
86 Included in this acreage are Mesa’s water farms and an additional 20,000 acres that several Maricopa 
County cities were in discussions to purchase. Checchio, 130, 137. 
87 Checchio, 143, 146. 
88 Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and 
Econotrend, Inc. Draft Water Transfer Study Phase II Report. Hydrologic and Socioeconomic Profiles, 
August 26, 1987, Part B: 5.1-5.2, Table 5.1. 
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percent. This drastic reduction in cultivated acreage should have manifested 
economically, but increased integration to the state’s economy likely mitigated some of 
these impacts. Though it had grown at 2.6 percent per year since 1950 and lacked any 
metropolitan area, state planners since the 1960s had proclaimed that the county would 
eventually be a component of a megapolitan area stretching from Phoenix to Tucson that 
would later be touted as the “Sun Corridor.”89 This integrated vision had not borne fruit 
by the 1980s, but new growth was taking root along the three major highways that 
crisscrossed the county which had economic implications. The retail sector rebounded 
from the recession: by 1983, total sales had tripled in value from eleven years earlier. 
Between 1984 and 1991, when the legislature was in negotiations over water farms, the 
number of retail employees increased 71 percent to 5,577 people—more than any other 
economic sector—with over $60 million in annual payroll.90 
Manufacturers, who had consistently employed about 2,400 workers since the 
early 1970s, were slower to expand. In the early 1980s, new capital expenditures were 
barely half of what they had been a decade earlier. That situation rapidly changed. Abbott 
Laboratories constructed a plant in Casa Grande in 1985 that employed 400 people to 
manufacture nutritional products. Frito-Lay also set down an 188,000-square foot plant to 
turn half-a-million potatoes into saturated snack foods every day.91 In fact, the number of 
                                                   
89 Mark Muro and Robert Lang, “Mountain Megas: A Profile of Arizona’s Sun Corridor,” Metropolitan 
Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, November 21, 2008: http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/events/2008/11/21%20mountain%20mega/sun_corridor_event%20pdf.pdf  
90 See Table 2: Pinal County Sector Employment, 1971-1991; Figure 3: Pinal County Sector Employment, 
1971-1991; and Figure 4: Pinal County First-Quarter Payroll (in $1,000s), 1971-1991 for a partial portrait 
of the county’s shifting economy.   
91 Pinal County Department of Economic Development, “Why Pinal County?” Accessed February 12, 
2013, http://pinalcountyaz.gov/ed/whypinalcounty/Pages/Home.aspx. 
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food-related manufacturing facilities and jobs, which were indirectly hit in retiring 
farmlands, increased.92 To their credit, Mesa also recruited the Sunbelt Refining 
Company to one of its tracts of land which contributed $2.2 million a year to the county 
economy.93 By 1991, manufacturers employed over 3,600 people with a $98 million 
payroll.94  
Beyond these economic facts lay the realities of Pinal County’s agricultural 
economy. Over fifty years of prolific farming had dramatically reduced groundwater 
levels in Pinal County. Estimates from when Mesa purchased its water farms figured 
groundwater storage at 80.3 million AF (down from 91 million AF in 1975) with a one-
million AF annual overdraft. The GMA attempted to balance concerns about the 
economic well-being of the agricultural economy with hydrologic realities by creating a 
unique water management goal called planned depletion. In curbing any expansion in 
cultivated acreage, this goal sought to open up the county for non-agricultural users while 
preserving future water supplies. If the Pinal AMA followed the conservation 
requirements established in its management plan, overdrafting would have halved by 
2025. But by that point, nearly two-thirds of groundwater would be gone.95 Assuming it 
capped its acquisitions at 11,606 acres, Mesa’s water farms would have been no worse 
than current farming. Where once 55,000 AF of groundwater had been pumped to 
cultivate these lands, Mesa would be limited to only 28,919 AF per year. The Eloy Sub-
                                                   
92 The number of employees increased 16% annually between 1971 and 1991. See Table 4: Pinal County 
Food and Kindred Product Manufacturing, 1971-1991. 
93 “State of the City.” N.D. Real Estate Services Department, City of Mesa. 
94 See “Table 3.4: First-Quarter Payroll (in $1,000s) in Pinal County, 1971-1991.”  
95 Checchio, 137; Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, 
Inc. and Econotrend, Inc., Part A: 5.2. 
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basin that hosted these farms had the most severe ground subsidence in the Pinal AMA 
(9.2 feet between 1948 and 1980, according to one monitoring line) and a water table that 
declined by over three-feet per year.96 Even taking into account the 10-15 percent 
recharge from irrigated agriculture, Mesa’s activities would reduce groundwater 
overdrafting.97 
CAP water deliveries could also hydrologically benefit the area. A legislative 
study predicted that as irrigation districts shifted to CAP, groundwater overdrafting 
county-wide would decline to less than 300,000 AF per year. Any decline in water levels 
by 2010 would be less than 3 feet per year, if that. Mesa’s water transfers would amount 
to just a percent of these activities. The only hydrologic harm from transporting 
groundwater, in fact, was the significantly less incidental recharge from farmlands that 
would be retired from agricultural uses. At the time Mesa became a landowner in Pinal 
County in 1987, the agricultural recharge was 205,000 acre-feet per year. The study 
estimated that by 2025, water transfers would cut this rate to between 102,000 and 
122,000 AF annually. But these very statistics were premised that anywhere from 58,000 
to 258,000 AF of water would be transported by 2025. At the bare minimum, this was 
twice what Mesa had planned to transport.98 
Pinal County’s groundwater crisis was brought on by half-a-century of the 
reckless attitudes and activities that had made it an agriculture powerhouse. The 
                                                   
96 Arizona Department of Water Resources, Pinal Active Management Area Management Plan for First 
Management Period, 1980-1990 (Phoenix: Arizona Department of Water Resources, December 1985), 26, 
29.  
97Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and 
Econotrend, Inc., Part A: Table 5.1. 
98 Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and 
Econotrend, Inc., Part A: 5.2-5.4, Table 5.1. 
87 
 
untenable nature of irrigated agriculture coupled with the overall decline of its 
commodity prices had led farmers to begin abandoning or selling their lands by the 
1970s. A similar decline in copper mining, the nascent presence and growth of 
manufacturing and service industries, and the initial realization of a megapolitan area 
stretching from Phoenix to Tucson, signaled a drastic reorientation in the area’s economy. 
Mesa’s intentions to retire and redevelop 11,606 acres of Pinal farmland fit seamlessly 
within this changing context. Whatever fiscal loss its activities would generate was 
comparatively small, while the hydrological impacts were mere drops compared to the 
groundwater pumping from local residents that would continue even after CAP deliveries 
began.           
SPECULATORS AND PROFITEERS 
Following the lead of these cities, several developers and speculators scoured La 
Paz County. Charles Keating, then head of American Continental Corporation (ACC), 
acquired Crowder-Weiser Ranch near Vicksburg in 1985 with the hope of selling its 
water to Phoenix for $60 million. ACC simultaneously bought two farms in western 
Maricopa County to supply lavish swimming pools at the Phoenician, Keating’s swanky 
resort, and the Estrella mixed-use development. The following year brought several more 
La Paz purchases so that Keating controlled 13,936 acres with groundwater rights 
estimated at 51,000-60,000 AF per year.99 The Santa Ana, California-based Birmingham 
Investments also acquired 4,703 acres that year.  
                                                   
99 A champion swimmer and anti-pornography activist, Keating moved to Phoenix in 1976 to turn-around 
American Continental Homes, a subsidiary of his larger business corporation. Keating rechristened his 
operations American Continental Corporation and became a prolific developer through numerous shady 
financial dealings. His grandiose displays of his wealth also made him a focus of the social scene. 
Keating’s money touched numerous prominent political figures at the municipal, county, or state level in 
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Don Moon, who had only recently retired as the first La Paz County Attorney to 
work as a lawyer and lobbyist for Phoenix-area developers like Richard Shaw and David 
Finch, joined R.A. Homes Vice-President Ron Ober to create AgriCom Management Inc. 
in July 1987.100 With financial backing from R.A. Homes, they had rapidly acquired the 
titles to virtually all of the land in the Ranegras Plain, which contained 80 percent of La 
Paz County’s groundwater, in pursuit of financial fortune by March 1988. Their plan was 
to sell the underlying groundwater on each parcel to smaller cities incapable of 
purchasing a large water farm, but that were nonetheless in need of future supplies. One 
estimate figured that their annual profits from transporting water could reach $150 
million.101  
                                                                                                                                                       
the 1980s including Arizona’s two senators. When Keating’s financial fortunes crumbled from years of 
deceitful practices, the Resolution Trust Corporation seized over 7,000 acres of La Paz lands. J.W. 
Casserly, “Steiger raps Hays on water,” Prescott Courier, June 25, 1989, 5A; Woodard et. al., 142-143; 
Randy Kull, “Well runs dry for water-rich landowners,” Phoenix Gazette, June 4, 1991, Metro, B1; Jerry 
Kammer, “Keating deals fake, jury told sham land sales and profits,” Arizona Republic, November 6, 1992, 
Front, A1.  
100 Ron Ober has an extensive history in Arizona politics. After graduating with his bachelor’s degree in 
political science at the University of Arizona, Ober ran Dennis DeConcini’s campaign for Pima County 
Attorney in 1973. As the scion of Evo Anton DeConcini, who served as Arizona Attorney General (1948-
1949) and a justice on the state supreme court (1949-1953), Dennis seemed set on higher office. After 
serving one term as county attorney, Ober ran DeConcini’s successful campaign for retiring Senator Paul 
Fannin’s seat in 1976. Ober served as his chief-of-staff for a decade before returning to Arizona. During 
that time, Ober and DeConcini became acquainted with Charles Keating, Jr. After returning to Arizona to 
run R.A. Homes, a company that his father Harold had run, Ober amassed almost $97 million in loans from 
Keating. Federal prosecutors alleged that these loans were used to buy land from Keating’s Lincoln 
Savings and Loan—including Continental Ranch, a potential water farm outside of Tucson—in order to 
inflate the company’s earnings reports. After the collapse of Keating’s empire, Ober faced lawsuits from 
bondholders. It is unclear whether Keating’s money directly financed Agri-Com’s acquisitions. “Paradise 
Valley Fighting to keep its borders secure,” Arizona Republic, March 9, 1987, Extra-Southeast, 6F; Jerry 
Kammer, “Keating deals fake, jury told sham land sales and profits,” Arizona Republic, November 6, 1992, 
Front, A1; Jerry Kammer, “Settlements cut defendants to 15 from 100; 3 accounting firms, 1 law group 
among those left for trial,” Arizona Republic, March 8, 1992, Front, A10; Agri Com Management, Inc. 
Articles of Incorporation. July 8, 1987. 001577. Arizona Corporation Commission.          
101 Tom Spratt, “Water bill: beginning of end for rural areas,” Phoenix Gazette, May 9, 1989, Front, A3.  
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Yet AgriCom’s hold on its properties remained shaky. Within two years of 
acquiring its lands, several owners foreclosed on the company for failing to make good 
on its promises. Even as it renegotiated contracts and expanded its grip to 26,000 acres of 
La Paz County lands, the initial $3.5 million from R.A. Homes was insufficient to all 
expenses. At the height of its power in 1989, the beleaguered company had not paid taxes 
on 92 percent of the 8,065 acres for which it had a title. It defaulted on 700 acres and 
faced foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1,000 additional acres that same year. Efforts to 
secure additional funding from other firms had failed, leaving the future of Arizona’s first 
large-scale water speculator in doubt.102  
When former-ADWR Director Wesley Steiner declared at October 1987 meeting 
of the Arizona League of Cities and Towns that Phoenix-area cities were 100,000 AF per 
year short of their 2025 needs and recommended that they acquire at least 400,000 AF for 
future growth, but insisted that any future water farms should be limited to western 
Arizona, developers and speculators took out options on 47,000 acres of La Paz land.103 
The swiftness with which they acquired land meant that over 90 percent of proposed 
water farms were occurring inside La Paz County. Assessing the plans, or lack thereof, 
for what each of these profiteers pursued in La Paz County is beyond the scope of this 
story. Moon and Ober publically stated that since they would not put in place any land-
                                                   
102 “Water speculator calls firm sound despite 2 foreclosures,” Arizona Republic, March 23, 1989, 
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use changes AgriCom would help farmers stay in business. Their attorney, former 
ADWR Director Kathy Ferris, insisted that even if AgriCom transported water from all of 
its holdings, enough water would remain in La Paz County to support half-a-million 
people—nearly fifty times greater than its current population.104 But their activities, 
which tactlessly handled groundwater without any of consideration of third-party impacts 
or future economic development that the cities had furnished, ignited an already brewing 
political issue over water farms into a statewide controversy. It would be the duty of state 
legislature that had enabled these water farms to wrestle with the fallout from the GMA.     
CLOSING THOUGHTS 
Immediate necessity compelled Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix to acquire rural 
lands. All moved rapidly to acquire lands through municipal development corporations or 
exchanges to avoid lengthy campaigns for bond approval. Their plans were in the 
formative stages at the time of purchase: Mesa only had a tentative exchange agreement 
from Tucson while Scottsdale and Phoenix lacked a CAP wheeling agreement. In all 
likelihood, the future crisis they were anticipating would provide the leverage to put this 
mechanism into place.  
The limited economic and fiscal data available can only speculate the potential 
harm of exporting water from these municipal farms. Rural areas, particularly the newly 
                                                   
104 Statements arguing that sufficient groundwater exists to support a significant population should be 
treated with skepticism. The core problem is accessing that amount of groundwater. For example, most 
residents of Bouse lived on less than $6,000 a year and depended on wells that could only reach down 400 
feet before encountering hard rock. Industrial drilling equipment which would have been accessible to 
AgriCom would enable the firm to plunge to depths twice as great to tap more of the underlying aquifer. 
Even if residents’ wells could reach that deep, questions remain about the water’s brackish quality and what 
affect pumping it would have on overlying lands. “Agri-Com meets with Bouse residents,” The Parker 
Pioneer, February 1, 1989, pg. 1; “Legislature may leave La Paz County high and dry in new water 
measure,” Arizona Republic, April 17, 1989, Valley & State, B1; “Community fears water-swap bill,” 
Arizona Republic, May 15, 1989, Valley & State, B1.    
91 
 
created La Paz County, lacked the staff and infrastructure to collect data or pursue any 
economic planning. Since only portions of this information were immediately accessible, 
the emotion surrounding water farms transformed them into a political issue. The fact that 
even a legislative study committee could not approximate the hydrologic and socio-
economic impact of these properties on counties-of-origin based on available information 
is a testament to the dearth of sufficient data. It also suggests why the negotiations to 
resolve the water farms issue would take such a circuitous path.   
One could argue that the presence of irrigated agriculture in rural areas determines 
that community’s value of water. That a community would base their economy on the 
excessive use of groundwater to the point that overdraft occurs and it becomes a “non-
renewable” resource could speak to the indifferent attitude farmers in Pinal and La Paz 
had for their surroundings. Many, after all, were selling their lands because the costs 
associated with farming—such as the price of electrical power to pump water from ever 
deeper in a declining aquifer—wiped out any reasonable profit margin. In this sense, 
retiring farmlands for limited groundwater exportation seemed hydrologically 
responsible.  
But fully accepting this proposition seems uneasy. While the belief in irrigated 
agriculture as a sustainable economic sector has been the enduring fallacy of southwest 
settlement, the question at the heart of the water farm issue—insofar as Mesa and 
Phoenix are concerned—is whether it is fair for an outside entity to buy up water that is 
inherent to a community. Whatever good intentions these municipalities had could not 
remedy the sentiment that La Paz County Attorney Steve Suskin captured when he fumed 
that: 
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“[G]ood neighbor” has become a term of art in La Paz for describing a large, tax-
exempt entity which functions under the arrogant assumption that it is more 
enlightened than La Paz, that its future is more important than that of La Paz and 
that its obligation to La Paz is discharged when it performs the wholly charitable 
function of paying what it thinks is fair as in-lieu payment.105  
 
For many rural residents, water farms were monuments to lost sovereignty. No amount of 
data can clarify this feeling or the questionable motive for exporting water to simply 
enable more metropolitan growth.  
Yet municipal water farms were but only one component of this issue. Jim 
Derouin, a lawyer who represented Phoenix in its purchases, asked me during an 
interview to imagine firing a shotgun at a wall. If the wall represented the water farm 
issue, the municipal properties only amounted to a missing chunk.106 Separating these 
farms and their consequences from the ravenous activities of speculators is nearly 
impossible. What united municipal and speculator acquisitions was the tacit 
acknowledgement that growth in La Paz County and agriculture in Pinal County—not to 
mention other rural areas throughout Arizona—had reached their limit. And both would 
struggle—together, and later, separately—to make their case to the state legislature.  
 
                                                   
105 Letter from Steven Suskin to George Britton, Deputy City Manager, November 9, 1988, Law 
Department, City of Phoenix.  
106 Personal interview with Jim Derouin, February 11, 2013.  
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CHAPTER 4: NEGOTIATIONS 
“Another year has passed in Arizona’s water war, 
And to put it most frankly, it’s become somewhat a bore. 
It’s become bureaucratic, with rules and regs stacked high, 
So that even our lawyers have been heard to sigh: 
‘Dear Lord, what have we created? What is this unholy mess 
That even Wesley Steiner has found difficult to bless?’”1 
 
 The initial water farm purchases did not garner much attention from the state 
legislature. Only when Phoenix and water speculators like AgriCom became involved 
after 1986 did they explode into a controversy requiring political remedy. The six years it 
took the legislature to create a compromise were among its most tumultuous. Lawmakers 
had to contend with losing key members who had shepherded consensus in drafting the 
Groundwater Management Act (GMA), the poisonous atmosphere created by Governor 
Evan Mecham’s scandalous behavior and impeachment, and a sting operation that turned 
them against each other.  
But differing opinions over the value of water for rural communities, which were 
largely expressed in emotional rhetoric, above all else prolonged resolution. When 
legislators could not hash-out differences through a temporary committee, they created a 
study committee to generate several reports that would quantify the impacts of water 
farms on rural communities, and therefore clarify the value of water for these areas. That 
study’s inability to establish mutually acceptable numbers helped push negotiations to an 
informal body of prominent water stakeholders called the “rump group.” As the default 
body for resolving water-related issues, the rump group had a collective knowledge and 
experience that vastly surpassed the capabilities of the legislature; that nearly all 
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members were seasoned negotiators meant that this group had more potential to coolly 
craft compromise. Yet the water farm issue created such an impasse within this body that 
cities and speculators opted to force through their own bill that would have enshrined 
their water farms. The emotional burnout from that measure’s failure ironically created 
the calm that had eluded “rump group” negotiations: rural representatives came to terms 
with providing the Phoenix-area with some of their water, while urban interests realized 
that any workable compromise needed the blessing of their rural counterparts. Though 
negotiations took another two years, this understanding set the foundations for a 
compromise that restricted the amount of water that could be transported across basins 
and created a replenishment district to better manage the Phoenix-area’s water supplies.      
THE LEGISLATURE2 
Legislative politics is an inherently complex and intertwined affair heavily 
moderated by personality. How the Arizona State Legislature has functioned since its 
creation owes much to the characters who crafted consensus. In the post-World War II 
legislature, Yuma Senator Harold Giss acted as the focus of power within the heavily 
Democratic body. Because legislative districts were apportioned largely along county 
lines, most legislators were from outside the Phoenix-area and stayed with major 
lobbyists in the Adams Hotel during the legislative session. Giss oversaw deliberations 
                                                   
2 I have accrued some of the information conveyed in this section over nearly three years of interviewing 
former state legislators. While few were directly involved in water transfers, all have offered insights and 
recollections into the complex nature of legislative politics during the time in which this issue was being 
negotiated. While these memories do not form an entirely uniform narrative, many struck similar themes. I 
have highlighted those themes throughout this chapter.    
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and deals at the hotel’s bar, where acrimonious behavior could be concealed from the 
public. The legislature would then civilly ratify these agreements.3 
Giss’s influence reflected political realities: while politically progressive at 
statehood in 1912, the Democratic Party that now dominated state politics was rural and 
conservative. Two events changed this dynamic. Postwar migration brought Midwestern 
and Eastern Republicans to Phoenix and Tucson, which became the epicenters of 
Republican activity. As moderate and liberal Democrats began to gain control of their 
party, conservative members either changed their affiliation or became “Pinto” 
Democrats who would vote Republican in general elections, thus realigning the state’s 
political parties to mirror their national counterparts. The Supreme Court’s 1964 
Reynolds v. Sims ruling that state legislative districts had to be approximately equal in 
population also shifted the state’s political system. Though they initially joined with 
Democrats in denouncing the Warren Court’s decision, Arizona Republicans supported 
litigation in federal court arguing that the composition of the legislature violated this 
“one-man, one vote” standard. The court agreed, and when the legislature failed to pass a 
new apportionment plan to meet this standard, it imposed its own. The legislature would 
now comprise thirty legislative districts of equal population, each of which would send 
two representatives and one senator. Where each county once had two senators, Maricopa 
County now had sixteen and an equally great number of representatives. The 1966 
                                                   
3 Ronald J. Watkins, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Term and Trials of Former Governor Evan 
Mecham (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1990), 29. 
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elections marked a seismic shift in Arizona politics as urban Republicans came to 
majority positions in both houses.4  
This political landslide also represented the end of Giss’s power and the ascension 
of Republican Burton Barr, who would go on to serve as House Majority Leader for 
twenty years. By the time Giss collapsed from a heart attack in 1973, Barr had become 
the pivotal force in legislative affairs. An energetic, persuasive, humorous, and 
consummate dealmaker who embodied the reformer-impulse of the “Gung-ho 27th” 
legislature to professionalize government and address the state’s serious policy questions, 
Barr worked with Senate President Stan Turley, Minority Leader Alfredo Gutierrez, and 
Gov. Bruce Babbitt on passage of the GMA in 1980. Five years later, this group tackled 
another vexing water issue.5  
Grassroots frustrations over the mining and agriculture industries’ stonewalling of 
stricter groundwater protection measures throughout the early 1980s and reports of 
trichloroethylene contamination of Tucson’s groundwater fueled a coalition of 
environmental and public interest groups to circulate petitions for an initiative in October 
1985 that was more comprehensive than any bill the legislature had considered. While its 
advocates insisted that their goal was to spurn legislators into action, favorable media 
coverage and Babbitt’s endorsement forced industry representatives to enter negotiations. 
Private meetings led by two Tucson-area legislators, Larry Hawke and Greg Lunn, 
created an initial working draft. When the Governor’s Ad Hoc Water Quality Committee 
                                                   
4 David R. Berman, Arizona Politics and Government: The Quest for Autonomy, Democracy and 
Development (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1998), 52-53, 94-95.  
5 Among the early achievements of Barr’s legislative class were new smog-control laws and reforms to the 
Liquor Control Board which had been plagued with scandals. “Gung-Ho Legislators,” Time Vol. 89, No. 10 
(March 10, 1967), 37.  
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convened, there was enough agreement to move legislation forward. As with the GMA, 
Babbitt acted as a mediator between parties in closed-door meetings. Reputations were on 
the line: Barr had already announced his intention to run for governor in 1986 and 
Babbitt was making plans for his 1988 presidential run. Both recognized that passing this 
legislation could bolster their image as pragmatic policy makers, even though the issue 
was potentially volatile and politically dangerous. In the meantime, Lunn and Hawke 
each ran a subcommittee to broaden the interest groups involved in negotiations. With 
political pressure and momentum on their side, the legislature negotiated, produced, and 
passed the Environmental Quality Act (EQA) in nine months.6 
What their success could have meant for water farms remains speculative. Babbitt 
quickly focused on boosting his national profile. Evan Mecham, an ultra-conservative 
politician known for shrilly denouncing his opponents as members of a monolithic 
establishment, shockingly defeated Barr in the Republican primary and proceeded to win 
a plurality of the vote (39 percent) in a three-way general election that pitted Democrat 
Carolyn Warner against politically moderate Independent Bill Schultz. A virulent critic of 
Babbitt, to whom he had lost the 1978 gubernatorial election, Mecham’s entrance brought 
the exodus of several Babbitt administration officials who had been involved in water 
policy discussions. Neither Mecham nor the replacements he selected had the standing 
and ability to tackle water farm negotiations.7 
                                                   
6 Gordon Meeks, Jr., “Negotiating a state Environmental Quality Act: the Arizona Groundwater Case,” 
Mediation Quarterly Vol. 20 (Summer 1988): 65-70. See Cody Ferguson, “’This is Our Land, We Have the 
Right to be Heard’: Community-based Environmental Activism in the Late-Twentieth Century,” (PhD 
diss., Arizona State University, 2012), 170-209. 
7Watkins, 53-56.  
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  Beyond the massive hole created by Barr’s and Babbit’s absence, two other 
legislators involved in the GMA negotiations left in 1986. A jovial sage whose twenty-
two years of service marked him as one of the few to serve as Speaker of the House and 
President of the Senate, Stan Turley was a child of rural Arizona whose close connections 
to agriculture that made him a pivotal force in water matters.8 His retirement from 
politics combined with the decision by Alfredo Gutierrez—who had been a student 
activist before coming under Barr’s tutelage, and then rose to serve as Senate Minority 
Leader—to leave and create his own lobbying firm, left substantial holes in the 
legislature’s leadership. But their style of legislative politics nonetheless endured. Five 
veterans of the GMA negotiations, ranging from John Hays to Jim Hartdegen, remained 
in the legislature, and the absence of term limits and relatively low turnover in the 1980s 
allowed these legislators, as well as many of their colleagues, to form personal 
connections that continued beyond the legislative session. The end result was a more 
conciliatory atmosphere: when measures failed, the possibility of returning next session 
to mollify opposition and try again smoothed over bruised egos.  
Many water lobbyists from the GMA negotiations also remained active. Bob 
McCain and Roger Manning continued to be the point men for the Arizona Municipal 
Water Users Association (AMWUA)—a growing group that represented the cities of 
Tempe, Scottsdale, Mesa, Chandler, Glendale, and Phoenix—just as Jim Klinker served 
as the legislative liaison for the Arizona Farm Bureau. In addition to Jack DeBolske of 
                                                   
8 Turley, Stan. “Oral history interview on November 4, 2004. Central Arizona Project Oral History Project. 
Accessed October 1, 2013. http://www.capaz.com/Portals/1/PropertyAgent/1228/Files/1189/Interview%20 
with%20Stan%20Turley .pdf. 
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the Arizona League of Cities and Towns, some cities had their own lobbyists. While all 
of these lobbyists curried favor with legislators, they also informally met in a “rump 
group.” Their meetings, which the ADWR Director hosted, functioned as forums for 
discussing and resolving potential problems before they became ensnared in the 
legislative process. The unanimous consensus that came from their negotiations—which 
the legislature sanctioned by creating formal committees during the creation of the 
seminal GMA and later, the EQA—would then be sent to the legislature from ratification. 
That little debate over or dissent of the rump group’s consensus occurred reflected its 
unwritten authority. Any attempt by legislators to pre-empt or amend the agreements 
which the rump group had approved would incur the wrath of the myriad stakeholders 
who comprised this body.9 The hegemony of this system had been challenged once with 
the creation and passage of the EQA, and it would face a similarly fierce challenge with 
water farms.  
INTERESTS 
Despite its outward appearances, the water farm issue went beyond being an 
urban-rural conflict. It pitted rural municipal and county governments against large 
landholders who had profited from selling their lands to cities and private firms, and it 
would reveal fissures between usually solid rural opposition.    
                                                   
9 Frank Gregg has called this system, where negotiations among a narrow range of directly interested 
parties and public officials would produce agreements that formal policy-making bodies subsequently 
ratified with little debate and dissent, the “Arizona style” of water management. Frank Gregg, “The 
Widening Circle: the Groundwater Management Act in the Context of Arizona Water Policy Evolution,” in 
Taking the Arizona Groundwater Management Act into the Nineties: Proceedings of a 
conference/symposium commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Arizona law (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Water Resources Research Center, 1990), 2. 
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Lawmakers from the two districts hosting municipal water farms took the lead in 
negotiations. The LD 5 team that represented Yuma and La Paz Counties, where 90 
percent of all proposed water farms were taking place, was tight-knit group. All were 
long-serving Democrats who not only lived in Yuma, but also carpooled together 
whenever they went to district meetings. Yet neither Sen. Jones Osborn—a newspaper 
publisher who served alongside with, and later replaced, Harold Giss—or Rep. Bob 
McLendon, a high school teacher, had much knowledge on water policy. While Rep. 
Frank McElhaney was a farmer familiar with water rights, he passed away in 1985, just 
as the water farm issue was igniting into a political controversy. As it turned out, his 
replacement would be the pivotal figure in resolving this issue. As a biologist who 
conducted environmental impact analyses, Herb Guenther became acquainted with 
Arizona water law and policy before becoming a manager for the Wellton-Mohawk 
Irrigation District outside of Yuma. He was not a political man: he became a Democrat 
on the advice of the woman registering him because that party had significantly more 
voters in Yuma County. But when Frank McElhaney passed way, Guenther’s name 
circulated as a replacement. Though he did not know why, his extensive water knowledge 
likely boosted his profile. It was only after the Yuma County Board of Supervisors 
appointed him that he came to understand the magnitude of water farms in his district.10 
As the legislator most conversant on water policy, Guenther, a political neophyte, would 
begin operating as powerbroker. 
                                                   
10 Personal Interview with Herb Guenther, March 20, 2013.  
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Legislative district (LD) 6, which spanned nearly all of Pinal County and parts of 
Maricopa and Pima Counties, was represented by a more politically diverse delegation. 
Though Sen. Alan Stephens and Rep. Henry Evans were Democrats, they fell on opposite 
ends of the political spectrum. Stephens was traditional East Coast Democrat who lived 
in Phoenix and was planning to run for a congressional seat. Evans, on the other hand, 
was a farmer from Tolleson—a small agricultural community west of Phoenix—who 
held convictions more in line with the Democratic Party that ruled Arizona prior to World 
War II; he was consistently ranked as one of the most conservative members in the 
legislature. Republican Jim Hartdegen of Casa Grande sat between them. A mine safety 
inspector recognized for his frank demeanor and willingness to buck the more 
conservative elements of his party, Hartdegen had participated in negotiating the GMA 
early in his legislative career and was one of the few to oppose the bill. The three together 
had a tenuous relationship, though on the water farm issue, they seldom differed.     
A contingent of Arizona’s rural eastern and northwestern legislators joined these 
two delegations in seeking to limit present and future water farms. Many, like Reps. A.V. 
“Bill” Hardt and Gus Arzberger, were cattlemen who felt that the current water farms, if 
not stopped, would set a precedent that would threaten their districts. They were a 
bipartisan group in which the dividing line between Republicans and Democrats was 
largely indistinct; most would have identified as moderate-to-conservative. The 
differences instead emerged in personality, such as the contrast between Sen. John Hays 
and his seatmate, Rep. Don Aldridge. Hays was a genial and good-humored Yarnell cattle 
rancher known for his earnestness to craft compromise. Aldridge was a foul-tempered, 
often vindictive realtor from prosperous Lake Havasu City who led an unabashedly 
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partisan group called the “Mean Thirteen” that opposed non-smoking areas in 
government buildings and requiring car seatbelts.11 Many Tucson-area lawmakers 
sympathetic to the potential plight of rural Arizona would also frequently support this 
group’s bills to limit water farms. But what separated them, their rural counterparts, and 
even LD 6 lawmakers from their La Paz County colleagues was willingness to 
compromise on water farms if it meant that their districts would be spared from future 
water farm speculation. These differences seldom flared during negotiations; nearly all 
remained united in their grievances against the “state of Maricopa,” which held a 
majority of seats.  
This alliance also reflected the consortium of interest groups opposed to water 
farms. Many—ranging from the Arizona Farm Bureau, the Arizona Cattlemen’s 
Association, to the Arizona AgriBusiness Council—were affiliated with agricultural 
interests. Others, like the Pinal County Governing Alliance and Yuma County Water 
User’s Association, represented areas that were either directly affected by, or were 
potential sites for, water farms. To bolster their profile in the legislature, the La Paz 
County Board of Supervisors hired Doug Nelson, an environmental lawyer and resource 
economist, to represent the Arizona Rural Water Association (ARWA). This catch-all 
organization coordinated lobbying efforts in Phoenix and held informational sessions 
throughout La Paz County to raise awareness of the water farms, and educate residents on 
                                                   
11 Amy Silverman, “He’s been mean for 14 years!,” The Phoenix New Times, December 19, 1996, accessed 
October 5, 2013, http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/1996-12-19/news/he-s-been-mean-for-14-years/.  
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the nuances of Arizona water law.12 Where Nelson’s efforts were intellectual, Citizens 
for Water Fairness (CWF) fired-up residents for grassroots political action. La Paz 
County Manager Neta Bowman encouraged those who attended CWF meetings to read 
Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert. La Paz County, she warned, would be the next Owens 
Valley unless they took action.13  
 The default position of these rural interests was to emphasize the profound costs 
transporting water would bring to the environment, economy, and lives of people in the 
surrounding areas. It was an argument grounded in the morality of collective rights: no 
entity should be able to remove “non-renewable” water from a basin with established 
communities that depended upon it. As negotiations progressed, rural lawmakers also 
began focusing on urban water practices. Their stance gradually shifted from insisting 
that Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix did not need water farms, to addressing the concerns 
Phoenix-area cities had about GMA’s safe-yield and AWS requirements through 
groundwater recharge legislation.    
Phoenix-area interests like the AMWUA countered that they had paid generously 
to legally acquire their water farms from consenting farmers. They opted to stall any 
legislation that would threaten the status quo and their investments. The sheer number of 
Phoenix-area legislators, which had been increasing with every decennial census and 
legislative redistricting, and the teams of experienced lobbyists to corral votes meant that 
they could control the pace of legislation and easily stop unfavorable bills. Yet nearly all 
                                                   
12 La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Legal Services Agreement,” January 6, 1986, pg. 
8600061-8600063; La Paz County Board of Supervisors Minutes, “Arizona Rural Water Association,” 
January 20, 1986, pg. 860010, RG 106 La Paz County, Roll 2, Arizona State Archives.  
13 Personal Interview with Doug Nelson, February 5, 2013. 
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of their legislators were ignorant of water policy; few had the intimate connection to 
water that their rural counterparts experienced. As negotiations and media coverage 
negatively portraying these water farms intensified, many of these urban legislators and 
their interest groups began to reconsider their ardent opposition to rural-backed measures. 
Limits on future water farms became permissible so long as current properties remained 
secure with favorable compensation rates. They also became more amenable to creating a 
Phoenix-area replenishment district that would resolve the projected water shortages that 
drove water farm acquisitions, even as differences between groundwater-dependent West 
Valley cities and their CAP- and SRP-supplied neighbors would surface over the nature 
of this district.     
The role of developers like Charles Keating’s American Continental Inc. and the 
R.A. Homes-backed AgriCom Management Inc. in negotiations is less than clear. Their 
desire to protect future profits as well as keep Arizona open to future water farms, a 
belief that all three of their principal lobbyists (former ADWR Directors Wesley Steiner 
and Kathy Ferris, as well as AgriCom CEO Ron Ober) espoused, coincided with the 
long-held stance of the Arizona Mining Association. Refining mineral ore required at 
several stages freshwater. Since many mines were located in rural areas without a 
significant water source nearby, mining companies were the first proponents of water 
transfers in Arizona. Any limitation on rural water transfers could potentially harm their 
industry. In the early stages of negotiations, this group formed a bloc with Scottsdale, 
Mesa, and Phoenix, which stressed that their activities were entirely legal and wielded the 
clout to stall any harmful legislation. But after trying to force through legislation that 
would have protected their investments, this bloc dissolved. As rural and municipal 
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negotiators came to a workable solution, American Continental and AgriCom would find 
themselves increasingly marginalized.  
RAISING AWARENESS  
The push within the legislature to address water farms began after Mesa 
purchased its Pinal County lands. While the EQA dominated the 1985-1986 session, 
leadership nonetheless acknowledged the water farm controversy. Sen. Stan Turley 
considered it unfair that municipally owned farmland would undercut an area’s property-
tax base, and Majority Leader Burton Barr thought that legislation guarding against 
indiscriminate water farm purchases should be introduced. While neither believed that 
water farms should be banned outright, they were certain that the legislature could 
address and remedy this issue when the next session began in January 1986.14  
 All the while, the water farm issue followed a trajectory like many legislative 
issues during the 1985-1986 session which began in early January. Rural lawmakers 
introduced measures to ban transfers outright, all of which died in committee, but they 
succeeded in creating a temporary committee to focus on this issue. Perhaps to get 
leadership on board and generate interest in this issue, they broadened its focus to include 
groundwater recharge. Many Phoenix-area cities were interested in artificially storing or 
“recharging” groundwater for future use, but Arizona lacked the necessary legal and 
institutional framework to facilitate it. The Joint Interim Committee on Groundwater 
Recharge and Transfer (JICGRT) functioned like many interim committees; it 
simultaneously raised the profile of both issues while providing a forum between sessions 
                                                   
14 “Rural Water-Rights Safeguards Eyed,” Arizona Capitol Times, July 24, 1985, pgs. 2, 3.  
106 
 
for discussion and possible consensus. Although JICGRT was co-chaired by two rural 
legislators, Sen. John Hays and Rep. Jim Hartdegen, and comprised largely of 
representatives from outlying areas, it also had two Tucson-area legislators and Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Usdane of Scottsdale on board which allowed for some 
discussions on initial steps to take for handling water transfers. 
 After four months of meetings and testimony that ended in January 1986, all 
committee members signed on to a temporary solution. House Bill (HB) 2264 mandated 
that any city with a water farm must file a development plan with the ADWR when it 
converted that farm’s irrigation grandfathered groundwater rights to a non-irrigation 
grandfather right. This plan, at the very least, would prepare rural counties for the 
hydrological and economic changes that would occur once groundwater transportation 
became possible. It also allowed, but did not require, cities to make payments in lieu of 
lost property tax revenue from water farms.15 AMWUA supported this bill, but wanted its 
provisions to also apply to properties purchased by developers like AgriCom. Behind-the-
scenes lobbying from AgriCom perhaps killed this provision: the final measure only 
applied to cities and towns. Even as it sailed through both houses, one senator wondered 
outloud whether this bill made any difference for rural communities. Hartdegen, who had 
introduced it, admitted that voluntary in-lieu payments were “less than half a loaf” for 
                                                   
15 The original version also directed cities to fully utilize their CAP allocations before pumping and 
transporting any groundwater from their water farms and limited withdrawals to no more than 2 acre-feet 
(AF) of water per acre every year. Betsy Rieke complained that the measure was lousy for water 
conservation: a farm could still continue pumping while a city withdrew additional groundwater.  
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areas affected by water farms, but maintained that it was the best agreement rural 
legislators could expect at the moment.16 
 The groundwater recharge side of JICGRT, however, had considerably more 
success. Before the session began, Phoenix-area cities were beginning to explore how 
groundwater recharge, storage, and recovery could firm their existing supplies. These 
methods had been used in California for the past forty years for droughts and had some 
precedent in Arizona. Phoenix had experimented with groundwater recharge in the 1960s 
and Tucson had successfully lobbied the legislature to authorize a project for their area. 
Since subcontracts for CAP water had not reached the project’s full capacity, AMWUA, 
Phoenix AMA officials, SRP, CAWCD, agricultural and industrial interests formed a 
group to explore how the state could use CAP water to recharge aquifers. Tucson Sen. 
John Mawhinney in the meantime secured passage of a measure that would allow 
CAWCD to study recharge and recovery projects. The biggest concern about 
groundwater recharge, as ADWR Chief Counsel Betsy Rieke pointed out to the JICGRT, 
was that neither case law nor statutes applied to recharged groundwater. In the absence of 
any such regulations, the ADWR and many Phoenix-area cities preferred that legislators 
draft a solution rather than rely on expensive and extensive litigation which would 
remove crafting any new legal doctrines from their control. Three groundwater recharge 
measures were introduced in the next session and later harmonized into a bill that created 
the necessary legal framework for groundwater recharge. What appealed to urban 
                                                   
16 “Water Transfer Bill Embraced,” Arizona Capitol Times, January 15, 1986, pg. 22; “Water-Transfer Bill 
Passes House,” Arizona Capitol Times, March 5, 1986, pgs. 1-2; “Water Farm Bill Sails,” Arizona Capitol 
Times, April 9, 1986, pg. 4; “The Water Farmers,” Arizona Capitol Times, December 10, 1986, pg. 6; 
Remote municipal property; taxation, water, HB 2264, 37th Legislature, 2nd Regular session (CH 146 E, 
1986). 
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interests was the process this measure created for using CAP water and water transported 
from outside an AMA (such as water farms) for recharge, storage, and recovery so long 
as it was consistent with that AMA’s management plan. These groundwater 
replenishment measures, which were later signed into law in May 1987, would have 
important ramifications for the water farm issue moving forward.17   
 One frequent refrain during the JICGRT meetings was that many involved could 
only speculate on how water farms would affect rural areas. The absence of hard data 
encouraged emotional rhetoric to guide discussions; impasse was inevitable. The most 
those involved could pursue was creating a study committee for the following session 
that would begin in January 1987. At Rieke’s recommendation, the committee would 
develop guidelines for and oversee a study that would assess the hydrologic impact and 
socioeconomic consequences of water farms. Nearly a third of the legislature signed on 
as its sponsors rushed it through both houses as the session drew to a close. They could 
accomplish little more: September primaries were approaching and a gubernatorial 
election loomed on the horizon. Most political observers wagered that Burton Barr would 
ascend to the governor’s office. All three living former Republican governors and the 
chair of the Arizona Republican Party broke precedent to publically endorse him, 
simultaneously reflecting the considerable political clout he had accrued over twenty-two 
years of wheeling and dealing and deepening fears that Evan Mecham would win and 
                                                   
17 Groundwater recharge and recovery, HB 2345, 37th Legislature, 2nd Regular sessions; Jurisdiction over 
exotic wildlife (NOW: waters; groundwater recharge; underground storage), HB 2209, 37th Legislature, 2nd 
Regular session (CH 289, 1986); Joint Interim Committee on Groundwater Recharge and Transfer, Minutes 
for October 7, 1985, 1-2; House Committee on Natural Resources and Energy, Minutes for March 10, 
1986, 1-2; Jack Lavelle, “Committee OKS bill for water shortage,” Phoenix Gazette, March 13, 1987, E10; 
House Committee on Natural Resources and Energy, Minutes from the March 9, 1987, 3-5; Groundwater 
recharge; district authority, HB 2401, 38th Legislature, 1st Regular session (CH 353, 1987). 
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make a second unsuccessful run for governor. Just as he had managed with the GMA and 
EQA, the possibility of consensus and compromise through Burton Barr seemed cause 
for optimism. Then Evan Mecham won the primary.  
ESTABLISHING FACTS?  
From his first comment about repealing the state’s Martin Luther King, Jr. 
holiday, Evan Mecham’s time in office perpetuated controversy and scandal that jammed 
the political process. Beyond callous remarks like “I’m not a racist. I’ve got black 
friends. I employ black people. I don’t employ them because they’re black. I employ 
them because they are the best people who applied for the cotton-picking job,” were more 
serious charges of financial impropriety and corruption of office.18 Before a criminal 
investigation could even begin, a campaign to recall him was underway and rapidly 
growing in popularity. The change in administration also meant mass exile of many 
Babbitt-era officials, including ADWR Director Kathy Ferris, who had been instrumental 
in crafting water policies.19 Though several of Mecham’s replacements—such State 
Liquor Board Superintendent Alberto Rodriguez, who was under investigation for his 
role in the death of a Mexican citizen and charges that he sexually assaulted a woman—
were controversial, Ferris’s successor, Alan Kleinman, was less so. His sentiment that the 
ADWR should favor planning over enforcement did reflect Mecham’s view of 
                                                   
18 Mark Siegel, The World According to Evan Mecham: A Collection of Quotes, Observations, and 
Editorial Cartoons (Mesa, Arizona: Blue Sky Press, 1987), 50. 
19Ferris came to Arizona fresh-out of law school to work as research staff for the Senate Natural Resources 
Committee in 1976 when negotiations for a new groundwater code began. Beyond becoming intimately 
involved in drafting the Groundwater Management Act, she worked as an attorney for ADWR to 
implement it and was a protégé of then-Director Wes Steiner.  By all accounts, she was the right choice to 
succeed him. Rumored differences with Sam Steiger, one of Mecham’s closest advisors, likely motivated 
her firing. Mary A.M. Gondhart and Sam Stanton, “State’s water chief quits due to Mecham,” Arizona 
Republic December 18, 1986.          
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government. But the former U.S. Bureau of Reclamation economist made a favorable 
impression with Senate Natural Resource Committee Chairman John Hays, whose 
committee unanimously confirmed him. He also revealed his sympathies on water farms 
when he criticized the current in-lieu payments scheme as “just of the tip of the iceberg” 
for justly compensating rural communities.20 But he could not rival either Ferris or 
Steiner in their expertise. Now out of public service, Ferris entered private practice, 
where she would re-emerge as a key player in water farm negotiations.    
As Mecham’s political career began to implode, news of Phoenix’s McMullen 
Valley acquisitions infused negotiations with newfound urgency. The prospect of 
Arizona’s largest city securing water farms pushed rural legislators to introduce measures 
ranging from a moratorium on water farm purchases to block Phoenix from fulfilling this 
exchange to curtailing a city’s ability to exercise eminent domain beyond its corporate 
limits. None passed.21 Amidst this tumult, the Joint Legislative Committee on 
Groundwater and Surface Water Exportation (JLCGSWE) began working on a three-part 
study into the impacts of proposed water transfers. The resulting data would hopefully 
                                                   
20 Sam Steiger, Mecham’s special assistant, later alleged that the governor appointed Kleinman as ADWR 
Director at the behest of Mormon Church President Ezra Taft Benson, who was one of Mecham’s mentors. 
In doing so, Mecham overrode Steiger’s favored candidate, agri-business executive Bob Moore. “GOP 
planning close look at Mecham picks,” Arizona Republic, January 25, 1987, A1; “Transfer of water to 
cities hurts rural area economy,” Arizona Republic, April 9, 1987, F1; “Commerce nomination, others 
advance; 1 rejected,” Arizona Republic, April 16, 1987, Valley & State, B2; The Associated Press, 
“Steiger: Church leader advised Mecham,” Prescott Courier, August 4, 1988, pg. 1.  
21 “City Plans War Farm Purchase,” Arizona Capitol Times, December 17, 1986, pg. 23; Moratorium until 
30 June 1988 on municipal and political subdivision purchase of property to obtain water rights, HB 2153, 
38th Legislature, 1st Regular session, 1987. 
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calm passions by providing legislators with a clearer understanding of the potential 
impacts of water farms and perhaps lay some paths for a solution.22  
From the release in May 1987 of its first phase report, which profiled eight areas 
that would likely host water transfers, the study was headed towards difficulties. These 
areas combined hydrologically distinct basins which risked distorting the specific 
hydrologic, economic, and fiscal impacts within each basin. Nor did the report mention 
Planet Ranch, which the committee agreed would be included in the next study. 
Researchers initially relied on three hydrologic criteria, as well as “soft” criteria like an 
area’s water quality and its capacity to transport 120,000 AF per year, to determine which 
areas would be candidates for water transfers. Any areas that could not satisfy these 
hydrologic criteria they discarded.23 The first phase report recommended five areas—
including the Pinal AMA and Harquahala-McMullen Valley-Butler Valley area, both of 
which were significantly overdrafting groundwater—for further study largely on the basis 
of current water farm activities.24  
As the summer heat and Mecham recall campaign intensified, La Paz County 
Manager Neta Bowman began working with ARWA on a constitutional amendment to 
                                                   
22 The committee’s enabling legislation stated that ADWR would carry out the hydrological analysis. The 
agency’s director, Kathy Ferris, selected three firms (Franzoy Corey, Econotrend, and Mountain West 
Research) to carry out the socio-economic dimension.Joint Legislative Committee Groundwater and 
Surface Water Exportation, Minutes for September 5, 1986, pg. 1, 3.  
23 One criterion demanded that an area’s water supply be able to support future municipal and industrial 
water demands. It reflected the researchers’ view that agriculture would not be economically significant in 
the future. The other two respectively required complete adjudication of surface water rights and that the 
legal and engineering mechanisms to “feasibly” transport water were in place. Franzoy Corey Engineers 
and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and Econotrend, Inc., Water Transfers 
Study Phase I: Baseline Hydrologic and Socioeconomic Profiles, May 13, 1987, 1.1-1.4. They clarified 
good water quality as having less than 1,500 mg/L of total dissolved solids. 
24 Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and 
Econotrend, Inc., 12.2; Joint Legislative Committee on Groundwater and Surface Water Exportation, 
Minutes for May 13, 1987, pg. 4.  
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exempt municipal water farms from being taxable property. If the legislature would not 
approve it for referendum, Bowman planned an initiative campaign. CWF was also 
filming a video narrated by Rex Allen, a celebrated cowboy and native son of Willcox, to 
highlight the potential rural plight from water transfers. The JLCGSWE’s announcement 
of its report on the hydrologic and socioeconomic impacts of water farms only their 
intensified sentiments.25          
The report that came before them in late August was disappointing for those who 
hungered for adequate data. Frenzied acquisitions of more rural lands had compelled the 
ADWR to radically hike its estimated transfer volumes from these water farms, but even 
these intensified scenarios could not provide the clarity legislators wanted.26 The 
potential hydrologic impacts varied greatly, from nearly none on the Mogollon Rim, to 
nominal in the Yuma-Wellton Corridor-Cibola Valley area, to significant in the case of 
the Harquahala-McMullen-Butler Valley area. The contrast between the two areas 
hosting municipal water farms also displayed the range of socioeconomic impacts. While 
retiring farmland would have a “moderate to strong” effect in the Pinal AMA, any 
consequences would rapidly diminish as the area’s economy diversified. Moreover, any 
fiscal impacts would be “relatively modest considering the overall size of the tax base in 
Pinal County.” Researchers in contrast predicted that even at the lowest estimated 
                                                   
25 “Water farm property tax law sought,” Parker Pioneer, July 8, 1987, pgs. 1-2; “UA economist tells 
impact of water loss on counties,” Parker Pioneer, July 15, 1987, pg. 5; “Water transfer video prepared,” 
Parker Pioneer, July 15, 1987, pg. 6; Sheryl Drew, “Economic growth plan needed, tied to water 
availability,” Parker Pioneer, August 26, 1987, pg. 1, 6; “State slates hearing series on new water transfer 
study,” Parker Pioneer, August 26, 1987, pg. 1. 
26 The first report had set low, medium, and high estimates at 60,000 AF, 90,000 AF, and 120,000 AF, 
respectively. These values were increased to 100,000 AF, 200,000 AF, and 300,000 AF in the second 
report. 
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volumes, water farms in the Harquahala-McMullen-Butler Valley area might reduce the 
area’s jobs by a third and drop school enrollment by at least 40 percent as residents fled. 
In light of these uneven predictions, the report’s only overall conclusion was that if an 
area was geographically small and was economically dependent on a large portion of its 
agriculture lands, then converting them to water farms would cause severe social and 
economic impacts in the local communities.27   
For five hours JLCGSWE members and speakers alike grilled the researchers. 
Some, like Jim Cumming of the Yuma County Irrigation District, pointed out factual 
inaccuracies. Others, like Rep. Don Aldridge, assailed them for being heavy on 
generalities with few concrete facts. Researchers admitted that they did not consider any 
quality of life indicators or how retiring particular crops would affect an area’s economy. 
For Rep. Hartdegen, the study was “worthless” because it did not answer how removing 
groundwater from an area would affect its future growth. The only reasonable defense 
researchers offered—one which all the legislators should have known—was that their 
contracts required them to use existing data, not conduct original research.28 
The following month, as thousands of adoring people jammed the streets of 
Phoenix to catch a glimpse of Pope John Paul II on his visit to Arizona, JLCGSWE 
members faced hostile crowds in statewide hearings. These hearings were originally 
                                                   
27 Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and 
Econotrend, Inc. Draft Water Transfer Study Phase II Report. Hydrologic and Socioeconomic Profiles, 
August 26, 1987, Part A. Hydrologic impacts, 1.1, 8.1, 8.2; Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in 
association with Mountain West Research, Inc. and Econotrend, Inc. Draft Water Transfer Study Phase II 
Report. Hydrologic and Socioeconomic Profiles, August 26, 1987, Part B. Socioeconomic Impacts, 3.1-3.2, 
Table 3.1, 5.1-5.3. 
28 Joint Legislative Committee on Groundwater and Surface Water Exportation, Minutes for August 31, 
1984, 3, 4, 6, 7. 
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intended to review data and take suggestions for future legislation. Members instead 
faced torrents of criticism. At their first meeting in Parker, Neta Bowman slammed both 
reports for failing to consider how future speculative purchases could impact La Paz 
County. Officials at a later meeting in Casa Grande fumed that the second report had not 
considered how water transfers would affect nascent industries, and speakers at an icy 
reception in Show Low decried the report’s finding that 70,000 AF annual transfers in the 
Mogollon region would have a “negligible” socioeconomic impact. One audience 
member summed up rural sentiments when she declared, “We may be paranoid, but have 
reason to be paranoid. We’re talking about our life’s blood—our water.” No legislator 
defended the report. Chairman Aldridge proclaimed that he had “learned more from the 
people in these public meetings than I did from this damned study.”29 
Out of disgust, the committee unanimously reassigned the third and final report to 
the ADWR and legislative staff. Since the second report had “polarized rural and urban 
factions” by not sufficiently addressing the socioeconomic impacts, they decided to 
develop solutions from their report and feedback from public meetings and hearings.30 
This final report, which arrived on the day that the committee expired, offered solutions 
ranging from writing statutes to protecting areas of origin to creating water planning 
regions within basins not covered by the GMA. In a nod towards ongoing recharge 
                                                   
29 “County voices heard by legislative group,” Parker Pioneer, September 9, 1987, 1, 8; Jim Fickess, 
“Legislature Comes to Casa Grande: Public, Panel Blast Water Farm study,” Casa Grande Dispatch, 
September 11, 1987, 1, 5; Andrew Walker, “Big city water transfers attacked,” White Mountain 
Independent, September 15, 1987, 1, 14. 
30 Joint Legislative Committee on Groundwater and Surface Water Exportation, Minutes for October 5, 
1987, pgs. 1, 4; Franzoy Corey Engineers and Architects, in association with Mountain West Research, Inc. 
and Econotrend, Inc., Final Water Transfer Study Phase III Report: Legislative Alternatives, December 
1987, 4, 30.  
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efforts, the report also suggested programs for firming urban supplies—like developing 
an augmentation district within the Phoenix AMA or a credit system for underground 
water storage and recovery—which could address the urban water demand that fueled 
water farm acquisitions.31  
The study committee’s failure to thoroughly quantify the impacts of water 
farms—and the larger failure to reach a consensus on the value of water—left all sides to 
return to their rhetorical positions they had adopted before the study: three rural 
lawmakers called for a ban on interbasin water transportation, while Roger Manning of 
AMWUA bluntly stated that any prohibitions or direct taxation on water farms were 
unacceptable.32 Like the previous session, the most that legislators could accomplish with 
the little time available was push through a bill to count water farms as taxable 
property—only for county debt limits and state sales tax distribution, which upset no 
one—and plan to restart efforts in the next legislative session.33  
But even this plan was in jeopardy. The recall petition signatures that opponents 
of Governor Mecham had turned in on November 2nd surpassed the number of votes that 
had carried him to office. Though the recall election was only a matter of time, 
revelations in October that Mecham had failed to report a $350,000 campaign loan—
combined with an ongoing investigation into whether he had used public monies to 
support his financially ailing Pontiac dealership—brought a hearing before a grand jury. 
Speaker Joe Lane immediately hired a special counsel to investigate these charges. The 
                                                   
31 Ibid., 16, 17-18, 20, 23-25, 27-29. 
32 “Water Transfer Bills Awaited,” Arizona Capitol Times, December 30, 1987, 5.  
33 Remote municipal property; fiscal impacts, HB 2462, 38th Legislature, 1st Regular session (CH 268, 
1987), §35-451.02; §42-301 (L); §42-1341 (A).  
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growing prospect of impeachment proceedings against Mecham, a nearly $300 million 
budget deficit, and the coming September primaries left committee members helpless and 
frustrated that they would be able resolve the issue in the next session. “We do not have 
time for a hiatus,” complained Rep. Jim Hartdegen. “We’ve opened the door, and the 
burglars are outside waiting to come in.” ADWR Director Alan Kleinman, who insisted 
in numerous public hearings that committee members would form a unified front and 
push for concerted action in the coming session, fumed over the dim prospects for 
resolving this issue soon. Chairman Don Aldridge joined him and glumly predicted that 
“we’re going to see this issue for a long time to come.”34 
FORCING RESOLUTION 
 A week into 1988, the grand jury had indicted Mecham and his brother on three 
counts of perjury, two counts of fraud, and one count of failing to report a campaign 
contribution. Speaker Joe Lane’s special counsel delivered his report a week later and the 
House promptly began impeachment proceedings. There are few descriptions that could 
adequately capture the intensity of these hearings; the divisions lingered long after the 
House voted on February 8th for impeachment. An equally intense malaise hung over the 
Senate, where proceedings dragged out for over a month before they threw Mecham out 
of office. Deliberations had halted in the face of this unprecedented event, leaving those 
mostly outside of the legislature to continue water farm negotiations.  
The out-of-sight nature of rump group and the fact that many of the lobbyists who 
comprised it were seasoned negotiators on complex water issues, ranging from the GMA 
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to Plan-6 funding, meant that it could serve as a less-heated forum for negotiations as the 
poisonous proceedings for Governor Mecham’s impeachment began. Since December 
1987, when the third study committee report was published with little solution in sight, 
rump members had been discussing solutions with little success. The gradual realization 
that any agreement they could reach would face opposition from those not involved 
prompted Chairwoman Betsy Rieke to expand the group in July to include four 
legislators (Speaker of the House Joe Lane, and Reps. Herb Guenther, Jim Hartdegen, 
and Jenny Norton) and fifty other people representing seventeen different interests. To 
streamline discussions, they divided into three committees that focused on transportation 
limits, determining compensation to rural counties, and taxing and bonding for areas with 
water farms. That each committee had generated several proposals by September gave 
Guenther hope that if they could reach agreement, the legislature would be able to pass a 
compromise the following year.35  
But by December 1988, negotiators could not reach consensus on the value of 
water; those involved remained divided over how much water should be set aside for 
counties and how much compensation these areas would receive. For rural lawmakers 
who had to balance these negotiations with fending off fierce electoral challenges from 
Mecham’s followers, who defeated Speaker Joe Lane and six others who voted for 
impeachment in the primary election and threatened countless others, this breakdown 
                                                   
35 “Water Farm Negotiators Target ’89 Regular Session,” Arizona Capitol Times, July 27, 1988, 1; “Water 
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made the session’s end a bitter experience.36 Even when a group of six representatives 
from various interest groups renewed negotiations at the beginning of the next session in 
January 1989 and reached agreement on closing some basins to future transfers, they 
remained in the same impasse as the rump group after four months. The municipal team 
was dead set on paying $2 per AF transported, while the rural interests wanted ten times 
as much. The closest agreement was over how much water could be removed from a 
basin: the rural team had offered 55 percent while the municipal team wanted 65 
percent.37 
Since the 1989 session began, everyone within the legislature seemed anxious to 
resolve the water farm issue. Stories in the state’s largest circulating papers, The Arizona 
Republic and The Phoenix Gazette, were generating public awareness and opposition to 
water farms. In northern Arizona, a proposed transfer from an area near Flagstaff to a 
resort town at the entrance of the Grand Canyon National Park brought the district’s 
lawmakers, who had previously been ambivalent on this issue, into strident opposition. 
When negotiations among the group of six fell apart, the interested parties coalesced into 
separate cliques and introduced four different comprehensive bills in late January.38  
                                                   
36 “Water Farm Talks Dammed by Transportation, Compensation Issues,” Arizona Capitol Times, 
December 14, 1988, 1-2; “Vote breathes new life into Mecham; victory balanced by some defeats for ex-
governor,” Arizona Republic, September 14, 1988, Front, A2.   
37 The rural delegation consisted of Guenther, Gene Fisher of CWF, and Bruce Babbitt. Roger Manning of 
AMWUA, Jim Derouin of the City of Phoenix, and Kathy Ferris, who was now representing AgriCom, 
formed the urban delegation. When negotiations broke down, all had agreed to close the Parker and Little 
Colorado Basins to future transfers while leaving the basins holding Bouse, Wenden, Salome, and 
McMullen Valley—all of which comprised Phoenix’s water farms—open to transfers.  
38 Transporting groundwater; county approval, HB 2032, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989); 
Groundwater; exempt wells, Fort Valley, HB 2030, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989).  
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AMWUA, together with Tucson, AgriCom, and the Arizona Mining Association 
introduced a bill that divided and conquered by limiting water transfers to ten mostly 
southwestern Arizona basins. Many rural interests ranging from Prescott to the Navajo, 
Apache, and Coconino Counties Little Colorado River Basin Water Conference saw this 
as their opportunity for a future free of water farms. They, along with nearly every 
Phoenix-area legislator, backed the legislation.39  
La Paz lawmakers Herb Guenther and Jones Osborn proposed an alternate 
package that created an agency to manage transfers and limited transfers to existing water 
farms. Beyond applying to ADWR for a permit to transport, those operating water farms 
could not withdraw more than 40 percent of a groundwater basin’s existing 
groundwater.40 A coalition of rural and urban legislators introduced a similar bill that 
required ADWR to approve all transfers and cities to make in-lieu payments for what the 
land would have been worth in private hands. Where it differed was in expanding the 
number of reserved basins and setting more generous terms for withdrawing 
groundwater.41  
In an effort to establish order, House Natural Resources and Agriculture 
Committee Chairman Jim Hartdegen refused to hear these three measures and introduced 
his own comprehensive package that inverted the approach of the other three bills. This 
ARWA-backed measure closed all AMAs and four environmentally sensitive basins to 
water farms while keeping the rest open to transfers. While the per-acre transportation 
                                                   
39 Water transfers; AMWUA consensus, HB 2653, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989). 
40 Water transfers; G, HB 2427, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989).  
41 Water transfers; water plan, SB 1450, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989). 
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limits mirrored those in Guenther and Osborn’s bill, it featured a lower limit for how 
much total water could be transported out of these basins. When little overlap emerged 
from a massive, collective meeting in February of three house and senate committees to 
discuss these four bills, leaders nominated yet another committee to continue 
negotiations.42 
When this new committee remained deadlocked with less than a month of the 
session to go, the mounting frustration with endless committees rehashing the same 
points provoked radical action. Speaker Hull and President Usdane pulled this new 
committee’s draft bill, gathered a list of sponsors, and threw it before the legislature. Like 
the earlier AMWUA-backed measure, HB 2666 (the “Beast Bill”)43 limited interbasin 
transfers to nine basins largely within La Paz and Yuma Counties. The $12 in 
compensation for each AF transported was closer to the $15 rural negotiators in the 
previous committee had desired, but the bill’s remaining provisions revolted them. Any 
entity could transport water unabated until 35 percent remained in these basins. Beyond 
protecting city- and speculator-properties, HB 2666 granted priority transportation rights 
to them with a provision for entities that had spent over $300,000 preparing their water 
farms for transportation. Many of the rural legislators outside the affected basins who 
joined in sponsoring this legislation—including Sens. John Hays, Gus Arzberger, and 
Alan Stephens, as well as Reps. Jim Hartdegen and Henry Evans—had previously 
                                                   
42 “First Water Transfer Bills Hit House; Hartdegen Holds Them For Own Act,” Arizona Capitol Times, 
January 25, 1989, 1; Water transfers; ARWA, HB 2635, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session (1989); Joint 
Senate Health, Welfare, Aging and Environment; House Natural Resources and Agriculture; House 
Environment Committees, Minutes for February 22, 1989, RG 97, SG1, S3, Box 36, NRA (2/4). 
43 Revelations 13:15-13:18 describes a red, seven-headed leviathan rising from the sea in the End Times. 
The number associated with the beast is 666. 
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opposed water farms. But the prospect of sparing their districts and resolving this issue 
was too attractive to pass-up. Legislative leadership gave the La Paz Board of 
Supervisors a day to formally reply. However they responded, HB 2666 had enough 
support from speculators, cities, and most rural legislators to pass.44 
This abandonment by legislative leaders was a wake-up for the La Paz County 
delegation. When leaders turned down their pleas to delay introducing HB 2666, they 
rallied their supporters to halt what Herb Guenther decried as the “rape” of La Paz 
County. Concerned residents organized petition drives, letter-writing campaigns, and 
flooded the House’s switchboard while CWF mobilized caravans of cars and buses for 
residents to Phoenix. Scores protested outside of AgriCom’s Central Avenue office and 
the Salt River Project’s headquarters for the utility’s support of the measure. Even more 
headed to the capitol to confront legislators. The bill’s first hearing before the House 
Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee on May 8th dragged on for fourteen hours 
as many Yuma and La Paz residents plead their opposition. Kathy Ferris, now 
representing AgriCom and perhaps those—like one former county supervisor—who had 
sold their lands to the company, favored the bill. Herb Guenther, Parker Mayor Sam 
Davis, and Gene Fisher offered a compromise that would allow 50 percent of 
groundwater to remain in each basin. No one took it. Sponsor Sen. Hays, who two years 
earlier had chaired the study committee that patiently listened to Parker residents’ 
                                                   
44 The nine reserved basins under HB 2666 were the Big Chino, Harquahala, Ranegras Plain, Clara Peak, 
Lower Gila, Tiger Wash, and Gila Bend basins as well as Child’s and Dendora Valleys; Jim Tiffin, 
“Supervisors ask delay in water transfer legislation,” Parker Pioneer, May 3, 1989, 1; “Legislature may 
leave La Paz County high and dry in new water measure,” Arizona Republic, April 17, 1989, Valley & 
State, B1; “Rural-to-city water rights plan offered,” Phoenix Gazette, April 29, 1989, Front, A1; 
Groundwater transportation act of 1989, HB 2666, 39th Legislature, 1st Regular session, 1989, §9-435, §42-
257, §45-464.64 (G).  
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apprehensions over water farms, now defended a bill that embodied their fears. He 
confessed, “I don’t think anyone is real happy with it, but it’s something. This is like 
King Solomon chopping the baby in half.” For better or worse, he argued that HB 2666 
could be the last opportunity for rural areas to exert control over their rights. If not, water 
farms would continue unregulated.45  
   By nighttime, committee members had grown restless with testimony and 
started hashing out details. After some initial amendments, Guenther seconded by his 
seatmate Bob McLendon proposed fourteen different amendments to soften portions of 
HB 2666. However fair they may have been, all failed. In what likely represented the 
feelings of all committee members outside La Paz County, Rep. Hartdegen defended his 
vote saying, “AgriCom has joined the pack of one for all and all for one. If they are not 
happy, they will withdraw their support, and that would kill the bill.” When the 
committee adjourned at half-past-midnight, it had passed HB 2666 with only three 
opposing votes.46  
The publicity generated by the House hearings weakened support for HB 2666. 
The weekend before the hearing, the Arizona Republic ran an extended commentary from 
Gary Woodard, a University of Arizona policy expert, who ripped HB 2666 for failing to 
articulate a “coherent policy” for water resource management. After the committee 
hearing, it ran another story highlighting the how the measure would favor AgriCom and 
American Continental while harming the value of state trust lands. The editorial board’s 
                                                   
45Joyce Barker, “Bouse area residents oppose water transfer bill at state legislature,” Parker Pioneer, May 
24, 1989, 3; “Groups protest water measure,” Phoenix Gazette, May 25, 1989, Metro, B4; House 
Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture, Minutes for May 8, 1989, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12.  
46Martin Van Der Werf, “Water-swap ‘rights’ in bill fire opposition,” Arizona Republic, May 10, 1989, B1; 
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statement that day acknowledged that La Paz County was “being sacrificed to the 
interests of other areas.” While little could be done to alter the legislation, “the public is 
entitled to know why two private businesses—AgriCom Management Inc. and American 
Continental Inc. that together own about 40,000 acres—are slated to receive preferential 
rights.”47  
House leadership did agree to hold HB 2666 for a week so that Guenther could 
line-up support for an earlier measure that would create an agency to regulate 
groundwater transfers. Any city applying to transfer groundwater would need to 
demonstrate that its population growth demanded new supplies. Representatives from 
Phoenix, Scottsdale, Mesa, and Glendale supported the measure, but Guenther could not 
round-up enough votes for the legislature to consider it. Negative press coverage and 
opposition from the State Land Department pushed sponsors to remove the preferential 
transportation language.48 But they tacked on an amendment that allowed any city 
transporting water to override any local ordinance on the placement of pipelines or 
canals. After killing seventeen of his proposed amendments, the House silenced two-and-
a-half hours of pleas from Guenther by passing HB 2666, 43-18.49  
                                                   
47 State trust lands were federal lands granted to territories upon statehood to fund their development. Most 
of the revenue from selling or leasing Arizona’s 9.2 million acres of lands is dedicated to K-12 public 
schools.  Gary C. Woodard, “Pumping a county till it’s dry,” Arizona Republic, May 7, 1989, C1-C3; 
“Water transfer legislation: Urban vs. rural interests,” Arizona Republic, May 10, 1989, A16.  
48 Speaker Hull and House Majority Leader Jim Meredith accused Phoenix, which had been the first city to 
support Guenther’s statewide agency, of trying to scuttle HB 2666 simply to leverage another amendment 
to grant them broader transportation rights. “Water-sway ‘rights’ in bill fire opposition; 2 firms, 2 cities are 
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Werf, “House OKs water transfer to big cities; La Paz lawmaker decries ‘atrocity’; bill faces Senate,” 
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Even after clearing the House, the steady crescendo of media scrutiny began 
whittling down support for the measure before the Senate could consider it. Rumors 
circulated that Phoenix Mayor Terry Goddard, who was planning a gubernatorial run, 
told his staff to support Guenther’s proposal. As demonstrators descended on the capitol 
for HB 2666’s hearing before the Senate Health, Welfare, Aging and Environment 
Committee (HWAE), Chairman John Hays was shoring up support for an amendment to 
include a study committee exploring Guenther’s proposal.50 But the pinnacle event on the 
day of the bill’s hearing came from a child. The following morning, Arizona Republic 
readers were greeted with an image of Amber Cappi on the front page of the “Valley & 
State” section. The two-year old from Quartzsite, exhausted from the summer heat, 
looked disconsolate as she slumped next to a sign reading “What will my kids drink 
daddy?” Though the image was undoubtedly staged, it spoke to a sense of injustice 
inherent in the water farms. Because some large landowners opted to reap the profits 
from selling their property and water rights to distant cities, those left behind would face 
the consequences of a declining water table—degraded groundwater quality, higher 
                                                   
50 When the House of Representatives passes a bill out of the Committee of the Whole, it is transmitted to 
the Senate for further deliberation. The bill was required to pass through the Rules Committee, which was 
responsible for determining whether it was constitutional; in actuality, the Rules Committee mostly exists 
to kill bills. Chairwoman Jan Brewer would have likely obeyed the dictates of leadership in certifying that 
it was proper for consideration. If not, she had six Republican votes to overcome the committee’s four 
Democrats (which include Gus Arzberger and Alan Stephens). As Senate President, Robert Usdane could 
decide which other committees would hear HB 2666; the fewer committee assignments it received, the 
more likely it was to pass. Politics likely dictated why Usdane assigned HB 2666 to the Health, Welfare, 
Aging and Environment (HWAE) Committee over the Natural Resources and Agriculture (NRA) 
Committee.  HWAE Chairman John Hays had been committed to passing HB 2666 and likely had the votes 
lined-up to do so; the committee’s six Republican members—all of whom, barring Hays, hailed from urban 
areas—outnumbered its four Democratic members. The NRA Committee, in contrast, was evenly split 
between Republicans and Democrats; in the event of a tie vote, the bill would be considered dead.     
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pumping costs, and overall economic decline—and the prospect that their future was 
limited.51   
The turn in public opinion manifested when the Senate HWAE Committee 
approved every amendment La Paz legislators introduced: the amount of water removed 
from a basin was reduced, and the revised measure now contained the framework for a 
statewide agency to acquire water rights and regulate transfers. But these provisions 
likely outweighed any benefit that cities and developers saw in passing it. Three 
Republican Senators representing Mesa and Phoenix joined with four Democrats to kill 
the bill in committee.  For Chairman Hays, who had shepherded HB 2666 to almost being 
a workable compromise, the defeat was tragic. Sen. Jones Osborn, who had been resigned 
to the passage of this improved bill, scoffed that “The cities apparently don’t think they 
need the bill.” Since any member could resurrect this measure with a strike-everything 
amendment, legislators remained on guard into the final days of the session in June. None 
came, nor did Governor Mofford—who had replaced Mecham after his impeachment—
call a special session to forge an agreement. All involved were left emotionally drained 
and uncertain of how to move negotiations forward.52  
CRAFTING COMPROMISE 
The failure of HB 2666 was the pivotal turning point in negotiations. City 
representatives realized they could not strong-arm a bill through the legislature; they 
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would need the support of La Paz lawmakers—and with it, more favorable compensation 
and limitations on transportation—for any agreement to last. And La Paz County leaders, 
including CWF members and the Board of Supervisors, accepted that they would have to 
provide the Phoenix-area with water in the future.53 None of the negotiating parties had 
formally met since the end of the last session seven months before. But the consensus that 
emerged from the embers of HB 2666 set a new tone for the new session in January 1990. 
Negotiators split into three groups to resolve which water farms would be grandfathered 
into law, which basins would be designated for future urban demands, and what costs 
would be tied to transporting water.54 Though Sen. Hays introduced a bill similar to HB 
2666 that could easily be re-amended to include a compromise, negotiators could not 
reach a clear agreement by the end of session in May 1990.55 
 While those talks simmered with the oncoming 1990 elections, many of the 
involved parties were also re-evaluating the GMA’s safe-yield and AWS requirements. 
Criticism of the law had been growing over the past two years. After completing an audit 
of the ADWR, long-time Auditor General Douglas Norton criticized safe-yield for being 
wholly unnecessary, since Phoenix and Tucson had enough groundwater to last several 
hundred years. He also faulted the AWS standards for igniting a hasty rush to secure 
groundwater pumping rights well before they were needed. His findings carried over to 
the Arizona Farm Bureau’s convention in November 1990, where members backed a 
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54 Personal interview with Herb Guenther, March 20, 2013. 
55 Jim Tiffin, “Water transfers legislation passes committee; bodes watching,” Parker Pioneer, March 14, 
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11.   
127 
 
resolution to throw out the GMA. Andy Kurtz, the Bureau’s Executive Secretary, began 
feeling out support for using an initiative to change the AWS requirements if water farm 
negotiations stalled again in the coming session. 56 
 The calls to re-examine the GMA also shifted attention toward creating a 
metropolitan district that, instead of allowing individual cities and water companies to 
independently acquire their own supplies, would coordinate planning for future water 
demand. It was an idea that had been in practice in Los Angeles for several decades and 
was not entirely new in Arizona; it was simply an extension of groundwater recharge 
legislation that urban lawmakers had pushed in earlier sessions and embodied one of the 
recommendations of the study committee’s final report. 
Congressional pressure provided the initial push for a prototype district. Many 
irrigation districts that had contracted for CAP water realized that they could no longer 
afford it to the point that looming underutilization accompanied the CAP as it came 
online in 1987. A General Accounting Office report to Congress in February found that 
Department of Interior accounting practices had allowed congressional spending for the 
CAP to exceed its authorization ceiling by $493 million.57 A Congress increasingly 
opposed to costly western water projects would need to approve the project’s greater 
ceiling. This uncertainty pushed a sizeable urban contingent to allow the Central Arizona 
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Water Conservation District (CAWCD) to operate underground water storage facilities. It 
could therefore utilize more project water by storing previously unused amounts 
underground for use in drier times.58  
The announcement of new AWS guidelines for the Second Management Plan 
(1990-2000) in November 1988 generated more momentum for creating a metropolitan 
water district. The initial guidelines for providing water for new subdivided lands that the 
ADWR had released in September 1982 focused on tepidly limiting the depth of 
groundwater pumping. Developers had anticipated that the ADWR would allow 
grandfathered irrigation rights that could be converted into moveable Type 1 rights to 
satisfy the AWS requirements. They could continue acquiring older farmlands for their 
underlying groundwater to demonstrate an AWS. But instead the ADWR’s new AWS 
guidelines reduced groundwater withdrawals to half-an-AF per acre on undeveloped land. 
The department was effectively limiting development on non-urban lands to 1-1.5 
residences per acre to that point that most future growth would occur in areas with access 
to surface waters. The wave of fury from the development community, farmers who saw 
the value of their lands they were marketing drop, and cities without CAP or SRP 
allocations forced ADWR to retreat from these guidelines in less than three months. 
                                                   
58 Groundwater recharge; district authority, HB 2401, 38th Legislature, 1st Regular session (CH 353, 1987), 
§ 48-3713 (B)(5); § 48-3713 (C); § 48-3713.01; House Committee on Natural Resources and Agriculture, 
Minutes for March 9, 1987, 3-5; “Those dry years are coming,” Phoenix Gazette, March 11, 1987, A-12; 
“Water For Dry Years,” Arizona Republic, March 11, 1987, A-8; Jack Lavelle, “Committee OKs bill for 
water storage,” Phoenix Gazette, March 13, 1987, E-10.   
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Rather than wait for additional regulations from ADWR, these interests began looking 
towards groundwater replenishment as solution to their problems.59   
Their efforts, and ongoing favorable discussions from a variety of sources on 
creating a metropolitan water district, came to fruition when the legislature convened in 
January 1990.60 Tucson Sen. John Mawhinney had been working for seven years with 
local water groups to create a water augmentation authority to help the Tucson AMA, 
which was one of the largest groundwater-dependent areas in the country, reach safe-
yield. The authority’s framework would allow it to acquire now-unused CAP allocations 
to farmers and offer interested parties a full portfolio of water rights that qualified as 
AWS. Its prohibition on importing groundwater gained the enthusiastic support of rural 
lawmakers. Several involved in water farm negotiations drew up a similar measure for 
the Phoenix AMA, but its exclusive focus on groundwater replenishment, dearth of 
protections for smaller communities’ water supplies, and mandatory membership soured 
support. The underlying idea would nonetheless return next session.61 
                                                   
59 Water Resources Research Center, University of Arizona, “Debate, Discussion Mark Ten-Year 
Anniversary of Arizona’s Groundwater Management Act,” Arroyo, Vol. 4, No. 3 (October 1990): 4-5.   
60 Norton’s audit had suggested that a metropolitan district could enhance management of existing supplies, 
conservation efforts, and augmentation for the Phoenix-area. Roger Manning of AMWUA had flown 
several legislators to visit the Metropolitan Water District to shore up support within the legislature. 
Arizona Office of the Auditor General, Performance Audit, Department of Water Resources, Arizona 
Water Commission; Report to the Arizona Legislature by the Auditor General, August 1989, 
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61AMA water augmentation authority, SB 1556, 39th Legislature, 2nd Regular session (CH 181, 1990); 
David Michael Gillilan, “Institutional Alternatives for Managing Water Resources in the Upper San Pedro 
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Metro/State, 1B, 4B; Groundwater replenishment districts, SB 1558, 39th Legislature, 2nd Regular session 
(1990). 
130 
 
Even as water farm negotiations subsided with the coming elections, a spat 
erupted that summer. Mesa and Phoenix lobbyists were pushing Congress, which was 
debating the Fort McDowell Indian Water Rights Settlement Act, to repeal a clause 
within the Colorado River Basin Project Act. To shift Arizona’s water consumption from 
finite groundwater to “renewable” CAP water, the act had restricted any entity 
contracting for project water from pumping non-surplus groundwater across the 
CAWCD’s boundaries. Since the Pinal AMA was a planned depletion area under the 
GMA, Rep. Jim Hartdegen argued that there was no such water available. He, Guenther, 
and new ADWR Director Bill Plummer persuaded a joint committee that rescinding this 
clause would be detrimental to ongoing water farm negotiations.62 They returned home 
successful and prepared for another round of elections.  
The returns that came in throughout the night of November 6th revealed two 
electoral bombshells. First, since neither Democrat Terry Goddard nor his Republican 
opponent, J. Fife Symington III, secured a majority of votes, they had to face-off in a run-
off election.63 The second surprise was that Democrats, for only the second time since 
legislative reapportionment, had won control of the Senate. Alan Stephens, who had been 
an active participant in water farm negotiations, became Majority Leader and while Sen. 
Pete Rios—who represented parts of Graham, Gila, and Pinal Counties—assumed the 
                                                   
62 Colorado River Basin Project Act, 43 U.S.C. 1524, PL 90-537, §304(C)(3); Fort McDowell Indian Water 
Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Joint Hearing before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of 
Representatives, and the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 
July 17th, 1990, 149-150, 325, 369-370, 372-373, 374; Tamara Hatzinger, “Federal Water Law Survives 
Cities’ Lobby for Repeal,” Arizona Capitol Times, August 8, 1990, 1. 
63 One legacy of Governor Evan Mecham’s tumultuous time in office was that the legislature, in an effort to 
ensure that neither he nor any candidate like him would win gubernatorial office, amended the state 
constitution in 1988 so that a candidate needed at least 50% of the vote to win. Symington received 49.7% 
of the vote, while Goddard fell half-a-percentage point behind at 49.2%. The legislature rescinded this 
change after the 1990 election. 
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Presidency. They, along with Speaker Jane Hull, eagerly pressed for resolution of the 
issue. The onset of another economic recession in July had already cooled water farm 
speculation and the atmosphere for negotiations. What took shape as the session began 
was a two-part package that would limit groundwater transportation to certain basins 
while laying the foundation for a Phoenix-area water district.64 A scandal at the 
beginning of the session temporarily derailed negotiations. Acting on rumors that 
legislators were taking bribes, Phoenix Police Chief Ruben Ortega and Maricopa County 
Attorney Rick Romley launched a sting operation. Operating under the alias “Tony 
Vincent,” former mobster J. Anthony Stedino hustled legislators and lobbyists for their 
help in setting up casino-style gambling in Arizona and doled out over $300,000 for their 
efforts. Seven legislators either resigned or were thrown-out of the legislature to face 
their indictments from “AZScam.” Among them was Hartdegen, who was one of the 
central legislators involved in negotiations.65   
Despite the loss of a pivotal member, a consensus was crystallizing among 
negotiators. While the details remain muddled, municipal and rural interests turned 
against AgriCom and American Continental. Part of the compromise measure (SB 1055) 
that Willcox-area Senate Natural Resources and Agriculture Chairman Gus Arzberger 
                                                   
64 “Stephens Gives Nucleus Club Peek at Democrat Senate,” Arizona Capitol Times, December 5, 1990, 1; 
“Committees Will Consider Everything From Collective Bargaining to AHCCCS Transplants: House 
Natural Resources & Agriculture,” Arizona Capitol Times, January 9, 1991, 40, 42; “Rios, Hull Interview,” 
Arizona Capitol Times, January 9, 1991, 26; Jane Crichton, “Water transfer legislation planned for 
legislative session,” Parker Pioneer, January 2, 1991, 1-2.  
65 Of the nine who resigned, Hartdegen was least culpable. Recordings showed Stedino continually pushing 
to the point of almost bullying a reticent Hartdegen into joining his scheme. When he finally acquiesced, it 
seemed that Hartdegen had done so simply to get Stedino to let up. Though he had to resign his seat as part 
of a plea agreement, Hartdegen’s tearful goodbye speech was greeted with a standing ovation. He has since 
been allowed to return to the legislature as a lobbyist, a privilege not accorded to any of the other AZScam 
legislators. Jean Novotny, “’AzScam’: A triumph and a milestone,” Arizona Republic, June 10, 1991, A5.  
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introduced in late February grandfathered in the municipal water farms and limited future 
groundwater transportation to three additional basins, none of which held the properties 
of speculators. Beyond attaching an amendment that established the framework for a 
Phoenix-area replenishment district—one that was supposed to be introduced separately 
in the House as part of this compromise—to ensure urban support, Arzberger held two 
informational meetings to ensure that everyone was onboard.66  
There was urgency in the air as his measure was set for a final Senate vote in late 
February. The runoff election between Goddard and Symington was scheduled for the 
26th. The two were neck-in-neck in all polls leading up the election. Rumors circulated 
that the Senate Democrats—seven of seventeen of whom hailed from rural districts—
were trying to push SB 1055 through before the runoff election in hopes that it would 
boost Goddard’s polling in rural areas. Their concerns were warranted. Symington’s 
campaign had dispersed fliers proclaiming “Terry Goddard Advocates Transfer of Rural 
County Water to Big Cities” throughout La Paz and Yuma Counties. Goddard had shot 
back with promises that he would fight alongside Herb Guenther, who had only endorsed 
him in this run-off election, for equitable water farm legislation. The efforts of Senate 
Democrats and Goddard were futile: the former Phoenix mayor received 48 percent of 
the vote, losing the runoff election—including La Paz County—to Symington.67 
                                                   
66 “Replenishment Accord Clears Way For Water Transfer Limits Bill,” Arizona Capitol Times, February 
27, 1991, 1-2.  
67 During the campaign, Goddard initially ripped into AgriCom for depriving rural areas of their future. 
When Ron Ober, AgriCom’s principal and a prominent figure within the Arizona Democratic Party, 
threatened to stop fundraising for Goddard, all mention of the company vanished from Goddard’s speeches. 
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Tiffin, “Goddard vows to fight 1991 water transfer legislation,” Parker Pioneer, January 23, 1991, 1-2.; Jay 
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While SB 1055 unanimously cleared the Senate, it collapsed upon arriving in the 
House in late March. Rather than admit defeat, Hull and Rios pulled together twenty-two 
urban, rural, and agricultural representatives to hammer-out their differences in the 
chamber’s basement. When talks fizzled again after a month of meetings, the determined 
pair created one last committee of five legislators to try for consensus before the session 
ended. It was an interesting mixture of personalities. House Majority Leader Mark 
Killian, a straight-laced, longtime Mesa resident with deep ties to farming, was an 
obvious selection. The same was true of Herb Guenther and Henry Evans, both of whom 
had been active in negotiations as representatives of areas with municipal water farms. 
While he was a retired stockbroker known for his outspoken conservative views, Rep. 
Stan Barnes’s childhood in Queen Creek and his district—which covered most of the 
agriculturally active East Valley—marked him as a successor for Jim Hartdegen’s 
chairmanship of the House Natural Resources and Agriculture Committee, and 
consequently, as the chairman of this five-member committee. The most interesting 
selection, however, was Phoenix Rep. Sue Gerard. A blunt New Jersey native interested 
in healthcare issues, Gerard—who chaired the House Government Operations 
Committee—was largely unfamiliar with Arizona water policy. She agreed to be a 
member as a favor to her seatmate, Speaker Hull, which gave her appointment symbolic 
                                                                                                                                                       
Christine A. Gow, “Water transfer issues could decide rural counties vote in election,” Parker Pioneer, 
January 2, 1991, 1, 3; John Kolbe, “Water-transfer bills inspire political statesmanship,” Phoenix Gazette, 
June 3, 1991, Front, A2; Jim Tiffin, “Symington carries La Paz County in governor’s race,” Parker 
Pioneer, March 6, 1991, 1.  
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heft. What Gerard possessed, and what every committee member shared as well, was 
resolve to craft a workable compromise.68 
This tenacity became evident as this group, which came to be known as “Mrs. 
Gerard and the Four Farmers,” spent the next week overhauling Arzberger’s bill. Since 
only two members were acquainted with water policy, they worked to develop an 
understanding of the facts with help from new ADWR Director Betsy Rieke—who had 
run earlier rump group negotiations—that was largely independent from the influence of 
the established interests that usually involved water negotiations. Stress still flared. Every 
interest group and member loudly complained about these revisions, one of which 
AWMUA Executive Director Roger Manning branded as “agricultural blackmail.” Hull 
continually prodded members back to the table at these moments, but as one member 
observed, it was rare to see these people labor to pass a bill they loathed. The maxim for 
their work seemed, according to Gerard, that “If everyone’s pissed, you know you’ve got 
a good compromise.” Determination carried the amended version of SB 1055 through the 
House and the groundwater replenishment district bill (HB 2499) through both chambers 
within ten days. The only dissent came from Maricopa County’s West Valley legislators 
who questioned why they should be taxed for a district from which they would reap little 
benefit. But their objections could not derail negotiations for another year. Governor 
                                                   
68 Ed Foster, “Conservative becomes diplomat on water transfer,” Arizona Republic, June 3, 1991, B2; Brad 
Christensen, “Water Talks Halted; Legislators To Go Solo,” Arizona Capitol Times, May 1, 1991, 1-2; 
Joint Legislative Study Committee on Achieve Groundwater Management Goals (Authorized by Laws 
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Symington signed both measures into law and proclaimed the water farm issue resolved 
on June 10, 1991.69 
 Rural and municipal interests alike benefited from this resolution. One bill halted 
interbasin groundwater transportation except for grandfathered municipal water farms 
and three, smaller basins.70 Any entity with a CAP subcontract was forbidden from 
transporting water to an AMA until it was using at least 80 percent of its project 
entitlement and had shown the capacity increase this usage to 95 percent.71 Beyond 
mandating payments in-lieu of property taxes to counties of origin, SB 1055 established 
progressive transportation fees based on the cumulative amount of water moved from 
these areas. The fees started at $3 per AF transported and increased to ten times that 
amount for transporting over 5 million AF. These compensation rates were also tied to 
GDP so that they would remain more generous than any previously proposed 
legislation.72 The other bill laid the foundation for a Phoenix-area groundwater 
replenishment district that—if approved by over 51 percent of the entities supplying the 
AMA’s population—would facilitate more orderly water planning. 
                                                   
69Jim Tiffin, “Water transfer bill set for debate, vote this week,” Arizona Capitol Times, May 15, 1991, 1; 
Kevin Willey, “Warring factions find peaceful end to water legislation,” Arizona Republic, May 23, 1991, 
B2; Jim Tiffin, “Water legislation passes house,” Parker Pioneer, May 29, 1991, 1-2; John Kolbe, “Water-
transfer bills inspire political statesmanship,” Phoenix Gazette, June 3, 1991, Front, A2; Personal interview 
with Sue Gerard, February 17, 2013; Jim Tiffin, “Water legislation expected to be signed by governor,” 
Parker Pioneer, June 9, 1991, 1.  
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Water speculators like AgriCom and American Continental, who had been 
marginalized in negotiations, witnessed the value of their properties decline as the basins 
which hosted them were closed to future transportation.73 But unresolved issues inherent 
in creating the Phoenix Groundwater Replenishment District meant that more work lay 
ahead for the legislature. The solution they fashioned would become a boon for many of 
the developers who had propelled water farm speculation. 
THOUGHTS ON PROCESS   
 The legislative process is by nature arduous and incremental, especially for issues 
as multifaceted and emotionally polarizing as groundwater policy. Lacking a consensus 
on whether these water farms even posed a problem and the external pressure that had 
forced all sides to coalesce around a workable solution and draft the GMA and the EQA, 
it seems small wonder that the route lawmakers took towards consensus was so 
nonsensical.  
The water farm issue was a new experience for the legislature. The initial motive 
for addressing this issue was the desire of rural legislators to see water farms restricted, if 
not eliminated. The gradual momentum generated from their continued efforts sparked 
concern in cities and speculators that unless they acted, their investments could be lost. 
These divergent motives drove negotiations, and consequently, none of the parties 
involved could consistently agree on what form a resolution would take. Absent this 
coherence, all options for regulating water farms—whether through a statutory 
frameworks or creating statewide agencies—were always on the table.  
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With such a broad spectrum of solutions and no reliable information to ground 
disagreements over how these measures would affect rural areas, the only guide was the 
consensus of the moment. Negotiations therefore frequently broke down even when a 
workable compromise seemed within grasp. Only the grinding attrition of these repeated 
failures and obdurate determination of rural lawmakers could compel a compromise that 
completely satisfied no one but that all could accept. Some would insist that the long 
journey to resolution reflects poorly on republican governance. But the fact that the 
legislature was able to reach broad consensus independent of any significant outside 
pressure shows that this system could still function. Whether this will remain true for the 
daunting water supply challenges awaiting the Phoenix-area is debatable.     
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CHAPTER 5: APPREHENSION 
The legislative package that curbed interbasin water transportation (SB 1055) and 
provided a framework for a Phoenix-area replenishment district (HB 2499) seemed to 
resolve the water farm issue and its underlying causes. While the Groundwater 
Transportation Act confined future water transportation to five basins, the replenishment 
district would facilitate a more organized approach to managing urban water resources. 
Developers, however, wielded enough influence that the resulting district became a weak 
entity which subsidized, rather than managed, growth. Subsequent legislation has enabled 
the district to more proactively affect the pace of growth, but it, along with the creation of 
a water bank to fully utilize the Central Arizona Project (CAP), has increased the 
Phoenix-area’s reliance on the “renewable” Colorado River. The river’s declining flows 
will bring future difficulties. For those living outside of the Phoenix-area, the resolution 
was a truce borne from their concerted labors which practically exhausted the legislative 
process. Yet the disparities in continued growth have only increased, making this hard-
fought resolution more tenuous with each passing year.   
NEW INSTITUTIONS   
HB 2499 only laid the foundation for the Phoenix Groundwater Replenishment 
District (PGRD).  The cities, towns, and private water companies supplying a majority of 
the Phoenix Active Management Area’s (AMA) population had to adopt resolutions 
supporting its creation for it to be established. Phoenix, which contained almost 49 
percent of the AMA’s population, now opposed the district’s creation on the grounds that 
it would subsidize growth on the periphery of the valley. Joining it were West Valley 
municipalities had consistently opposed the district when it was nascent legislation; a 
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1991 study which projected that district pumping fees could increase water bills by 50 
percent (or $6.84 per 12,000 gallons a month consumed) buttressed their fears. Many 
East Valley cities and developers had misgivings that the district’s mandatory 
membership would burden current residents and businesses.1 For the next two years, a 
group of West Valley legislators supported by the Del Webb Corporation and the 
Western Maricopa Coalition tried to repeal the district; others sought to split it up into 
two separate districts for East and West Valley cities.2 
As the PGRD remained unrealized, developers fretted over new assured water 
supply (AWS) draft rules that the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) 
released in October 1992. In order to remain compliant with the Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA), new subdivided land could no longer simply rely on 
groundwater to demonstrate that it had access to a legal and continuously available AWS 
that could last a century. The ADWR instead planned to completely phase-out 
groundwater dependence within fifteen years in favor of surface supplies largely from the 
underutilized CAP.3 Though two University of Arizona economists, Bill Martin and 
                                                   
1 One notable outlier in this study by Willdan Associates was the exclusion of Glendale, which was largely 
weaned from groundwater. Lori Baker, “West Valley could bear brunt of water district’s tax; residents in 
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Robert Young, had foreseen it twenty-five years earlier, water policymakers were 
realizing that agricultural users could not afford project water.4 Irrigation districts had 
already taken on $150 million in debts to cover the construction costs for infrastructure to 
divert project water. Once the Department of Interior declared the CAP “substantially 
complete,” these districts would need to repay these debts, cover the cost of their 
diversions, and help cover the $2.6 billion in project construction costs as their sector was 
becoming less profitable. Project water diversions in 1991 revealed this financial 
hardship: within a year, irrigation district use had plummeted from 745,000 AF to 
421,000 AF. By the following year, ADWR Director Betsy Rieke warned that several 
districts were facing imminent bankruptcy. The larger fear for state water policy makers 
was that this unused allocation would be an open invitation for California and Nevada to 
divert more water from the Colorado River.5  
The initial solutions for remedying CAP underutilization were sporadic. 
Agricultural interests pushed for a state subsidy to lessen the cost of project water, which 
drew protests from municipal representatives who insisted that they should not have to 
                                                   
4 Martin and Young’s original article generated so much controversy that the Dean of the College of 
Agriculture tried to have the findings rebutted in the state’s newspapers. A later report from agricultural 
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bear the entire burden of paying for the project. The ADWR briefly entertained leasing 
Arizona’s unused allocation to California while the CAWCD paid the federal government 
$28.8 million to acquire the CAP rights of the insolvent Harquahala Valley Irrigation 
District in November 1992. The valuable suggestion, which came from a task force 
Governor Symington formed in the summer of 1992, was to create a replenishment 
district to inject unused project water underground.6     
This idea resonated with developers and groundwater-dependent West Valley 
cities. Since many lacked CAP subcontracts and were operating outside the boundaries of 
municipal water providers and the Salt River Project (SRP), they had no immediate 
access to surface waters that would guarantee an AWS. They instead would face the 
costly task of purchasing and treating water from elsewhere—now made all the more 
difficult by the Groundwater Transportation Act. The increased burden of the AWS 
standards and unwillingness of more established cities to create the PGRD had already 
sparked rumors of a developer-led campaign to repeal the GMA. But the addition of 
ongoing CAP underutilization created the momentum for a new institution to replace the 
exiled PGRD. A coalition of developers and groundwater-reliant cities, led by Robson 
Communities CFO Karl Polen along with Jim Johnson, one of the lawyers who had 
represented mines in the GMA negotiations, proposed a new replenishment district that 
would offset the hydrologic burden of new development. Their district’s voluntary 
membership gained the backing of PGRD opponents, its use of project water appealed to 
policy makers insecure about losing part of Arizona’s Colorado River allocation, and by 
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undercutting the AWS rules, it allowed for continued development. After little legislative 
debate, Governor Symington signed the Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment 
District (CAGRD) into law on April 22, 1993.7  
 Unlike the PGRD, this district operated within the boundaries of CAWCD, 
making its services available to users within Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima Counties. It 
allowed municipal water providers or individual subdivisions that were members to pump 
groundwater in exchange for paying a variable assessment fee to the district. The revenue 
generated would cover the district’s obligation to use surface waters (primarily excess 
CAP) to replenish the amount of groundwater a member withdrew in excess of their 
AMA’s management plan. The district did not have to recharge the same aquifer from 
which members had withdrawn groundwater; it only had to pump it into the same AMA 
within three years.8 The district, in other words, guaranteed its members paper rights for 
an AWS without ensuring that the actual water supply was available. While the 
CAGRD’s relationship to the CAWCD implied that it would have access to the project 
water necessary for its replenishment obligations, it was never required to demonstrate 
that it had enough water for an AWS. This flaw has been especially problematic as its 
replenishment obligation, which was predicted to be 50,000 AF in 1994, surpassed 
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100,000 AF by 2004 and is now edging closer to 250,000 AF—an amount that exceeds 
the surplus CAP water on which the CAGRD depends.9    
At the behest of the district, the legislature has taken some corrective actions. It 
lengthened the district’s planning horizon from 20 to 100 years and required it to increase 
replenishment reserves to meet immediate demands of the Phoenix, Tucson, and Pinal 
AMAs. The legislature has also put in place mechanisms to keep the district fiscally 
solvent. One measure in 2005 required water service providers entering the district to 
cover the delinquent expenses of their predecessors before they could qualify for 
replenishment. A follow-up bill effectively doubled CAWCD’s bonding capacity to $500 
million and, for the first time, gave the district the power to approve subdivisions for 
membership and required that it be a party to the agreement between a subdivision and 
the municipal provider that will supply it.10 Prior to this legislation, the district’s board 
had no say over which entities could become members. These bills together provide some 
optimism that the CAGRD can curb its replenishment obligations to a more maintainable 
level.  
 All the while, the potential expansion of the CAGRD and the diminishing 
availability of CAP water will force CAWCD board members into an uncomfortable 
position. Though responsible for overseeing CAP, they also serve on the CAGRD board. 
This conflicting obligation between established users and newer developments may force 
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a crisis in Arizona’s future.11  While Arizona Water Banking Authority (AWBA), which 
was created in April 1996 to permanently resolve CAP underutilization and store excess 
Colorado River water to cushion droughts, can provide excess water to cushion this 
crisis, its ability to do so is limited.12 Arizona’s structural debt, which has been fed by 
zealous tax cuts that the legislature began to pursue in 1990s, has diminished the state’s 
general funds to the extent that the AWBA’s revenues, according to one former 
chairman, have been a “favorite target” for state legislators looking to fund other 
programs since 2003.13 Their actions, the CAWCD’s retention of revenues generated 
from an ad valorem property tax, and the longtime position of the AWBA as the last user 
to access surplus CAP water have undermined the bank’s ability to store excess CAP 
water for in-state uses.14  
Increased CAP usage has further constricted the bank’s capacity. Its planners had 
envisioned the AWBA storing up to 400,000 AF a year for a total of 14 million AF by 
                                                   
11 Bill Coates, “New subdivisions being developed in Arizona’s desert and beyond the reach of water 
system,” Arizona Capitol Times, April 28, 2006, 1.  
12 The AWBA also stores portions of California’s and Nevada’s Colorado River allocation through direct 
and indirect recharge. Gerry Lynn Wildeman, “The Arizona Water Banking Authority: A descriptive 
analysis from conception to legislation” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 2005), 68-70, 71, 82-84, 85, 
88, 89, 91-92, 95, 97, 98, 100-102; Arizona Water Banking Authority, HB 2494, 42nd Legislature, 2nd 
Regular Session (CH 308, 1996); Arizona Water Banking Authority, 1997 Annual Plan of Operation, 
accessed May 5, 2013, http://www.azwaterbank.gov/Plans_and_Reports_Documents/documents/1997 
PlanofOperation.PDF, 18. 
13 In response to the legislature’s $18 million transfer for the Arizona Water Banking Fund in 2009, $13.9 
million of which came from Nevada’s subaccount, the CAWCD sued on the basis that the transfer was 
unconstitutional. Superior Court Judge Kreamer ruled on June 10, 2011 that the legislature actions were 
illegal but did not force the legislature to return the funds because CAWCD did not file its original claim in 
a timely manner. Arizona Water Banking Authority, 2009 Annual Plan of Operation, accessed May 5, 
2013, http://www.azwaterbank.gov/documents/2009FinalPlanofOperation.pdf, 6.   
14 The CAWCD granted AWBA equal standing with CAGRD in purchasing excess CAP water in July 
2009. Arizona Water Banking Authority, 2010 Annual Plan of Operation, http://www.azwaterbank.gov 
/documents/Final2010PlanofOperation.pdf, 6.    
145 
 
2030, when Arizona would finally utilize full its Colorado River allocation.15 But future 
plans have usually fallen short of available water for most of the bank’s operation. 
Arizona reached its full allocation in 2002.16 Diminishing river flows coupled with 
CAP’s low priority will place the excess water that the CAGRD relies upon in jeopardy. 
Though the AWBA currently has enough credits for 3.7 million AF, over 600,000 AF of 
that supply is earmarked for Nevada.17 While the remaining amount is well over a one-
year allocation from the Colorado River, its long-term viability is doubtful.  When Lake 
Mead’s water levels drop below 1025 feet, the AWBA will face completing obligations 
to withdraw water for California and Nevada and instate users too. These limiting factors 
collectively undermine the ability of the AWBA to bailout CAGRD and put Arizona’s 
metropolitan areas at further risk of future water shortages.18    
MONUMENTS 
The Groundwater Transportation Act grandfathered in the water farms of 
Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix. The creation of the CAGRD, the successful conclusion of 
two additional tribal gaming compacts that enabled long-term water leases to 
municipalities, and loosening of AWS standards set the conditions for more stable 
growth, and in the process, vitiated the doomsday predictions that had pushed these three 
                                                   
15 Arizona Water Banking Authority, 1997 Annual Plan of Operation, accessed May 5, 2013, http://www. 
azwaterbank.gov/Plans_and_Reports_Documents/documents/1997PlanofOperation.PDF, 21. 
16Arizona Water Banking Authority, 2002 Annual Plan of Operation, accessed May 5, 2013, http://www. 
azwaterbank.gov/documents/2002/Final2002PlanofOperation.pdf, 3.  
17 Arizona Water Banking Authority, 2011 Annual Plan of Operation, accessed May 5, 2013, 
http://www.azwaterbank.gov/documents/Final2011PlanofOperation.pdf, 4.  
18 Project ADD (Acquisition, Development and Deliver) Water, a consortium of stakeholders statewide that 
began meeting in 2008, is in the process of identifying future water supplies for the CAGRD. Should they 
succeed in doing so, they may be able to help the CAGRD meet its replenishment obligations. “Strategy for 
Implementation of ADD Water: Revised June 11, 2010,” accessed October 2, 2013, http://projectaddwater. 
com/PublicParticipation.aspx.    
146 
 
cities to acquire rural farmland.19 Projected population growth, according to one Phoenix 
report, was no longer an accurate basis for determining future water consumption. Higher 
water rates, smaller lots which consumed less water for landscaping by hosting larger 
houses, increased efficiencies through better plumbing equipment, and growing popular 
acceptance of water conservation measures contributed to lower water demands.20 Mesa 
concluded in February 2004 that the desalination necessary to treat the saline and nitrate-
heavy groundwater underlying their water farms was too costly; reclaimed water, 
efficient well capacity, tribal waters leases, redeeming storage credits accrued from 
recharging groundwater, and ongoing conservation efforts would be sufficient to make-
up the difference.21 While all three cities continued to hold onto their properties, the costs 
of maintaining them had surpassed their now questionable value.     
During the final years of legislative negotiations on water farms, Scottsdale had 
lobbied Arizona Senator John McCain to get the Department of the Interior to buy Planet 
Ranch and incorporate it into the Bill Williams Unit of the Havasu National Wildlife 
Refuge. In return, Scottsdale would receive CAP water from the San Carlos Apache tribe 
as part of its water rights settlement in 1991. Though city leaders received the support of 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, La Paz and Mojave County officials, and various 
                                                   
19 Arizona Water Settlements Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-451, 118 Stat. 3478, 108th Congress, December 
10, 2004. 
20 City of Phoenix Water Services Department, 2011 Water Resource Plan, accessed July 2, 2013, http:// 
phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/@inter/@dept/@wsd/documents/web_content/wsd2011wrp.pdf, 29-
30, 37, 38, 39. 
21 City of Mesa, 2004 Water Resource Master Plan, February 2004, 3-19.  
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environmental groups, the deal never came through.22 As the years wore on, the taxes and 
maintenance costs for Planet Ranch—even after the city abandoned alfalfa farming—
exceeded $220,000 per year. After several abortive efforts at selling the ranch in the late 
1990s, Phoenix-based Phelps-Dodge Corporation (PDC) offered to purchase the property 
for $24.6 million in 2006.23 PDC intended to convert Planet Ranch into a wildlife habitat 
under the Lower Colorado Multi-Species Conservation Program. The 2005 joint 
agreement between several federal agencies, private entities, and tribes allowed 
companies to avoid environmental fines by creating new habitats elsewhere. Faced with 
the burdens of environmental damage claims in Morenci and the Tohono O’odham 
Reservation, letting nature reclaim Planet Ranch seemed like an easy way out. The 
Scottsdale City Council unanimously approved the deal in July 2006, only to have 
negotiations between PDC and state and federal agencies over conservation easements 
drag out for five years. The terms of sale shifted when Freeport-McMoRan Copper & 
Gold Inc. (FMM) acquired PDC to become the largest publically traded copper company 
in the world that year. Beyond paying Scottsdale $10.15 million for the ranch, FMM also 
provided 50,000 AF of SRP water credits that enabled Scottsdale to have a completely 
“renewable” water supply. FMM has leased parts of Planet Ranch to the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation for Colorado River conservation program, but water from the Bill Williams 
                                                   
22 San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1991, Joint Hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Affairs United States Senate and the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House of 
Representatives, 102nd Congress, 1st Session, March 21, 1991, 101-104. 
23 A 1997 deal with P&L Investments to purchase the property for $25 million fell through after a $ 
500,000 down payment. PDC paid $12 million and provided 500 AF of SRP water rights valued at $12.6 
million. 
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will be transported to its copper and molybdenum-mine 50 miles away in Bagdad, 
Arizona.24      
After holding on to its Pinal properties for almost twenty years, budget shortfalls 
and a report from the city’s water resource manager arguing that the water farms were no 
longer needed pushed the Mesa City Council to consider selling them in 2004. They were 
significant assets: neighboring lands were selling for $5,000-12,000 an acre, leading a 
city finance committee to suggest that Mesa could reap $300 million in land sales. The 
city council began marketing these farmlands in March 2006 with the goal of netting $10 
million a year in sales. When they had only sold a single 120-acre parcel a year later, the 
city council—which had only recently paid off the bond debt from their original 
purchases—hired the real-estate brokerage firm Nathan & Associates to manage sales. 
Though the city’s new mayor scrapped the $10 million a year sales goal, Nathan & 
Associates continued marketing the lands. Two energy companies—TransCanada and 
Juwi Solar Inc.—have purchased land totaling 335 acres for $12.2 million that will host a 
natural gas and solar photovoltaic power plant. Mesa’s remaining properties are currently 
in escrow awaiting the conclusion of several sales agreements. It remains to be seen what 
changes these new owners will bring to Mesa’s former water farms. Besides these two 
parcels that are currently supporting industrial facilities, the nearby city of Coolidge has 
proposed to annex almost 6,000 acres to accommodate projected “hypergrowth” in the 
                                                   
24 Resource Management Office, Restoration Group, Bureau of Reclamation, “Potential Habitat 
Restoration: Preliminary Site Analysis and Conceptual Design,” February 2005, 5, 13-15, Planet Ranch 
Files, City of Scottsdale; Lesley Wright, “Phelps Dodge, Scottsdale OK Deal on Ranch,” Arizona Republic, 
July 12, 2006, Valley &  State, B4; Memorandum to the Honorable Mayor and City Council re: Sale of 
Planet Ranch, from Marshall Brown, CC: Executive Team, Cliff Frey, December 14, 2011, Planet Ranch 
Files, City of Scottsdale;  Peter Corbett, “Mining company agrees to acquire Planet Ranch,” Arizona 
Republic, December 24, 2011, 8.  
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coming decades.25 These parcels sales and Coolidge’s proposed annexation plans, if 
anything, have vindicated the urban-industrial land use patterns that Mesa’s planners had 
envisioned for these properties over twenty-five years ago. 
Phoenix integrated its McMullen Valley properties into its water management 
plan after the passage of the Groundwater Transportation Act. Even as Scottsdale and 
Mesa were marketing their water farms in 2008, Phoenix officials still counted on 
McMullen Valley’s groundwater as a lifeline against future severe droughts.26 But the 
fiscal hurdles inherent in building the infrastructure necessary to transport this 
groundwater were too great. Within a year of advertising its 12,900 acres of farmlands in 
2012, Phoenix found a buyer in Arizona Farming LLC, a subsidiary of the International 
Farming Corporation. The $30 million Arizona Farming paid will go towards paying off 
the remaining bond debts on these lands and stabilizing future rate adjustments for water 
service customers.27 Phoenix, in other words, sold their McMullen Valley lands for 
practically the same numerical amount of money that they had paid for them twenty-six 
years earlier.     
Thus after months of negotiating their purchases and years spent fighting in the 
legislature to protect their right to reap these considerable investments, none of these 
cities have or will ever transport a drop of water from their water farms. It would be easy 
                                                   
25 Adam Klawonn, “Mesa considering sale of it Pinal water farm,” Arizona Republic, July 9, 2004, B5; 
Justin Juozapavicius, “Mesa considers selling Pinal County farmland,” Arizona Republic, December 15, 
2005, Local & State, 8; Gary Nelson, “Mesa hires help to sell Pinal land,” Arizona Republic, March 17, 
2007, 10; Gary Nelson, “Mesa sells Pinal parcel for $2.2 million,” Arizona Republic, May 6, 2011,  9; Gary 
Nelson, “Coolidge looks to annex Mesa-owned Pinal land,” Arizona Republic, October 13, 2010, 9.  
26 Michael Clancy, “Lower usage urged to protect city water supply,” Arizona Republic, July 2, 2008, 
Northeast Phoenix Republic, 3. 
27 Ken Kroski, “Phoenix Sells McMullen Property for $30M; Funds to Offset Future Rate Increase,” last 
modified July 10, 2012, accessed on April 3, 2013, http://phoenix.gov/news/071012mcmullen.html. 
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to brand them as unnecessary with the benefit of hindsight, but the circumstances at play 
when Scottsdale, Mesa, and Phoenix chose to sink their money in these water farms 
speaks to the nature of urban water planning in the 1980s. Though Phoenix-area cities 
had engaged in large-scale expansion in the 1960s and 1970s, the implementation of the 
GMA’s GPCD reductions and safe-yield requirements—which restricted traditional 
dependence on groundwater in favor of limited surface water supplies—marked the first 
time Phoenix-area cities had to focus their water planning efforts on assertive demand 
management.28 The significant growth their plans projected in undeveloped areas, which 
lacked access to these crucial surface waters, in the immediate future could not be 
remedied with demand reductions. In this atmosphere, city planners confronted a future 
that was uncertain and rapidly approaching. The security of owning these rights seemed 
to mitigate the prohibitively expensive costs of transporting this water, not to mention the 
legal obstacles in conveying it through the CAP. These farms, in other words, were the 
consequence of intense urgency and uncertainty brought on by assumptions of growing 
populations and complementary, inelastic demand. They were the most rational choice 
under those assumptions and with the information immediately available to planners 
focused on ensuring the continued viability of their communities. 
FUTURE FARMS  
The creation of CAGRD, which has temporarily subsidized Phoenix-area water 
demand, and the declines in available water supplies have only heightened tensions 
                                                   
28 Phoenix Water Resource Plan, 1985: a plan developed by the Phoenix Water and Wastewater 
Department to meet long-range water resource requirements (Phoenix: City of Phoenix, Water and 
Wastewater Department, 1985), 2; City of Scottsdale Water Resource Department, 1985 Water Resource 
Plan, 1.  
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between rural and urban areas of the state. Even as per capita water deliveries for cities 
and water service providers have declined throughout the state, total water demand has 
continued to grow since 1990 from population growth. These growing municipal 
demands reflect a larger change within the Colorado River basin. Though they constitute 
only 15 percent of current river water deliveries, urban populations have grown from 10 
million in 1990 to nearly 35 million by 2008; they are now the fastest-growing sector of 
water deliveries throughout the entire basin.29  
One growing trend to curb metropolitan water demand is the adoption of 
reclaimed effluent. Considering that roughly 70 percent of household water consumption 
derives from outdoor water use, where potable water is not required, the potential for 
water savings certainly exists. In certain areas of the state such as Tucson, homes with 
systems that recycle gray water—waste water from sinks, showers, baths, and other 
basins free of human waste and chemicals—for outdoor use have become increasingly 
popular. But these systems, while innovative, pose several problems. Gray water used 
outdoors cannot be recovered for further reuse; it simply evapo-transpirates, meaning that 
any water savings is limited to one-time use. Large-scale acceptance of these systems 
would also undermine the existing contracts that many cities have in place for reclaimed 
water, including recharge projects that generate storage credits which are a cornerstone 
for their water portfolios. Nor is there a solid consensus on whether recycled gray water 
is safe; while the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality sanctioned use of these 
systems in 2001, concerns within Maricopa County government remain. Whether 
                                                   
29 Michael J. Cohen, “Municipal Deliveries of Colorado River Basin Water” The Pacific Institute, June 27, 
2011, accessed September 3, 2013, http://www.pacinst.org/reports/co_river_municipal_deliveries/crb_ 
water_6_27_2011.pdf, 1, 13-16. 
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declines in per-capita consumption and growing effluent reuse throughout the state can 
continue to mitigate a growing population’s demand for CAP deliveries remains to be 
seen.    
The situation regarding groundwater, which continues to act as an easy supply 
source for the most populous areas of the state, is shakier. As of this writing, the Fourth 
Management Plan for the Phoenix AMA will have entered into effect. The ADWR has 
emphasized that each AWS will need to meet an “unchanging” GPCD target and that it 
intends to phase-out the alternative non-per capita conservation program. While the 
ADWR has noted that non-residential GPCD rates were lower than expected for the 
Third Management Period, the agency is pushing for lower residential GPCD rates. The 
new minimum GPCD requirements for water providers in the Fourth Management Plan 
are largely beyond one standard deviation from the median values the previous 
management plan’s requirements. In practical terms, this statistical difference 
underscores the great difference between existing patterns of consumption and what will 
be necessary to move demand management forward in the coming decade.30  
Future projections offer little cause for optimism. The three scenarios that the 
Phoenix AMA Groundwater Users Advisory Committee entertained in evaluating the 
Four Management Plan projected an overdraft between 154,629 and 497,522 AF by 
2025, the year that the GMA mandated that AMAs should meet “safe yield.”31 The final 
                                                   
30 Arizona Department of Water Resources, “Preliminary Draft of 4MP Total GPCD Program,” PowerPoint 
presentation at the Phoenix AMA Groundwater Users Advisory Council, Phoenix, Arizona, September 13, 
2012, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/WaterManagement/AMAs/documents 
/GUAC_4MP_GPCD_PROGRAM_PHXAMA.pdf. 
31 Arizona Department of Water Resources, “Assessment of the Assessment/ Fourth Management Plan 
Development: Phoenix AMA,” PowerPoint presentation at the Phoenix AMA Groundwater Users Advisory 
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report from a statewide water commission likewise predicted that the demand within the 
AMA will outstrip supplies by 427,000 AF by 2035. Climate change could exacerbate 
this scenario by curbing CAP deliveries, and in process, amplifying this gulf between 
demand and supply to 703,000 AF. In less than a century from now, this overstretched 
demand will mushroom to 1.79-2.12 million AF—an amount that closes in on Arizona’s 
annual diversions from the Colorado River.32    
In the face of this widening disparity between demand and available supplies, 
another round of water farm seems inevitable. The compromise the legislature passed in 
1991 merely restricted interbasin groundwater transportation from four basins in 1991. 
Some have already begun to take advantage of these parameters. Scottsdale struck up a 
water delivery agreement with two companies that operated seven golf courses in the 
surrounding area in May 2002. In exchange for 1,650 AF of water for their turf, 
Scottsdale asked these companies to acquire farmland in the Harquahala Valley which 
would provide a back-up water supply if CAP water became no longer available and 
contribute to an escrow account that would pay for future pipeline construction to the 
CAP.33 They originally purchased a 1,216-acre farm that year which was 13.5 miles from 
the CAP, only to later discover another comparable farm owned by the Vidler Water 
                                                                                                                                                       
Council, January 12, 2012, http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/WaterManagement/AMAs/documents/ 
PHXAMA_GUAC_AssessmentoftheAssessment_4MP.pdf; Arizona Department of Water Resources, 
“Phoenix Active Management Area Water Demand and Supply Assessment: 1985-2025,” last modified 
December 2011, accessed August 12, 2013, http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/WaterManagement/ 
Assessments/documents/PhxAMA_AssessmentSummarySheet.pdf. 
32Water Resources Development Commission, Final Report, Volume II: Committee Reports, October 1, 
2011, accessed June 5, 2013, http://www.azwater.gov/AzDWR/WaterManagement/WRDC_HB2661 
/documents/WRDCFinalReportVolumeIICommitteeReports.pdf, 368, 372.  
33 Scottsdale would also get a 1,260 AF cut to use for their own purposes. Resolution No. 9262, Scottsdale 
City Council, December 4, 2012; Purchase Agreement and Escrow Instructions, Scottsdale No. 2012-189-
COS, pgs. 1, 2. 
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Company located just two miles away from the project. The comparatively low pipeline 
construction cost from the Vidler farm—$4 million, compared with $30 million from 
their original property—justified paying $9.93 million for the water company’s land. 
Pipeline construction is delayed and  the wheeling agreement necessary for transporting 
water via CAP remains the Holy Grail for water policy makers—mythic and, for now, 
unrealized.34 
But there are signs that more water farms may be on the horizon. Pressure for 
additional water in rural areas brought on by increasingly severe drought has occasionally 
flared. With the blessing of several rural lawmakers, the Arizona House of 
Representatives considered a bill in 2003 that would have temporarily waived the 
groundwater transportation prohibitions during these dry times. Beyond requiring the 
consent of any town, city, county, or water district from which groundwater would be 
withdrawn, House Bill (HB) 2478 also declared that any area receiving this transported 
groundwater could not be within an AMA and had to implement emergency conservation 
measures. Though it passed with little dissent, none of the transportation provisions have 
been utilized.35 Speaker of the House Andy Tobin introduced a bill this past session that 
would have allowed local governments and private groups to create regional water 
augmentation districts that could acquire water rights and exercise some eminent domain 
power. The collective protest against it from the Arizona Farm Bureau, the Arizona 
Cattlemen’s Association, water conservation groups, Yuma-area farmers, and county 
                                                   
34 Ibid.  
35 Herb Guenther, whose early career as a lawmaker had been defined by the water transfer issue, served as 
was serving as the ADWR Director at the time this legislation was debated. As director, he now had the 
power to approve or strike down any proposed water transfer. Water report; DWR, HB 2478, 46th 
Legislature, 1st Regular Session (CH 248 E, 2003), §4 (A), §5 (A)(B)(C).  
155 
 
boards of supervisors forced Tobin to place it with an interim committee to smooth over 
differences.36 The fate of this idea remains unclear, but like HB 2478, it nonetheless 
portends a gradual shift towards revisiting the consensus embodied in the 1991 
Groundwater Transportation Act.      
ENDURING PERSONALITIES 
  As tensions increase throughout Arizona over the coming of future water farms, 
Gus Arzberger has remained on the land his father settled over a century ago outside of 
Willcox. Now approaching 94 years old, he likely will not participate in a resumption of 
the debate over interbasin water farms. But many of those involved in the 1980s water 
farm issue remain active. In between two stints as attorney general and two failed 
gubernatorial runs, former Phoenix Mayor Terry Goddard has and continues to serve on 
the CAWCD Board (1996-1998, 2012-2018). Jim Hartdegen, whose fourteen-year career 
in the state legislature was defined by negotiating the GMA, has represented Pinal 
County on the CAWCD Board (1996-2008, 2012-2014) and currently is a member the 
AWBA. John Mawhinney, the legislative architect of the Tucson replenishment district, 
serves alongside Hartdegen on the AWBA and on the Tucson Active Management Area’s 
Groundwater Users Advisory Council. Kathy Ferris, whose career began with drafting 
the GMA and succeeding her mentor, Wes Steiner, as ADWR Director, and continued 
with representing AgriCom Management Inc., has since become the Executive Director 
of the Arizona Municipal Water Users Association. And Herb Guenther, whose political 
                                                   
36 Regional water augmentation authorities, HB 2338, 51st Legislature, 1st Regular Session (2013); Hank 
Stephenson, “Hearing on Arizona House Speaker Andy Tobin’s comprehensive water plan delayed to 
address myriad concerns,” Arizona Capitol Times, February 18, 2013, accessed March 23, 2013 http:// 
search.proquest.com.ezproxy 1.lib.asu.edu/docview/1310808946. 
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career was defined by the water farm fight, went on to serve as ADWR Director (2002-
2009) and now works as a private consultant. 
 Though these enduring personalities continue to guide state water policy, many of 
their interviews with me ended in trepidation. There is reoccurring observation from this 
generation—the one that came of age in drafting the GMA, worked to resolve the water 
farm issue, and has overseen the implementation of the CAGRD and AWBA—that the 
same aging actors continue to be the driving forces in water policy. By 2035, when 
current estimates predict that CAP deliveries will no longer be sufficient to meet 
projected demand, and Arizona will have an overall unmet demand of 1 million AF per 
year, nearly all of these experts will have passed on. The lack of new blood entering state 
water policy at a time when climate change—which will whittle away at surface waters 
like the Colorado River and Verde River, and therefore, necessitate strict demand 
management measures—will eclipse the complexity of past issues is jarring, especially 
for rural areas that are facing a future of water farms and the gradual decline in the 
political clout of their lawmakers with every legislative redistricting. The uncertainly 
over future metropolitan-area water supplies and their tenuous relationship with rural 
areas has been an ongoing concern for Gus and Marsha Arzberger, and it is one that has 
stayed with me since I left their home in Willcox three years ago and headed towards 
Phoenix, contemplating my future.  
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ACRE-FEET (AF) 
ACTIVE MANAGEMENT AREA (AMA) 
AMERICAN CONTINENTAL CORPORATION (ACC) 
ASSURED WATER SUPPLY (AWS) 
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES (ADWR) 
ARIZONA MUNICIPAL WATER USERS ASSOCIATION (AMWUA) 
ARIZONA RANCH AND METALS COMPANY (ARMCO) 
ARIZONA RURAL WATER ASSOCIATION (ARWA) 
ARIZONA WATER BANKING AUTHORITY (AWBA) 
ARIZONA WATER COMMISSION (AWC) 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (BOR) 
CITIZENS FOR WATER FAIRNESS (CWF) 
CENTRAL ARIZONA GROUNDWATER REPLENISHMENT DISTRICT (CAGRD) 
CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT (CAP) 
CENTRAL ARIZONA WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT (CAWCD) 
COLORADO RIVER BASIN PROJECCT ACT (CRBPA) 
COLORADO RIVER COMPACT (CRC) 
COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES (CRIT) 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY ACT (EQA) 
FARMERS INVESTMENT COMPANY (FICO) 
FISCAL YEAR (FY) 
FREEPORT-MCMORAN COPPER & GOLD INC. (FMM) 
GALLONS PER CAPITA PER DAY (GPCD) 
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GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT ACT (GMA) 
HOUSE BILL (HB)  
JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON GROUNDWATER RECHARGE AND 
TRANSFER (JICGRT) 
JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON GROUNDWATER / SURFACE WATER 
EXPORTATION (JLCGSWE) 
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT (LD) 
MCMULLEN VALLEY WATER CONSERVATION AND DRAINAGE AND 
DISTRICT (MVWCCD) 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT (MWD) 
PHELPS-DODGE CORPORATION (PDC) 
PHOENIX GROUNDWATER REPLENISHMENT DISTRICT (PGRD) 
SALT RIVER VALLEY WATER USERS ASSOCIATIONS (SRVWUA) 
SALT RIVER PROJECT (SRP) 
SENATE BILL (SB) 
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FIGURE 1: MUNICIPAL POPULATION GROWTH, 1930-1990
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Sources: U.S Bureau of the Census. Census of Population, 1930-1990. Washington, D.C: U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1971-1991. 
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FIGURE 3: PINAL COUNTY SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, 1971-1991
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